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 * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License

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 * accompanied this code).

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package java.lang;

import java.security.*;

import java.util.Enumeration;

import java.util.Hashtable;

import java.util.StringTokenizer;

/**

 * This class is for runtime permissions. A RuntimePermission

 * contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but

 * no actions list; you either have the named permission

 * or you don't.

 *

 * <P>

 * The target name is the name of the runtime permission (see below). The

 * naming convention follows the  hierarchical property naming convention.

 * Also, an asterisk

 * may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to

 * signify a wildcard match. For example: "loadLibrary.*" and "*" signify a

 * wildcard match, while "*loadLibrary" and "a*b" do not.

 * <P>

 * The following table lists all the possible RuntimePermission target names,

 * and for each provides a description of what the permission allows

 * and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.

 *

 * <table border=1 cellpadding=5 summary="permission target name,

 *  what the target allows,and associated risks">

 * <tr>

 * <th>Permission Target Name</th>

 * <th>What the Permission Allows</th>

 * <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>createClassLoader</td>

 *   <td>Creation of a class loader</td>

 *   <td>This is an extremely dangerous permission to grant.

 * Malicious applications that can instantiate their own class

 * loaders could then load their own rogue classes into the system.

 * These newly loaded classes could be placed into any protection

 * domain by the class loader, thereby automatically granting the

 * classes the permissions for that domain.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>getClassLoader</td>

 *   <td>Retrieval of a class loader (e.g., the class loader for the calling

 * class)</td>

 *   <td>This would grant an attacker permission to get the

 * class loader for a particular class. This is dangerous because

 * having access to a class's class loader allows the attacker to

 * load other classes available to that class loader. The attacker

 * would typically otherwise not have access to those classes.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>setContextClassLoader</td>

 *   <td>Setting of the context class loader used by a thread</td>

 *   <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions

 * when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system

 * class loader. Granting setContextClassLoader permission would allow

 * code to change which context class loader is used

 * for a particular thread, including system threads.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>enableContextClassLoaderOverride</td>

 *   <td>Subclass implementation of the thread context class loader methods</td>

 *   <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions

 * when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system

 * class loader. Granting enableContextClassLoaderOverride permission would allow

 * a subclass of Thread to override the methods that are used

 * to get or set the context class loader for a particular thread.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>closeClassLoader</td>

 *   <td>Closing of a ClassLoader</td>

 *   <td>Granting this permission allows code to close any URLClassLoader

 * that it has a reference to.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>setSecurityManager</td>

 *   <td>Setting of the security manager (possibly replacing an existing one)

 * </td>

 *   <td>The security manager is a class that allows

 * applications to implement a security policy. Granting the setSecurityManager

 * permission would allow code to change which security manager is used by

 * installing a different, possibly less restrictive security manager,

 * thereby bypassing checks that would have been enforced by the original

 * security manager.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>createSecurityManager</td>

 *   <td>Creation of a new security manager</td>

 *   <td>This gives code access to protected, sensitive methods that may

 * disclose information about other classes or the execution stack.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>getenv.{variable name}</td>

 *   <td>Reading of the value of the specified environment variable</td>

 *   <td>This would allow code to read the value, or determine the

 *       existence, of a particular environment variable.  This is

 *       dangerous if the variable contains confidential data.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>exitVM.{exit status}</td>

 *   <td>Halting of the Java Virtual Machine with the specified exit status</td>

 *   <td>This allows an attacker to mount a denial-of-service attack

 * by automatically forcing the virtual machine to halt.

 * Note: The "exitVM.*" permission is automatically granted to all code

 * loaded from the application class path, thus enabling applications

 * to terminate themselves. Also, the "exitVM" permission is equivalent to

 * "exitVM.*".</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>shutdownHooks</td>

 *   <td>Registration and cancellation of virtual-machine shutdown hooks</td>

 *   <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious shutdown

 * hook that interferes with the clean shutdown of the virtual machine.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>setFactory</td>

 *   <td>Setting of the socket factory used by ServerSocket or Socket,

 * or of the stream handler factory used by URL</td>

 *   <td>This allows code to set the actual implementation

 * for the socket, server socket, stream handler, or RMI socket factory.

 * An attacker may set a faulty implementation which mangles the data

 * stream.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>setIO</td>

 *   <td>Setting of System.out, System.in, and System.err</td>

 *   <td>This allows changing the value of the standard system streams.

 * An attacker may change System.in to monitor and

 * steal user input, or may set System.err to a "null" OutputStream,

 * which would hide any error messages sent to System.err. </td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>modifyThread</td>

 *   <td>Modification of threads, e.g., via calls to Thread

 * <tt>interrupt</tt>, <tt>stop</tt>, <tt>suspend</tt>,

 * <tt>resume</tt>, <tt>setDaemon</tt>, <tt>setPriority</tt>,

 * <tt>setName</tt> and <tt>setUncaughtExceptionHandler</tt>

 * methods</td>

 * <td>This allows an attacker to modify the behaviour of

 * any thread in the system.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>stopThread</td>

 *   <td>Stopping of threads via calls to the Thread <code>stop</code>

 * method</td>

 *   <td>This allows code to stop any thread in the system provided that it is

 * already granted permission to access that thread.

 * This poses as a threat, because that code may corrupt the system by

 * killing existing threads.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>modifyThreadGroup</td>

 *   <td>modification of thread groups, e.g., via calls to ThreadGroup

 * <code>destroy</code>, <code>getParent</code>, <code>resume</code>,

 * <code>setDaemon</code>, <code>setMaxPriority</code>, <code>stop</code>,

 * and <code>suspend</code> methods</td>

 *   <td>This allows an attacker to create thread groups and

 * set their run priority.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>getProtectionDomain</td>

 *   <td>Retrieval of the ProtectionDomain for a class</td>

 *   <td>This allows code to obtain policy information

 * for a particular code source. While obtaining policy information

 * does not compromise the security of the system, it does give

 * attackers additional information, such as local file names for

 * example, to better aim an attack.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>getFileSystemAttributes</td>

 *   <td>Retrieval of file system attributes</td>

 *   <td>This allows code to obtain file system information such as disk usage

 *       or disk space available to the caller.  This is potentially dangerous

 *       because it discloses information about the system hardware

 *       configuration and some information about the caller's privilege to

 *       write files.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>readFileDescriptor</td>

 *   <td>Reading of file descriptors</td>

 *   <td>This would allow code to read the particular file associated

 *       with the file descriptor read. This is dangerous if the file

 *       contains confidential data.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>writeFileDescriptor</td>

 *   <td>Writing to file descriptors</td>

 *   <td>This allows code to write to a particular file associated

 *       with the descriptor. This is dangerous because it may allow

 *       malicious code to plant viruses or at the very least, fill up

 *       your entire disk.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>loadLibrary.{library name}</td>

 *   <td>Dynamic linking of the specified library</td>

 *   <td>It is dangerous to allow an applet permission to load native code

 * libraries, because the Java security architecture is not designed to and

 * does not prevent malicious behavior at the level of native code.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>accessClassInPackage.{package name}</td>

 *   <td>Access to the specified package via a class loader's

 * <code>loadClass</code> method when that class loader calls

 * the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageAccess</code> method</td>

 *   <td>This gives code access to classes in packages

 * to which it normally does not have access. Malicious code

 * may use these classes to help in its attempt to compromise

 * security in the system.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>defineClassInPackage.{package name}</td>

 *   <td>Definition of classes in the specified package, via a class

 * loader's <code>defineClass</code> method when that class loader calls

 * the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageDefinition</code> method.</td>

 *   <td>This grants code permission to define a class

 * in a particular package. This is dangerous because malicious

 * code with this permission may define rogue classes in

 * trusted packages like <code>java.security</code> or <code>java.lang</code>,

 * for example.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>accessDeclaredMembers</td>

 *   <td>Access to the declared members of a class</td>

 *   <td>This grants code permission to query a class for its public,

 * protected, default (package) access, and private fields and/or

 * methods. Although the code would have

 * access to the private and protected field and method names, it would not

 * have access to the private/protected field data and would not be able

 * to invoke any private methods. Nevertheless, malicious code

 * may use this information to better aim an attack.

 * Additionally, it may invoke any public methods and/or access public fields

 * in the class.  This could be dangerous if

 * the code would normally not be able to invoke those methods and/or

 * access the fields  because

 * it can't cast the object to the class/interface with those methods

 * and fields.

</td>

 * </tr>

 * <tr>

 *   <td>queuePrintJob</td>

 *   <td>Initiation of a print job request</td>

 *   <td>This could print sensitive information to a printer,

 * or simply waste paper.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>getStackTrace</td>

 *   <td>Retrieval of the stack trace information of another thread.</td>

 *   <td>This allows retrieval of the stack trace information of

 * another thread.  This might allow malicious code to monitor the

 * execution of threads and discover vulnerabilities in applications.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>setDefaultUncaughtExceptionHandler</td>

 *   <td>Setting the default handler to be used when a thread

 *   terminates abruptly due to an uncaught exception</td>

 *   <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious

 *   uncaught exception handler that could interfere with termination

 *   of a thread</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>preferences</td>

 *   <td>Represents the permission required to get access to the

 *   java.util.prefs.Preferences implementations user or system root

 *   which in turn allows retrieval or update operations within the

 *   Preferences persistent backing store.) </td>

 *   <td>This permission allows the user to read from or write to the

 *   preferences backing store if the user running the code has

 *   sufficient OS privileges to read/write to that backing store.

 *   The actual backing store may reside within a traditional filesystem

 *   directory or within a registry depending on the platform OS</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>usePolicy</td>

 *   <td>Granting this permission disables the Java Plug-In's default

 *   security prompting behavior.</td>

 *   <td>For more information, refer to Java Plug-In's guides, <a href=

 *   "../../../technotes/guides/plugin/developer_guide/security.html">

 *   Applet Security Basics</a> and <a href=

 *   "../../../technotes/guides/plugin/developer_guide/rsa_how.html#use">

 *   usePolicy Permission</a>.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>localeServiceProvider</td>

 *   <td>This {@code RuntimePermission} is required to be granted to

 *   classes which subclass and implement

 *   {@code java.util.spi.LocaleServiceProvider}. The permission is

 *   checked during invocation of the abstract base class constructor.

 *   This permission ensures trust in classes which implement this

 *   security-sensitive provider mechanism. </td>

 *   <td>See <a href= "../util/spi/LocaleServiceProvider.html">

 *   {@code java.util.spi.LocaleServiceProvider}</a> for more

 *   information.</td>

 * </tr>

 * </table>

 *

 * @see java.security.BasicPermission

 * @see java.security.Permission

 * @see java.security.Permissions

 * @see java.security.PermissionCollection

 * @see java.lang.SecurityManager

 *

 *

 * @author Marianne Mueller

 * @author Roland Schemers

 */

public final class RuntimePermission extends BasicPermission {

    private static final long serialVersionUID = 7399184964622342223L;

    /**

     * Creates a new RuntimePermission with the specified name.

     * The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, such as

     * "exit", "setFactory", etc. An asterisk

     * may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to

     * signify a wildcard match.

     *

     * @param name the name of the RuntimePermission.

     *

     * @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>.

     * @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty.

     */

    public RuntimePermission(String name)

    {

        super(name);

    }

    /**

     * Creates a new RuntimePermission object with the specified name.

     * The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, and the

     * actions String is currently unused and should be null.

     *

     * @param name the name of the RuntimePermission.

     * @param actions should be null.

     *

     * @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>.

     * @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty.

     */

    public RuntimePermission(String name, String actions)

    {

        super(name, actions);

    }

}