author | martin |
Tue, 15 Sep 2015 21:56:04 -0700 | |
changeset 32649 | 2ee9017c7597 |
parent 30904 | ec0224270f90 |
child 34687 | d302ed125dc9 |
permissions | -rw-r--r-- |
2 | 1 |
/* |
29488 | 2 |
* Copyright (c) 1996, 2015, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. |
2 | 3 |
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER. |
4 |
* |
|
5 |
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it |
|
6 |
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as |
|
5506 | 7 |
* published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this |
2 | 8 |
* particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided |
5506 | 9 |
* by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code. |
2 | 10 |
* |
11 |
* This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT |
|
12 |
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or |
|
13 |
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License |
|
14 |
* version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that |
|
15 |
* accompanied this code). |
|
16 |
* |
|
17 |
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version |
|
18 |
* 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, |
|
19 |
* Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. |
|
20 |
* |
|
5506 | 21 |
* Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA |
22 |
* or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any |
|
23 |
* questions. |
|
2 | 24 |
*/ |
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27 |
package sun.security.ssl; |
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28 |
||
29 |
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream; |
|
30 |
import java.io.IOException; |
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7039 | 31 |
import java.util.Hashtable; |
16913 | 32 |
import java.util.Arrays; |
2 | 33 |
|
34 |
import java.security.*; |
|
35 |
import javax.crypto.*; |
|
36 |
import javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec; |
|
16913 | 37 |
import javax.crypto.spec.GCMParameterSpec; |
2 | 38 |
|
39 |
import java.nio.*; |
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40 |
||
41 |
import sun.security.ssl.CipherSuite.*; |
|
42 |
import static sun.security.ssl.CipherSuite.*; |
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16913 | 43 |
import static sun.security.ssl.CipherSuite.CipherType.*; |
2 | 44 |
|
45 |
import sun.misc.HexDumpEncoder; |
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46 |
||
47 |
||
48 |
/** |
|
49 |
* This class handles bulk data enciphering/deciphering for each SSLv3 |
|
50 |
* message. This provides data confidentiality. Stream ciphers (such |
|
51 |
* as RC4) don't need to do padding; block ciphers (e.g. DES) need it. |
|
52 |
* |
|
53 |
* Individual instances are obtained by calling the static method |
|
54 |
* newCipherBox(), which should only be invoked by BulkCipher.newCipher(). |
|
55 |
* |
|
7039 | 56 |
* In RFC 2246, with bock ciphers in CBC mode, the Initialization |
57 |
* Vector (IV) for the first record is generated with the other keys |
|
58 |
* and secrets when the security parameters are set. The IV for |
|
59 |
* subsequent records is the last ciphertext block from the previous |
|
60 |
* record. |
|
61 |
* |
|
62 |
* In RFC 4346, the implicit Initialization Vector (IV) is replaced |
|
63 |
* with an explicit IV to protect against CBC attacks. RFC 4346 |
|
64 |
* recommends two algorithms used to generated the per-record IV. |
|
65 |
* The implementation uses the algorithm (2)(b), as described at |
|
66 |
* section 6.2.3.2 of RFC 4346. |
|
67 |
* |
|
68 |
* The usage of IV in CBC block cipher can be illustrated in |
|
69 |
* the following diagrams. |
|
70 |
* |
|
71 |
* (random) |
|
72 |
* R P1 IV C1 |
|
73 |
* | | | | |
|
74 |
* SIV---+ |-----+ |-... |----- |------ |
|
75 |
* | | | | | | | | |
|
76 |
* +----+ | +----+ | +----+ | +----+ | |
|
77 |
* | Ek | | + Ek + | | Dk | | | Dk | | |
|
78 |
* +----+ | +----+ | +----+ | +----+ | |
|
79 |
* | | | | | | | | |
|
80 |
* |----| |----| SIV--+ |----| |-... |
|
81 |
* | | | | |
|
82 |
* IV C1 R P1 |
|
83 |
* (discard) |
|
84 |
* |
|
85 |
* CBC Encryption CBC Decryption |
|
86 |
* |
|
2 | 87 |
* NOTE that any ciphering involved in key exchange (e.g. with RSA) is |
88 |
* handled separately. |
|
89 |
* |
|
90 |
* @author David Brownell |
|
91 |
* @author Andreas Sterbenz |
|
92 |
*/ |
|
93 |
final class CipherBox { |
|
94 |
||
95 |
// A CipherBox that implements the identity operation |
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32649
2ee9017c7597
8136583: Core libraries should use blessed modifier order
martin
parents:
30904
diff
changeset
|
96 |
static final CipherBox NULL = new CipherBox(); |
2 | 97 |
|
98 |
/* Class and subclass dynamic debugging support */ |
|
99 |
private static final Debug debug = Debug.getInstance("ssl"); |
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100 |
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101 |
// the protocol version this cipher conforms to |
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102 |
private final ProtocolVersion protocolVersion; |
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103 |
||
104 |
// cipher object |
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105 |
private final Cipher cipher; |
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106 |
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107 |
/** |
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7039 | 108 |
* secure random |
109 |
*/ |
|
110 |
private SecureRandom random; |
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111 |
||
112 |
/** |
|
16913 | 113 |
* fixed IV, the implicit nonce of AEAD cipher suite, only apply to |
114 |
* AEAD cipher suites |
|
115 |
*/ |
|
116 |
private final byte[] fixedIv; |
|
117 |
||
118 |
/** |
|
119 |
* the key, reserved only for AEAD cipher initialization |
|
120 |
*/ |
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121 |
private final Key key; |
|
122 |
||
123 |
/** |
|
124 |
* the operation mode, reserved for AEAD cipher initialization |
|
10915 | 125 |
*/ |
16913 | 126 |
private final int mode; |
127 |
||
128 |
/** |
|
129 |
* the authentication tag size, only apply to AEAD cipher suites |
|
130 |
*/ |
|
131 |
private final int tagSize; |
|
132 |
||
133 |
/** |
|
134 |
* the record IV length, only apply to AEAD cipher suites |
|
135 |
*/ |
|
136 |
private final int recordIvSize; |
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137 |
||
138 |
/** |
|
139 |
* cipher type |
|
140 |
*/ |
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141 |
private final CipherType cipherType; |
|
10915 | 142 |
|
143 |
/** |
|
7039 | 144 |
* Fixed masks of various block size, as the initial decryption IVs |
145 |
* for TLS 1.1 or later. |
|
146 |
* |
|
147 |
* For performance, we do not use random IVs. As the initial decryption |
|
148 |
* IVs will be discarded by TLS decryption processes, so the fixed masks |
|
149 |
* do not hurt cryptographic strength. |
|
150 |
*/ |
|
151 |
private static Hashtable<Integer, IvParameterSpec> masks; |
|
152 |
||
153 |
/** |
|
2 | 154 |
* NULL cipherbox. Identity operation, no encryption. |
155 |
*/ |
|
156 |
private CipherBox() { |
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30904 | 157 |
this.protocolVersion = ProtocolVersion.DEFAULT_TLS; |
2 | 158 |
this.cipher = null; |
30904 | 159 |
this.cipherType = NULL_CIPHER; |
16913 | 160 |
this.fixedIv = new byte[0]; |
161 |
this.key = null; |
|
162 |
this.mode = Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE; // choose at random |
|
163 |
this.random = null; |
|
164 |
this.tagSize = 0; |
|
165 |
this.recordIvSize = 0; |
|
2 | 166 |
} |
167 |
||
168 |
/** |
|
169 |
* Construct a new CipherBox using the cipher transformation. |
|
170 |
* |
|
171 |
* @exception NoSuchAlgorithmException if no appropriate JCE Cipher |
|
172 |
* implementation could be found. |
|
173 |
*/ |
|
174 |
private CipherBox(ProtocolVersion protocolVersion, BulkCipher bulkCipher, |
|
7039 | 175 |
SecretKey key, IvParameterSpec iv, SecureRandom random, |
176 |
boolean encrypt) throws NoSuchAlgorithmException { |
|
2 | 177 |
try { |
178 |
this.protocolVersion = protocolVersion; |
|
179 |
this.cipher = JsseJce.getCipher(bulkCipher.transformation); |
|
16913 | 180 |
this.mode = encrypt ? Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE : Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE; |
7039 | 181 |
|
182 |
if (random == null) { |
|
183 |
random = JsseJce.getSecureRandom(); |
|
184 |
} |
|
185 |
this.random = random; |
|
16913 | 186 |
this.cipherType = bulkCipher.cipherType; |
7039 | 187 |
|
188 |
/* |
|
189 |
* RFC 4346 recommends two algorithms used to generated the |
|
190 |
* per-record IV. The implementation uses the algorithm (2)(b), |
|
191 |
* as described at section 6.2.3.2 of RFC 4346. |
|
192 |
* |
|
193 |
* As we don't care about the initial IV value for TLS 1.1 or |
|
194 |
* later, so if the "iv" parameter is null, we use the default |
|
195 |
* value generated by Cipher.init() for encryption, and a fixed |
|
196 |
* mask for decryption. |
|
197 |
*/ |
|
198 |
if (iv == null && bulkCipher.ivSize != 0 && |
|
199 |
mode == Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE && |
|
30904 | 200 |
protocolVersion.useTLS11PlusSpec()) { |
7039 | 201 |
iv = getFixedMask(bulkCipher.ivSize); |
202 |
} |
|
203 |
||
16913 | 204 |
if (cipherType == AEAD_CIPHER) { |
205 |
// AEAD must completely initialize the cipher for each packet, |
|
206 |
// and so we save initialization parameters for packet |
|
207 |
// processing time. |
|
208 |
||
209 |
// Set the tag size for AEAD cipher |
|
210 |
tagSize = bulkCipher.tagSize; |
|
211 |
||
212 |
// Reserve the key for AEAD cipher initialization |
|
213 |
this.key = key; |
|
214 |
||
215 |
fixedIv = iv.getIV(); |
|
216 |
if (fixedIv == null || |
|
217 |
fixedIv.length != bulkCipher.fixedIvSize) { |
|
218 |
throw new RuntimeException("Improper fixed IV for AEAD"); |
|
219 |
} |
|
7039 | 220 |
|
16913 | 221 |
// Set the record IV length for AEAD cipher |
222 |
recordIvSize = bulkCipher.ivSize - bulkCipher.fixedIvSize; |
|
223 |
||
224 |
// DON'T initialize the cipher for AEAD! |
|
225 |
} else { |
|
226 |
// CBC only requires one initialization during its lifetime |
|
227 |
// (future packets/IVs set the proper CBC state), so we can |
|
228 |
// initialize now. |
|
229 |
||
230 |
// Zeroize the variables that only apply to AEAD cipher |
|
231 |
this.tagSize = 0; |
|
232 |
this.fixedIv = new byte[0]; |
|
233 |
this.recordIvSize = 0; |
|
234 |
this.key = null; |
|
235 |
||
236 |
// Initialize the cipher |
|
237 |
cipher.init(mode, key, iv, random); |
|
2 | 238 |
} |
239 |
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) { |
|
240 |
throw e; |
|
241 |
} catch (Exception e) { |
|
242 |
throw new NoSuchAlgorithmException |
|
243 |
("Could not create cipher " + bulkCipher, e); |
|
244 |
} catch (ExceptionInInitializerError e) { |
|
245 |
throw new NoSuchAlgorithmException |
|
246 |
("Could not create cipher " + bulkCipher, e); |
|
247 |
} |
|
248 |
} |
|
249 |
||
250 |
/* |
|
251 |
* Factory method to obtain a new CipherBox object. |
|
252 |
*/ |
|
253 |
static CipherBox newCipherBox(ProtocolVersion version, BulkCipher cipher, |
|
7039 | 254 |
SecretKey key, IvParameterSpec iv, SecureRandom random, |
255 |
boolean encrypt) throws NoSuchAlgorithmException { |
|
2 | 256 |
if (cipher.allowed == false) { |
257 |
throw new NoSuchAlgorithmException("Unsupported cipher " + cipher); |
|
258 |
} |
|
7039 | 259 |
|
29488 | 260 |
if (cipher == BulkCipher.B_NULL) { |
2 | 261 |
return NULL; |
262 |
} else { |
|
7039 | 263 |
return new CipherBox(version, cipher, key, iv, random, encrypt); |
2 | 264 |
} |
265 |
} |
|
266 |
||
267 |
/* |
|
7039 | 268 |
* Get a fixed mask, as the initial decryption IVs for TLS 1.1 or later. |
269 |
*/ |
|
270 |
private static IvParameterSpec getFixedMask(int ivSize) { |
|
271 |
if (masks == null) { |
|
272 |
masks = new Hashtable<Integer, IvParameterSpec>(5); |
|
273 |
} |
|
274 |
||
275 |
IvParameterSpec iv = masks.get(ivSize); |
|
276 |
if (iv == null) { |
|
277 |
iv = new IvParameterSpec(new byte[ivSize]); |
|
278 |
masks.put(ivSize, iv); |
|
279 |
} |
|
280 |
||
281 |
return iv; |
|
282 |
} |
|
283 |
||
284 |
/* |
|
2 | 285 |
* Encrypts a block of data, returning the size of the |
286 |
* resulting block. |
|
287 |
*/ |
|
288 |
int encrypt(byte[] buf, int offset, int len) { |
|
289 |
if (cipher == null) { |
|
290 |
return len; |
|
291 |
} |
|
7039 | 292 |
|
2 | 293 |
try { |
16913 | 294 |
int blockSize = cipher.getBlockSize(); |
295 |
if (cipherType == BLOCK_CIPHER) { |
|
2 | 296 |
len = addPadding(buf, offset, len, blockSize); |
297 |
} |
|
16913 | 298 |
|
2 | 299 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("plaintext")) { |
300 |
try { |
|
301 |
HexDumpEncoder hd = new HexDumpEncoder(); |
|
302 |
||
303 |
System.out.println( |
|
304 |
"Padded plaintext before ENCRYPTION: len = " |
|
305 |
+ len); |
|
306 |
hd.encodeBuffer( |
|
307 |
new ByteArrayInputStream(buf, offset, len), |
|
308 |
System.out); |
|
309 |
} catch (IOException e) { } |
|
310 |
} |
|
16913 | 311 |
|
312 |
||
313 |
if (cipherType == AEAD_CIPHER) { |
|
314 |
try { |
|
315 |
return cipher.doFinal(buf, offset, len, buf, offset); |
|
316 |
} catch (IllegalBlockSizeException | BadPaddingException ibe) { |
|
317 |
// unlikely to happen |
|
318 |
throw new RuntimeException( |
|
319 |
"Cipher error in AEAD mode in JCE provider " + |
|
320 |
cipher.getProvider().getName(), ibe); |
|
321 |
} |
|
322 |
} else { |
|
323 |
int newLen = cipher.update(buf, offset, len, buf, offset); |
|
324 |
if (newLen != len) { |
|
325 |
// catch BouncyCastle buffering error |
|
326 |
throw new RuntimeException("Cipher buffering error " + |
|
327 |
"in JCE provider " + cipher.getProvider().getName()); |
|
328 |
} |
|
329 |
return newLen; |
|
2 | 330 |
} |
331 |
} catch (ShortBufferException e) { |
|
16913 | 332 |
// unlikely to happen, we should have enough buffer space here |
2 | 333 |
throw new ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException(e.toString()); |
334 |
} |
|
335 |
} |
|
336 |
||
337 |
/* |
|
338 |
* Encrypts a ByteBuffer block of data, returning the size of the |
|
339 |
* resulting block. |
|
340 |
* |
|
341 |
* The byte buffers position and limit initially define the amount |
|
342 |
* to encrypt. On return, the position and limit are |
|
343 |
* set to last position padded/encrypted. The limit may have changed |
|
344 |
* because of the added padding bytes. |
|
345 |
*/ |
|
16913 | 346 |
int encrypt(ByteBuffer bb, int outLimit) { |
2 | 347 |
|
348 |
int len = bb.remaining(); |
|
349 |
||
350 |
if (cipher == null) { |
|
351 |
bb.position(bb.limit()); |
|
352 |
return len; |
|
353 |
} |
|
354 |
||
16913 | 355 |
int pos = bb.position(); |
2 | 356 |
|
16913 | 357 |
int blockSize = cipher.getBlockSize(); |
358 |
if (cipherType == BLOCK_CIPHER) { |
|
359 |
// addPadding adjusts pos/limit |
|
360 |
len = addPadding(bb, blockSize); |
|
361 |
bb.position(pos); |
|
362 |
} |
|
7039 | 363 |
|
16913 | 364 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("plaintext")) { |
365 |
try { |
|
366 |
HexDumpEncoder hd = new HexDumpEncoder(); |
|
367 |
||
368 |
System.out.println( |
|
369 |
"Padded plaintext before ENCRYPTION: len = " |
|
370 |
+ len); |
|
371 |
hd.encodeBuffer(bb.duplicate(), System.out); |
|
372 |
||
373 |
} catch (IOException e) { } |
|
374 |
} |
|
7039 | 375 |
|
16913 | 376 |
/* |
377 |
* Encrypt "in-place". This does not add its own padding. |
|
378 |
*/ |
|
379 |
ByteBuffer dup = bb.duplicate(); |
|
380 |
if (cipherType == AEAD_CIPHER) { |
|
381 |
try { |
|
382 |
int outputSize = cipher.getOutputSize(dup.remaining()); |
|
383 |
if (outputSize > bb.remaining()) { |
|
384 |
// need to expand the limit of the output buffer for |
|
385 |
// the authentication tag. |
|
386 |
// |
|
387 |
// DON'T worry about the buffer's capacity, we have |
|
388 |
// reserved space for the authentication tag. |
|
389 |
if (outLimit < pos + outputSize) { |
|
390 |
// unlikely to happen |
|
391 |
throw new ShortBufferException( |
|
392 |
"need more space in output buffer"); |
|
393 |
} |
|
394 |
bb.limit(pos + outputSize); |
|
7039 | 395 |
} |
16913 | 396 |
int newLen = cipher.doFinal(dup, bb); |
397 |
if (newLen != outputSize) { |
|
398 |
throw new RuntimeException( |
|
399 |
"Cipher buffering error in JCE provider " + |
|
400 |
cipher.getProvider().getName()); |
|
401 |
} |
|
402 |
return newLen; |
|
403 |
} catch (IllegalBlockSizeException | |
|
404 |
BadPaddingException | ShortBufferException ibse) { |
|
405 |
// unlikely to happen |
|
406 |
throw new RuntimeException( |
|
407 |
"Cipher error in AEAD mode in JCE provider " + |
|
408 |
cipher.getProvider().getName(), ibse); |
|
2 | 409 |
} |
16913 | 410 |
} else { |
411 |
int newLen; |
|
412 |
try { |
|
413 |
newLen = cipher.update(dup, bb); |
|
414 |
} catch (ShortBufferException sbe) { |
|
415 |
// unlikely to happen |
|
416 |
throw new RuntimeException("Cipher buffering error " + |
|
417 |
"in JCE provider " + cipher.getProvider().getName()); |
|
2 | 418 |
} |
419 |
||
420 |
if (bb.position() != dup.position()) { |
|
421 |
throw new RuntimeException("bytebuffer padding error"); |
|
422 |
} |
|
423 |
||
424 |
if (newLen != len) { |
|
425 |
// catch BouncyCastle buffering error |
|
426 |
throw new RuntimeException("Cipher buffering error " + |
|
427 |
"in JCE provider " + cipher.getProvider().getName()); |
|
428 |
} |
|
429 |
return newLen; |
|
430 |
} |
|
431 |
} |
|
432 |
||
433 |
||
434 |
/* |
|
435 |
* Decrypts a block of data, returning the size of the |
|
436 |
* resulting block if padding was required. |
|
7039 | 437 |
* |
438 |
* For SSLv3 and TLSv1.0, with block ciphers in CBC mode the |
|
439 |
* Initialization Vector (IV) for the first record is generated by |
|
440 |
* the handshake protocol, the IV for subsequent records is the |
|
441 |
* last ciphertext block from the previous record. |
|
442 |
* |
|
443 |
* From TLSv1.1, the implicit IV is replaced with an explicit IV to |
|
444 |
* protect against CBC attacks. |
|
445 |
* |
|
446 |
* Differentiating between bad_record_mac and decryption_failed alerts |
|
447 |
* may permit certain attacks against CBC mode. It is preferable to |
|
448 |
* uniformly use the bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of |
|
449 |
* the error. |
|
2 | 450 |
*/ |
16113 | 451 |
int decrypt(byte[] buf, int offset, int len, |
452 |
int tagLen) throws BadPaddingException { |
|
2 | 453 |
if (cipher == null) { |
454 |
return len; |
|
455 |
} |
|
7039 | 456 |
|
2 | 457 |
try { |
16913 | 458 |
int newLen; |
459 |
if (cipherType == AEAD_CIPHER) { |
|
460 |
try { |
|
461 |
newLen = cipher.doFinal(buf, offset, len, buf, offset); |
|
462 |
} catch (IllegalBlockSizeException ibse) { |
|
463 |
// unlikely to happen |
|
464 |
throw new RuntimeException( |
|
465 |
"Cipher error in AEAD mode in JCE provider " + |
|
466 |
cipher.getProvider().getName(), ibse); |
|
467 |
} |
|
468 |
} else { |
|
469 |
newLen = cipher.update(buf, offset, len, buf, offset); |
|
470 |
if (newLen != len) { |
|
471 |
// catch BouncyCastle buffering error |
|
472 |
throw new RuntimeException("Cipher buffering error " + |
|
473 |
"in JCE provider " + cipher.getProvider().getName()); |
|
474 |
} |
|
2 | 475 |
} |
476 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("plaintext")) { |
|
477 |
try { |
|
478 |
HexDumpEncoder hd = new HexDumpEncoder(); |
|
479 |
||
480 |
System.out.println( |
|
481 |
"Padded plaintext after DECRYPTION: len = " |
|
482 |
+ newLen); |
|
483 |
hd.encodeBuffer( |
|
484 |
new ByteArrayInputStream(buf, offset, newLen), |
|
485 |
System.out); |
|
486 |
} catch (IOException e) { } |
|
487 |
} |
|
16113 | 488 |
|
16913 | 489 |
if (cipherType == BLOCK_CIPHER) { |
490 |
int blockSize = cipher.getBlockSize(); |
|
16113 | 491 |
newLen = removePadding( |
492 |
buf, offset, newLen, tagLen, blockSize, protocolVersion); |
|
7039 | 493 |
|
30904 | 494 |
if (protocolVersion.useTLS11PlusSpec()) { |
7039 | 495 |
if (newLen < blockSize) { |
496 |
throw new BadPaddingException("invalid explicit IV"); |
|
497 |
} |
|
498 |
} |
|
2 | 499 |
} |
500 |
return newLen; |
|
501 |
} catch (ShortBufferException e) { |
|
16913 | 502 |
// unlikely to happen, we should have enough buffer space here |
2 | 503 |
throw new ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException(e.toString()); |
504 |
} |
|
505 |
} |
|
506 |
||
507 |
||
508 |
/* |
|
509 |
* Decrypts a block of data, returning the size of the |
|
510 |
* resulting block if padding was required. position and limit |
|
511 |
* point to the end of the decrypted/depadded data. The initial |
|
512 |
* limit and new limit may be different, given we may |
|
513 |
* have stripped off some padding bytes. |
|
7039 | 514 |
* |
515 |
* @see decrypt(byte[], int, int) |
|
2 | 516 |
*/ |
16113 | 517 |
int decrypt(ByteBuffer bb, int tagLen) throws BadPaddingException { |
2 | 518 |
|
519 |
int len = bb.remaining(); |
|
520 |
||
521 |
if (cipher == null) { |
|
522 |
bb.position(bb.limit()); |
|
523 |
return len; |
|
524 |
} |
|
525 |
||
526 |
try { |
|
527 |
/* |
|
528 |
* Decrypt "in-place". |
|
529 |
*/ |
|
530 |
int pos = bb.position(); |
|
531 |
ByteBuffer dup = bb.duplicate(); |
|
16913 | 532 |
int newLen; |
533 |
if (cipherType == AEAD_CIPHER) { |
|
534 |
try { |
|
535 |
newLen = cipher.doFinal(dup, bb); |
|
536 |
} catch (IllegalBlockSizeException ibse) { |
|
537 |
// unlikely to happen |
|
538 |
throw new RuntimeException( |
|
539 |
"Cipher error in AEAD mode \"" + ibse.getMessage() + |
|
540 |
" \"in JCE provider " + cipher.getProvider().getName()); |
|
541 |
} |
|
542 |
} else { |
|
543 |
newLen = cipher.update(dup, bb); |
|
544 |
if (newLen != len) { |
|
545 |
// catch BouncyCastle buffering error |
|
546 |
throw new RuntimeException("Cipher buffering error " + |
|
547 |
"in JCE provider " + cipher.getProvider().getName()); |
|
548 |
} |
|
2 | 549 |
} |
550 |
||
16913 | 551 |
// reset the limit to the end of the decryted data |
552 |
bb.limit(pos + newLen); |
|
553 |
||
2 | 554 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("plaintext")) { |
555 |
try { |
|
556 |
HexDumpEncoder hd = new HexDumpEncoder(); |
|
557 |
||
558 |
System.out.println( |
|
559 |
"Padded plaintext after DECRYPTION: len = " |
|
560 |
+ newLen); |
|
561 |
||
16113 | 562 |
hd.encodeBuffer( |
27292
7ff4b24b33ce
4774077: Use covariant return types in the NIO buffer hierarchy
rwarburton
parents:
25859
diff
changeset
|
563 |
bb.duplicate().position(pos), System.out); |
2 | 564 |
} catch (IOException e) { } |
565 |
} |
|
566 |
||
567 |
/* |
|
568 |
* Remove the block padding. |
|
569 |
*/ |
|
16913 | 570 |
if (cipherType == BLOCK_CIPHER) { |
571 |
int blockSize = cipher.getBlockSize(); |
|
2 | 572 |
bb.position(pos); |
16913 | 573 |
newLen = removePadding(bb, tagLen, blockSize, protocolVersion); |
7039 | 574 |
|
16913 | 575 |
// check the explicit IV of TLS v1.1 or later |
30904 | 576 |
if (protocolVersion.useTLS11PlusSpec()) { |
7039 | 577 |
if (newLen < blockSize) { |
578 |
throw new BadPaddingException("invalid explicit IV"); |
|
579 |
} |
|
580 |
||
581 |
// reset the position to the end of the decrypted data |
|
16913 | 582 |
bb.position(bb.limit()); |
7039 | 583 |
} |
2 | 584 |
} |
585 |
return newLen; |
|
586 |
} catch (ShortBufferException e) { |
|
16913 | 587 |
// unlikely to happen, we should have enough buffer space here |
588 |
throw new ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException(e.toString()); |
|
2 | 589 |
} |
590 |
} |
|
591 |
||
592 |
private static int addPadding(byte[] buf, int offset, int len, |
|
593 |
int blockSize) { |
|
594 |
int newlen = len + 1; |
|
595 |
byte pad; |
|
596 |
int i; |
|
597 |
||
598 |
if ((newlen % blockSize) != 0) { |
|
599 |
newlen += blockSize - 1; |
|
600 |
newlen -= newlen % blockSize; |
|
601 |
} |
|
602 |
pad = (byte) (newlen - len); |
|
603 |
||
604 |
if (buf.length < (newlen + offset)) { |
|
605 |
throw new IllegalArgumentException("no space to pad buffer"); |
|
606 |
} |
|
607 |
||
608 |
/* |
|
609 |
* TLS version of the padding works for both SSLv3 and TLSv1 |
|
610 |
*/ |
|
611 |
for (i = 0, offset += len; i < pad; i++) { |
|
612 |
buf [offset++] = (byte) (pad - 1); |
|
613 |
} |
|
614 |
return newlen; |
|
615 |
} |
|
616 |
||
617 |
/* |
|
618 |
* Apply the padding to the buffer. |
|
619 |
* |
|
620 |
* Limit is advanced to the new buffer length. |
|
621 |
* Position is equal to limit. |
|
622 |
*/ |
|
623 |
private static int addPadding(ByteBuffer bb, int blockSize) { |
|
624 |
||
625 |
int len = bb.remaining(); |
|
626 |
int offset = bb.position(); |
|
627 |
||
628 |
int newlen = len + 1; |
|
629 |
byte pad; |
|
630 |
int i; |
|
631 |
||
632 |
if ((newlen % blockSize) != 0) { |
|
633 |
newlen += blockSize - 1; |
|
634 |
newlen -= newlen % blockSize; |
|
635 |
} |
|
636 |
pad = (byte) (newlen - len); |
|
637 |
||
638 |
/* |
|
639 |
* Update the limit to what will be padded. |
|
640 |
*/ |
|
641 |
bb.limit(newlen + offset); |
|
642 |
||
643 |
/* |
|
644 |
* TLS version of the padding works for both SSLv3 and TLSv1 |
|
645 |
*/ |
|
646 |
for (i = 0, offset += len; i < pad; i++) { |
|
647 |
bb.put(offset++, (byte) (pad - 1)); |
|
648 |
} |
|
649 |
||
650 |
bb.position(offset); |
|
651 |
bb.limit(offset); |
|
652 |
||
653 |
return newlen; |
|
654 |
} |
|
655 |
||
16113 | 656 |
/* |
657 |
* A constant-time check of the padding. |
|
658 |
* |
|
659 |
* NOTE that we are checking both the padding and the padLen bytes here. |
|
660 |
* |
|
661 |
* The caller MUST ensure that the len parameter is a positive number. |
|
662 |
*/ |
|
663 |
private static int[] checkPadding( |
|
664 |
byte[] buf, int offset, int len, byte pad) { |
|
665 |
||
666 |
if (len <= 0) { |
|
667 |
throw new RuntimeException("padding len must be positive"); |
|
668 |
} |
|
669 |
||
670 |
// An array of hits is used to prevent Hotspot optimization for |
|
671 |
// the purpose of a constant-time check. |
|
672 |
int[] results = {0, 0}; // {missed #, matched #} |
|
673 |
for (int i = 0; i <= 256;) { |
|
674 |
for (int j = 0; j < len && i <= 256; j++, i++) { // j <= i |
|
675 |
if (buf[offset + j] != pad) { |
|
676 |
results[0]++; // mismatched padding data |
|
677 |
} else { |
|
678 |
results[1]++; // matched padding data |
|
679 |
} |
|
680 |
} |
|
681 |
} |
|
682 |
||
683 |
return results; |
|
684 |
} |
|
685 |
||
686 |
/* |
|
687 |
* A constant-time check of the padding. |
|
688 |
* |
|
689 |
* NOTE that we are checking both the padding and the padLen bytes here. |
|
690 |
* |
|
691 |
* The caller MUST ensure that the bb parameter has remaining. |
|
692 |
*/ |
|
693 |
private static int[] checkPadding(ByteBuffer bb, byte pad) { |
|
694 |
||
695 |
if (!bb.hasRemaining()) { |
|
696 |
throw new RuntimeException("hasRemaining() must be positive"); |
|
697 |
} |
|
698 |
||
699 |
// An array of hits is used to prevent Hotspot optimization for |
|
700 |
// the purpose of a constant-time check. |
|
701 |
int[] results = {0, 0}; // {missed #, matched #} |
|
702 |
bb.mark(); |
|
703 |
for (int i = 0; i <= 256; bb.reset()) { |
|
704 |
for (; bb.hasRemaining() && i <= 256; i++) { |
|
705 |
if (bb.get() != pad) { |
|
706 |
results[0]++; // mismatched padding data |
|
707 |
} else { |
|
708 |
results[1]++; // matched padding data |
|
709 |
} |
|
710 |
} |
|
711 |
} |
|
712 |
||
713 |
return results; |
|
714 |
} |
|
2 | 715 |
|
716 |
/* |
|
717 |
* Typical TLS padding format for a 64 bit block cipher is as follows: |
|
718 |
* xx xx xx xx xx xx xx 00 |
|
719 |
* xx xx xx xx xx xx 01 01 |
|
720 |
* ... |
|
721 |
* xx 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 |
|
722 |
* 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 |
|
723 |
* TLS also allows any amount of padding from 1 and 256 bytes as long |
|
724 |
* as it makes the data a multiple of the block size |
|
725 |
*/ |
|
726 |
private static int removePadding(byte[] buf, int offset, int len, |
|
16113 | 727 |
int tagLen, int blockSize, |
728 |
ProtocolVersion protocolVersion) throws BadPaddingException { |
|
729 |
||
2 | 730 |
// last byte is length byte (i.e. actual padding length - 1) |
731 |
int padOffset = offset + len - 1; |
|
16113 | 732 |
int padLen = buf[padOffset] & 0xFF; |
2 | 733 |
|
16113 | 734 |
int newLen = len - (padLen + 1); |
735 |
if ((newLen - tagLen) < 0) { |
|
736 |
// If the buffer is not long enough to contain the padding plus |
|
737 |
// a MAC tag, do a dummy constant-time padding check. |
|
738 |
// |
|
739 |
// Note that it is a dummy check, so we won't care about what is |
|
740 |
// the actual padding data. |
|
741 |
checkPadding(buf, offset, len, (byte)(padLen & 0xFF)); |
|
742 |
||
743 |
throw new BadPaddingException("Invalid Padding length: " + padLen); |
|
2 | 744 |
} |
745 |
||
16113 | 746 |
// The padding data should be filled with the padding length value. |
747 |
int[] results = checkPadding(buf, offset + newLen, |
|
748 |
padLen + 1, (byte)(padLen & 0xFF)); |
|
30904 | 749 |
if (protocolVersion.useTLS10PlusSpec()) { |
16113 | 750 |
if (results[0] != 0) { // padding data has invalid bytes |
751 |
throw new BadPaddingException("Invalid TLS padding data"); |
|
2 | 752 |
} |
753 |
} else { // SSLv3 |
|
754 |
// SSLv3 requires 0 <= length byte < block size |
|
755 |
// some implementations do 1 <= length byte <= block size, |
|
756 |
// so accept that as well |
|
757 |
// v3 does not require any particular value for the other bytes |
|
16113 | 758 |
if (padLen > blockSize) { |
759 |
throw new BadPaddingException("Invalid SSLv3 padding"); |
|
2 | 760 |
} |
761 |
} |
|
16113 | 762 |
return newLen; |
2 | 763 |
} |
764 |
||
765 |
/* |
|
766 |
* Position/limit is equal the removed padding. |
|
767 |
*/ |
|
768 |
private static int removePadding(ByteBuffer bb, |
|
16113 | 769 |
int tagLen, int blockSize, |
770 |
ProtocolVersion protocolVersion) throws BadPaddingException { |
|
2 | 771 |
|
772 |
int len = bb.remaining(); |
|
773 |
int offset = bb.position(); |
|
774 |
||
775 |
// last byte is length byte (i.e. actual padding length - 1) |
|
776 |
int padOffset = offset + len - 1; |
|
16113 | 777 |
int padLen = bb.get(padOffset) & 0xFF; |
2 | 778 |
|
16113 | 779 |
int newLen = len - (padLen + 1); |
780 |
if ((newLen - tagLen) < 0) { |
|
781 |
// If the buffer is not long enough to contain the padding plus |
|
782 |
// a MAC tag, do a dummy constant-time padding check. |
|
783 |
// |
|
784 |
// Note that it is a dummy check, so we won't care about what is |
|
785 |
// the actual padding data. |
|
786 |
checkPadding(bb.duplicate(), (byte)(padLen & 0xFF)); |
|
787 |
||
788 |
throw new BadPaddingException("Invalid Padding length: " + padLen); |
|
2 | 789 |
} |
790 |
||
16113 | 791 |
// The padding data should be filled with the padding length value. |
792 |
int[] results = checkPadding( |
|
27292
7ff4b24b33ce
4774077: Use covariant return types in the NIO buffer hierarchy
rwarburton
parents:
25859
diff
changeset
|
793 |
bb.duplicate().position(offset + newLen), |
16113 | 794 |
(byte)(padLen & 0xFF)); |
30904 | 795 |
if (protocolVersion.useTLS10PlusSpec()) { |
16113 | 796 |
if (results[0] != 0) { // padding data has invalid bytes |
797 |
throw new BadPaddingException("Invalid TLS padding data"); |
|
2 | 798 |
} |
799 |
} else { // SSLv3 |
|
800 |
// SSLv3 requires 0 <= length byte < block size |
|
801 |
// some implementations do 1 <= length byte <= block size, |
|
802 |
// so accept that as well |
|
803 |
// v3 does not require any particular value for the other bytes |
|
16113 | 804 |
if (padLen > blockSize) { |
805 |
throw new BadPaddingException("Invalid SSLv3 padding"); |
|
2 | 806 |
} |
807 |
} |
|
808 |
||
809 |
/* |
|
810 |
* Reset buffer limit to remove padding. |
|
811 |
*/ |
|
16113 | 812 |
bb.position(offset + newLen); |
813 |
bb.limit(offset + newLen); |
|
2 | 814 |
|
16113 | 815 |
return newLen; |
2 | 816 |
} |
1763
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
817 |
|
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
818 |
/* |
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
819 |
* Dispose of any intermediate state in the underlying cipher. |
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
820 |
* For PKCS11 ciphers, this will release any attached sessions, and |
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
821 |
* thus make finalization faster. |
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
822 |
*/ |
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
823 |
void dispose() { |
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
824 |
try { |
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
825 |
if (cipher != null) { |
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
826 |
// ignore return value. |
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
827 |
cipher.doFinal(); |
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
828 |
} |
16913 | 829 |
} catch (Exception e) { |
830 |
// swallow all types of exceptions. |
|
1763
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
831 |
} |
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
832 |
} |
0a6b65d56746
6750401: SSL stress test with GF leads to 32 bit max process size in less than 5 minutes,with PCKS11 provider
wetmore
parents:
2
diff
changeset
|
833 |
|
10915 | 834 |
/* |
835 |
* Does the cipher use CBC mode? |
|
836 |
* |
|
837 |
* @return true if the cipher use CBC mode, false otherwise. |
|
838 |
*/ |
|
839 |
boolean isCBCMode() { |
|
16913 | 840 |
return cipherType == BLOCK_CIPHER; |
10915 | 841 |
} |
16113 | 842 |
|
16913 | 843 |
/* |
844 |
* Does the cipher use AEAD mode? |
|
845 |
* |
|
846 |
* @return true if the cipher use AEAD mode, false otherwise. |
|
847 |
*/ |
|
848 |
boolean isAEADMode() { |
|
849 |
return cipherType == AEAD_CIPHER; |
|
850 |
} |
|
851 |
||
852 |
/* |
|
16113 | 853 |
* Is the cipher null? |
854 |
* |
|
855 |
* @return true if the cipher is null, false otherwise. |
|
856 |
*/ |
|
857 |
boolean isNullCipher() { |
|
858 |
return cipher == null; |
|
859 |
} |
|
860 |
||
16913 | 861 |
/* |
862 |
* Gets the explicit nonce/IV size of the cipher. |
|
863 |
* |
|
864 |
* The returned value is the SecurityParameters.record_iv_length in |
|
865 |
* RFC 4346/5246. It is the size of explicit IV for CBC mode, and the |
|
866 |
* size of explicit nonce for AEAD mode. |
|
867 |
* |
|
868 |
* @return the explicit nonce size of the cipher. |
|
869 |
*/ |
|
870 |
int getExplicitNonceSize() { |
|
871 |
switch (cipherType) { |
|
872 |
case BLOCK_CIPHER: |
|
873 |
// For block ciphers, the explicit IV length is of length |
|
874 |
// SecurityParameters.record_iv_length, which is equal to |
|
875 |
// the SecurityParameters.block_size. |
|
30904 | 876 |
if (protocolVersion.useTLS11PlusSpec()) { |
16913 | 877 |
return cipher.getBlockSize(); |
878 |
} |
|
879 |
break; |
|
880 |
case AEAD_CIPHER: |
|
881 |
return recordIvSize; |
|
882 |
// It is also the length of sequence number, which is |
|
883 |
// used as the nonce_explicit for AEAD cipher suites. |
|
884 |
} |
|
885 |
||
886 |
return 0; |
|
887 |
} |
|
888 |
||
889 |
/* |
|
890 |
* Applies the explicit nonce/IV to this cipher. This method is used to |
|
891 |
* decrypt an SSL/TLS input record. |
|
892 |
* |
|
893 |
* The returned value is the SecurityParameters.record_iv_length in |
|
894 |
* RFC 4346/5246. It is the size of explicit IV for CBC mode, and the |
|
895 |
* size of explicit nonce for AEAD mode. |
|
896 |
* |
|
897 |
* @param authenticator the authenticator to get the additional |
|
898 |
* authentication data |
|
899 |
* @param contentType the content type of the input record |
|
900 |
* @param bb the byte buffer to get the explicit nonce from |
|
901 |
* |
|
902 |
* @return the explicit nonce size of the cipher. |
|
903 |
*/ |
|
904 |
int applyExplicitNonce(Authenticator authenticator, byte contentType, |
|
30904 | 905 |
ByteBuffer bb, byte[] sequence) throws BadPaddingException { |
16913 | 906 |
switch (cipherType) { |
907 |
case BLOCK_CIPHER: |
|
908 |
// sanity check length of the ciphertext |
|
909 |
int tagLen = (authenticator instanceof MAC) ? |
|
910 |
((MAC)authenticator).MAClen() : 0; |
|
911 |
if (tagLen != 0) { |
|
912 |
if (!sanityCheck(tagLen, bb.remaining())) { |
|
913 |
throw new BadPaddingException( |
|
914 |
"ciphertext sanity check failed"); |
|
915 |
} |
|
916 |
} |
|
917 |
||
918 |
// For block ciphers, the explicit IV length is of length |
|
919 |
// SecurityParameters.record_iv_length, which is equal to |
|
920 |
// the SecurityParameters.block_size. |
|
30904 | 921 |
if (protocolVersion.useTLS11PlusSpec()) { |
16913 | 922 |
return cipher.getBlockSize(); |
923 |
} |
|
924 |
break; |
|
925 |
case AEAD_CIPHER: |
|
926 |
if (bb.remaining() < (recordIvSize + tagSize)) { |
|
927 |
throw new BadPaddingException( |
|
928 |
"invalid AEAD cipher fragment"); |
|
929 |
} |
|
930 |
||
931 |
// initialize the AEAD cipher for the unique IV |
|
932 |
byte[] iv = Arrays.copyOf(fixedIv, |
|
933 |
fixedIv.length + recordIvSize); |
|
934 |
bb.get(iv, fixedIv.length, recordIvSize); |
|
935 |
bb.position(bb.position() - recordIvSize); |
|
936 |
GCMParameterSpec spec = new GCMParameterSpec(tagSize * 8, iv); |
|
937 |
try { |
|
938 |
cipher.init(mode, key, spec, random); |
|
939 |
} catch (InvalidKeyException | |
|
940 |
InvalidAlgorithmParameterException ikae) { |
|
941 |
// unlikely to happen |
|
942 |
throw new RuntimeException( |
|
943 |
"invalid key or spec in GCM mode", ikae); |
|
944 |
} |
|
945 |
||
946 |
// update the additional authentication data |
|
947 |
byte[] aad = authenticator.acquireAuthenticationBytes( |
|
30904 | 948 |
contentType, bb.remaining() - recordIvSize - tagSize, |
949 |
sequence); |
|
16913 | 950 |
cipher.updateAAD(aad); |
951 |
||
952 |
return recordIvSize; |
|
953 |
// It is also the length of sequence number, which is |
|
954 |
// used as the nonce_explicit for AEAD cipher suites. |
|
955 |
} |
|
956 |
||
957 |
return 0; |
|
958 |
} |
|
959 |
||
960 |
/* |
|
961 |
* Creates the explicit nonce/IV to this cipher. This method is used to |
|
962 |
* encrypt an SSL/TLS output record. |
|
963 |
* |
|
964 |
* The size of the returned array is the SecurityParameters.record_iv_length |
|
965 |
* in RFC 4346/5246. It is the size of explicit IV for CBC mode, and the |
|
966 |
* size of explicit nonce for AEAD mode. |
|
967 |
* |
|
968 |
* @param authenticator the authenticator to get the additional |
|
969 |
* authentication data |
|
970 |
* @param contentType the content type of the input record |
|
971 |
* @param fragmentLength the fragment length of the output record, it is |
|
972 |
* the TLSCompressed.length in RFC 4346/5246. |
|
973 |
* |
|
974 |
* @return the explicit nonce of the cipher. |
|
975 |
*/ |
|
976 |
byte[] createExplicitNonce(Authenticator authenticator, |
|
977 |
byte contentType, int fragmentLength) { |
|
978 |
||
979 |
byte[] nonce = new byte[0]; |
|
980 |
switch (cipherType) { |
|
981 |
case BLOCK_CIPHER: |
|
30904 | 982 |
if (protocolVersion.useTLS11PlusSpec()) { |
16913 | 983 |
// For block ciphers, the explicit IV length is of length |
984 |
// SecurityParameters.record_iv_length, which is equal to |
|
985 |
// the SecurityParameters.block_size. |
|
986 |
// |
|
987 |
// Generate a random number as the explicit IV parameter. |
|
988 |
nonce = new byte[cipher.getBlockSize()]; |
|
989 |
random.nextBytes(nonce); |
|
990 |
} |
|
991 |
break; |
|
992 |
case AEAD_CIPHER: |
|
993 |
// To be unique and aware of overflow-wrap, sequence number |
|
994 |
// is used as the nonce_explicit of AEAD cipher suites. |
|
995 |
nonce = authenticator.sequenceNumber(); |
|
996 |
||
997 |
// initialize the AEAD cipher for the unique IV |
|
998 |
byte[] iv = Arrays.copyOf(fixedIv, |
|
999 |
fixedIv.length + nonce.length); |
|
1000 |
System.arraycopy(nonce, 0, iv, fixedIv.length, nonce.length); |
|
1001 |
GCMParameterSpec spec = new GCMParameterSpec(tagSize * 8, iv); |
|
1002 |
try { |
|
1003 |
cipher.init(mode, key, spec, random); |
|
1004 |
} catch (InvalidKeyException | |
|
1005 |
InvalidAlgorithmParameterException ikae) { |
|
1006 |
// unlikely to happen |
|
1007 |
throw new RuntimeException( |
|
1008 |
"invalid key or spec in GCM mode", ikae); |
|
1009 |
} |
|
1010 |
||
30904 | 1011 |
// Update the additional authentication data, using the |
1012 |
// implicit sequence number of the authenticator. |
|
16913 | 1013 |
byte[] aad = authenticator.acquireAuthenticationBytes( |
30904 | 1014 |
contentType, fragmentLength, null); |
16913 | 1015 |
cipher.updateAAD(aad); |
1016 |
break; |
|
1017 |
} |
|
1018 |
||
1019 |
return nonce; |
|
1020 |
} |
|
1021 |
||
30904 | 1022 |
// See also CipherSuite.calculatePacketSize(). |
1023 |
int calculatePacketSize(int fragmentSize, int macLen, int headerSize) { |
|
1024 |
int packetSize = fragmentSize; |
|
1025 |
if (cipher != null) { |
|
1026 |
int blockSize = cipher.getBlockSize(); |
|
1027 |
switch (cipherType) { |
|
1028 |
case BLOCK_CIPHER: |
|
1029 |
packetSize += macLen; |
|
1030 |
packetSize += 1; // 1 byte padding length field |
|
1031 |
packetSize += // use the minimal padding |
|
1032 |
(blockSize - (packetSize % blockSize)) % blockSize; |
|
1033 |
if (protocolVersion.useTLS11PlusSpec()) { |
|
1034 |
packetSize += blockSize; // explicit IV |
|
1035 |
} |
|
1036 |
||
1037 |
break; |
|
1038 |
case AEAD_CIPHER: |
|
1039 |
packetSize += recordIvSize; |
|
1040 |
packetSize += tagSize; |
|
1041 |
||
1042 |
break; |
|
1043 |
default: // NULL_CIPHER or STREAM_CIPHER |
|
1044 |
packetSize += macLen; |
|
1045 |
} |
|
1046 |
} |
|
1047 |
||
1048 |
return packetSize + headerSize; |
|
1049 |
} |
|
1050 |
||
1051 |
// See also CipherSuite.calculateFragSize(). |
|
1052 |
int calculateFragmentSize(int packetLimit, int macLen, int headerSize) { |
|
1053 |
int fragLen = packetLimit - headerSize; |
|
1054 |
if (cipher != null) { |
|
1055 |
int blockSize = cipher.getBlockSize(); |
|
1056 |
switch (cipherType) { |
|
1057 |
case BLOCK_CIPHER: |
|
1058 |
if (protocolVersion.useTLS11PlusSpec()) { |
|
1059 |
fragLen -= blockSize; // explicit IV |
|
1060 |
} |
|
1061 |
fragLen -= (fragLen % blockSize); // cannot hold a block |
|
1062 |
// No padding for a maximum fragment. |
|
1063 |
fragLen -= 1; // 1 byte padding length field: 0x00 |
|
1064 |
fragLen -= macLen; |
|
1065 |
||
1066 |
break; |
|
1067 |
case AEAD_CIPHER: |
|
1068 |
fragLen -= recordIvSize; |
|
1069 |
fragLen -= tagSize; |
|
1070 |
||
1071 |
break; |
|
1072 |
default: // NULL_CIPHER or STREAM_CIPHER |
|
1073 |
fragLen -= macLen; |
|
1074 |
} |
|
1075 |
} |
|
1076 |
||
1077 |
return fragLen; |
|
1078 |
} |
|
1079 |
||
1080 |
// Estimate the maximum fragment size of a received packet. |
|
1081 |
int estimateFragmentSize(int packetSize, int macLen, int headerSize) { |
|
1082 |
int fragLen = packetSize - headerSize; |
|
1083 |
if (cipher != null) { |
|
1084 |
int blockSize = cipher.getBlockSize(); |
|
1085 |
switch (cipherType) { |
|
1086 |
case BLOCK_CIPHER: |
|
1087 |
if (protocolVersion.useTLS11PlusSpec()) { |
|
1088 |
fragLen -= blockSize; // explicit IV |
|
1089 |
} |
|
1090 |
// No padding for a maximum fragment. |
|
1091 |
fragLen -= 1; // 1 byte padding length field: 0x00 |
|
1092 |
fragLen -= macLen; |
|
1093 |
||
1094 |
break; |
|
1095 |
case AEAD_CIPHER: |
|
1096 |
fragLen -= recordIvSize; |
|
1097 |
fragLen -= tagSize; |
|
1098 |
||
1099 |
break; |
|
1100 |
default: // NULL_CIPHER or STREAM_CIPHER |
|
1101 |
fragLen -= macLen; |
|
1102 |
} |
|
1103 |
} |
|
1104 |
||
1105 |
return fragLen; |
|
1106 |
} |
|
1107 |
||
1108 |
||
16913 | 1109 |
/* |
1110 |
* Is this cipher available? |
|
1111 |
* |
|
1112 |
* This method can only be called by CipherSuite.BulkCipher.isAvailable() |
|
1113 |
* to test the availability of a cipher suites. Please DON'T use it in |
|
1114 |
* other places, otherwise, the behavior may be unexpected because we may |
|
1115 |
* initialize AEAD cipher improperly in the method. |
|
1116 |
*/ |
|
1117 |
Boolean isAvailable() { |
|
1118 |
// We won't know whether a cipher for a particular key size is |
|
1119 |
// available until the cipher is successfully initialized. |
|
1120 |
// |
|
1121 |
// We do not initialize AEAD cipher in the constructor. Need to |
|
1122 |
// initialize the cipher to ensure that the AEAD mode for a |
|
1123 |
// particular key size is supported. |
|
1124 |
if (cipherType == AEAD_CIPHER) { |
|
1125 |
try { |
|
1126 |
Authenticator authenticator = |
|
1127 |
new Authenticator(protocolVersion); |
|
1128 |
byte[] nonce = authenticator.sequenceNumber(); |
|
1129 |
byte[] iv = Arrays.copyOf(fixedIv, |
|
1130 |
fixedIv.length + nonce.length); |
|
1131 |
System.arraycopy(nonce, 0, iv, fixedIv.length, nonce.length); |
|
1132 |
GCMParameterSpec spec = new GCMParameterSpec(tagSize * 8, iv); |
|
1133 |
||
1134 |
cipher.init(mode, key, spec, random); |
|
1135 |
} catch (Exception e) { |
|
1136 |
return Boolean.FALSE; |
|
1137 |
} |
|
1138 |
} // Otherwise, we have initialized the cipher in the constructor. |
|
1139 |
||
1140 |
return Boolean.TRUE; |
|
1141 |
} |
|
1142 |
||
16113 | 1143 |
/** |
1144 |
* Sanity check the length of a fragment before decryption. |
|
1145 |
* |
|
1146 |
* In CBC mode, check that the fragment length is one or multiple times |
|
1147 |
* of the block size of the cipher suite, and is at least one (one is the |
|
1148 |
* smallest size of padding in CBC mode) bigger than the tag size of the |
|
1149 |
* MAC algorithm except the explicit IV size for TLS 1.1 or later. |
|
1150 |
* |
|
1151 |
* In non-CBC mode, check that the fragment length is not less than the |
|
1152 |
* tag size of the MAC algorithm. |
|
1153 |
* |
|
1154 |
* @return true if the length of a fragment matches above requirements |
|
1155 |
*/ |
|
16913 | 1156 |
private boolean sanityCheck(int tagLen, int fragmentLen) { |
1157 |
if (!isCBCMode()) { |
|
16113 | 1158 |
return fragmentLen >= tagLen; |
1159 |
} |
|
1160 |
||
16913 | 1161 |
int blockSize = cipher.getBlockSize(); |
16113 | 1162 |
if ((fragmentLen % blockSize) == 0) { |
1163 |
int minimal = tagLen + 1; |
|
1164 |
minimal = (minimal >= blockSize) ? minimal : blockSize; |
|
30904 | 1165 |
if (protocolVersion.useTLS11PlusSpec()) { |
16113 | 1166 |
minimal += blockSize; // plus the size of the explicit IV |
1167 |
} |
|
1168 |
||
1169 |
return (fragmentLen >= minimal); |
|
1170 |
} |
|
1171 |
||
1172 |
return false; |
|
1173 |
} |
|
1174 |
||
2 | 1175 |
} |