author | xuelei |
Fri, 01 Mar 2013 02:34:34 -0800 | |
changeset 16045 | 9d08c3b9a6a0 |
parent 14664 | e71aa0962e70 |
child 16067 | 36055e4b5305 |
permissions | -rw-r--r-- |
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/* |
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* Copyright (c) 2003, 2012, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. |
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* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER. |
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* |
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* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it |
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* under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as |
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* published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this |
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* particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided |
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* by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code. |
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* |
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* This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT |
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* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or |
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* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License |
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* version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that |
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* accompanied this code). |
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* |
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version |
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* 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, |
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* Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. |
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* |
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* Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA |
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* or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any |
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* questions. |
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*/ |
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package sun.security.ssl; |
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import java.io.*; |
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import java.nio.*; |
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import javax.net.ssl.*; |
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import javax.crypto.BadPaddingException; |
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import sun.misc.HexDumpEncoder; |
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/** |
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* Wrapper class around InputRecord. |
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* |
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* Application data is kept external to the InputRecord, |
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* but handshake data (alert/change_cipher_spec/handshake) will |
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* be kept internally in the ByteArrayInputStream. |
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* |
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* @author Brad Wetmore |
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*/ |
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final class EngineInputRecord extends InputRecord { |
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private SSLEngineImpl engine; |
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/* |
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* A dummy ByteBuffer we'll pass back even when the data |
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* is stored internally. It'll never actually be used. |
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*/ |
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static private ByteBuffer tmpBB = ByteBuffer.allocate(0); |
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/* |
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* Flag to tell whether the last read/parsed data resides |
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* internal in the ByteArrayInputStream, or in the external |
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* buffers. |
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*/ |
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private boolean internalData; |
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EngineInputRecord(SSLEngineImpl engine) { |
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super(); |
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this.engine = engine; |
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} |
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||
14664
e71aa0962e70
8003950: Adds missing Override annotations and removes unnecessary imports in sun.security.ssl
xuelei
parents:
5506
diff
changeset
|
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@Override |
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byte contentType() { |
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if (internalData) { |
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return super.contentType(); |
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} else { |
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return ct_application_data; |
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} |
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} |
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/* |
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* Check if there is enough inbound data in the ByteBuffer |
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* to make a inbound packet. Look for both SSLv2 and SSLv3. |
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* |
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* @return -1 if there are not enough bytes to tell (small header), |
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*/ |
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int bytesInCompletePacket(ByteBuffer buf) throws SSLException { |
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/* |
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* SSLv2 length field is in bytes 0/1 |
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* SSLv3/TLS length field is in bytes 3/4 |
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*/ |
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if (buf.remaining() < 5) { |
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return -1; |
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} |
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int pos = buf.position(); |
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byte byteZero = buf.get(pos); |
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int len = 0; |
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/* |
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* If we have already verified previous packets, we can |
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* ignore the verifications steps, and jump right to the |
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* determination. Otherwise, try one last hueristic to |
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* see if it's SSL/TLS. |
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*/ |
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if (formatVerified || |
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(byteZero == ct_handshake) || |
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(byteZero == ct_alert)) { |
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/* |
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* Last sanity check that it's not a wild record |
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*/ |
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ProtocolVersion recordVersion = |
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ProtocolVersion.valueOf(buf.get(pos + 1), buf.get(pos + 2)); |
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// Check if too old (currently not possible) |
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// or if the major version does not match. |
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// The actual version negotiation is in the handshaker classes |
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if ((recordVersion.v < ProtocolVersion.MIN.v) |
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|| (recordVersion.major > ProtocolVersion.MAX.major)) { |
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throw new SSLException( |
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"Unsupported record version " + recordVersion); |
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} |
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/* |
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* Reasonably sure this is a V3, disable further checks. |
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* We can't do the same in the v2 check below, because |
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* read still needs to parse/handle the v2 clientHello. |
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*/ |
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formatVerified = true; |
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/* |
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* One of the SSLv3/TLS message types. |
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*/ |
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len = ((buf.get(pos + 3) & 0xff) << 8) + |
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(buf.get(pos + 4) & 0xff) + headerSize; |
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} else { |
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/* |
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* Must be SSLv2 or something unknown. |
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* Check if it's short (2 bytes) or |
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* long (3) header. |
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* |
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* Internals can warn about unsupported SSLv2 |
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*/ |
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boolean isShort = ((byteZero & 0x80) != 0); |
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if (isShort && |
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((buf.get(pos + 2) == 1) || buf.get(pos + 2) == 4)) { |
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ProtocolVersion recordVersion = |
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ProtocolVersion.valueOf(buf.get(pos + 3), buf.get(pos + 4)); |
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// Check if too old (currently not possible) |
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// or if the major version does not match. |
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// The actual version negotiation is in the handshaker classes |
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if ((recordVersion.v < ProtocolVersion.MIN.v) |
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|| (recordVersion.major > ProtocolVersion.MAX.major)) { |
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// if it's not SSLv2, we're out of here. |
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if (recordVersion.v != ProtocolVersion.SSL20Hello.v) { |
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throw new SSLException( |
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"Unsupported record version " + recordVersion); |
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} |
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} |
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/* |
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* Client or Server Hello |
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*/ |
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int mask = (isShort ? 0x7f : 0x3f); |
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len = ((byteZero & mask) << 8) + (buf.get(pos + 1) & 0xff) + |
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(isShort ? 2 : 3); |
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} else { |
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// Gobblygook! |
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throw new SSLException( |
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"Unrecognized SSL message, plaintext connection?"); |
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} |
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} |
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return len; |
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} |
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/* |
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* Pass the data down if it's internally cached, otherwise |
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* do it here. |
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* |
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* If internal data, data is decrypted internally. |
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* |
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* If external data(app), return a new ByteBuffer with data to |
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* process. |
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*/ |
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ByteBuffer decrypt(Authenticator authenticator, |
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CipherBox box, ByteBuffer bb) throws BadPaddingException { |
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if (internalData) { |
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decrypt(authenticator, box); // MAC is checked during decryption |
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return tmpBB; |
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} |
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BadPaddingException bpe = null; |
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if (!box.isNullCipher()) { |
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try { |
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// apply explicit nonce for AEAD/CBC cipher suites if needed |
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int nonceSize = |
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box.applyExplicitNonce(authenticator, contentType(), bb); |
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// decrypt the content |
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if (box.isAEADMode()) { |
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// DON'T encrypt the nonce_explicit for AEAD mode |
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bb.position(bb.position() + nonceSize); |
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} // The explicit IV for CBC mode can be decrypted. |
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box.decrypt(bb); |
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bb.position(nonceSize); // We don't actually remove the nonce. |
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} catch (BadPaddingException e) { |
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// RFC 2246 states that decryption_failed should be used |
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// for this purpose. However, that allows certain attacks, |
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// so we just send bad record MAC. We also need to make |
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// sure to always check the MAC to avoid a timing attack |
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// for the same issue. See paper by Vaudenay et al and the |
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// update in RFC 4346/5246. |
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// |
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// Failover to message authentication code checking. |
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bpe = new BadPaddingException("invalid padding"); |
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} |
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} |
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// Requires message authentication code for null, stream and block |
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// cipher suites. |
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if (authenticator instanceof MAC) { |
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MAC signer = (MAC)authenticator; |
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int macLen = signer.MAClen(); |
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if (macLen != 0) { |
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if (bb.remaining() < macLen) { |
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// negative data length, something is wrong |
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throw new BadPaddingException("bad record"); |
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} |
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int position = bb.position(); |
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int limit = bb.limit(); |
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int macOffset = limit - macLen; |
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bb.limit(macOffset); |
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byte[] hash = signer.compute(contentType(), bb); |
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if (hash == null || macLen != hash.length) { |
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// something is wrong with MAC implementation |
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throw new RuntimeException("Internal MAC error"); |
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} |
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bb.position(macOffset); |
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bb.limit(limit); |
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try { |
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for (byte b : hash) { // No BB.equals(byte []); ! |
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if (bb.get() != b) { |
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throw new BadPaddingException("bad record MAC"); |
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} |
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} |
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} finally { |
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// reset to the data |
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bb.position(position); |
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bb.limit(macOffset); |
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} |
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} |
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} |
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// Is it a failover? |
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if (bpe != null) { |
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throw bpe; |
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} |
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return bb.slice(); |
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} |
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/* |
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* Override the actual write below. We do things this way to be |
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* consistent with InputRecord. InputRecord may try to write out |
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* data to the peer, and *then* throw an Exception. This forces |
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* data to be generated/output before the exception is ever |
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* generated. |
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*/ |
|
14664
e71aa0962e70
8003950: Adds missing Override annotations and removes unnecessary imports in sun.security.ssl
xuelei
parents:
5506
diff
changeset
|
279 |
@Override |
2 | 280 |
void writeBuffer(OutputStream s, byte [] buf, int off, int len) |
281 |
throws IOException { |
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/* |
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* Copy data out of buffer, it's ready to go. |
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*/ |
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ByteBuffer netBB = (ByteBuffer) |
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(ByteBuffer.allocate(len).put(buf, 0, len).flip()); |
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engine.writer.putOutboundDataSync(netBB); |
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} |
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/* |
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* Delineate or read a complete packet from src. |
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* |
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* If internal data (hs, alert, ccs), the data is read and |
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* stored internally. |
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* |
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* If external data (app), return a new ByteBuffer which points |
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* to the data to process. |
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*/ |
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ByteBuffer read(ByteBuffer srcBB) throws IOException { |
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/* |
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* Could have a src == null/dst == null check here, |
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* but that was already checked by SSLEngine.unwrap before |
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* ever attempting to read. |
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*/ |
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||
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/* |
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* If we have anything besides application data, |
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* or if we haven't even done the initial v2 verification, |
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* we send this down to be processed by the underlying |
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* internal cache. |
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*/ |
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if (!formatVerified || |
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(srcBB.get(srcBB.position()) != ct_application_data)) { |
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internalData = true; |
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read(new ByteBufferInputStream(srcBB), (OutputStream) null); |
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return tmpBB; |
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} |
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internalData = false; |
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int srcPos = srcBB.position(); |
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int srcLim = srcBB.limit(); |
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||
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ProtocolVersion recordVersion = ProtocolVersion.valueOf( |
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srcBB.get(srcPos + 1), srcBB.get(srcPos + 2)); |
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// Check if too old (currently not possible) |
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// or if the major version does not match. |
|
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// The actual version negotiation is in the handshaker classes |
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329 |
if ((recordVersion.v < ProtocolVersion.MIN.v) |
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|| (recordVersion.major > ProtocolVersion.MAX.major)) { |
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throw new SSLException( |
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"Unsupported record version " + recordVersion); |
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} |
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||
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/* |
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* It's really application data. How much to consume? |
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* Jump over the header. |
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*/ |
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int len = bytesInCompletePacket(srcBB); |
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assert(len > 0); |
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||
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if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("packet")) { |
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try { |
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HexDumpEncoder hd = new HexDumpEncoder(); |
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ByteBuffer bb = srcBB.duplicate(); // Use copy of BB |
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16045 | 346 |
bb.limit(srcPos + len); |
2 | 347 |
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System.out.println("[Raw read (bb)]: length = " + len); |
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hd.encodeBuffer(bb, System.out); |
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} catch (IOException e) { } |
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} |
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||
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// Demarcate past header to end of packet. |
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srcBB.position(srcPos + headerSize); |
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srcBB.limit(srcPos + len); |
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||
357 |
// Protect remainder of buffer, create slice to actually |
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// operate on. |
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ByteBuffer bb = srcBB.slice(); |
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360 |
||
361 |
srcBB.position(srcBB.limit()); |
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srcBB.limit(srcLim); |
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363 |
||
364 |
return bb; |
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365 |
} |
|
366 |
} |