author | ohair |
Wed, 06 Apr 2011 22:06:11 -0700 | |
changeset 9035 | 1255eb81cc2f |
parent 7973 | dffe8439eb20 |
child 25541 | df83fb1a542e |
permissions | -rw-r--r-- |
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/* |
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1255eb81cc2f
7033660: Update copyright year to 2011 on any files changed in 2011
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changeset
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* Copyright (c) 2003, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. |
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* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER. |
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* |
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* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it |
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* under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as |
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* published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this |
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* particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided |
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* by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code. |
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* |
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* This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT |
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* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or |
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* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License |
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* version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that |
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* accompanied this code). |
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* |
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version |
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* 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, |
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* Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. |
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* |
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* Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA |
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* or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any |
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* questions. |
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*/ |
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package sun.security.rsa; |
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import java.math.BigInteger; |
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import java.util.*; |
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import java.security.SecureRandom; |
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import java.security.interfaces.*; |
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import javax.crypto.BadPaddingException; |
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import sun.security.jca.JCAUtil; |
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/** |
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* Core of the RSA implementation. Has code to perform public and private key |
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* RSA operations (with and without CRT for private key ops). Private CRT ops |
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* also support blinding to twart timing attacks. |
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* |
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* The code in this class only does the core RSA operation. Padding and |
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* unpadding must be done externally. |
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* |
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* Note: RSA keys should be at least 512 bits long |
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* |
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* @since 1.5 |
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* @author Andreas Sterbenz |
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*/ |
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public final class RSACore { |
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private RSACore() { |
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// empty |
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} |
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/** |
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* Return the number of bytes required to store the magnitude byte[] of |
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* this BigInteger. Do not count a 0x00 byte toByteArray() would |
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* prefix for 2's complement form. |
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*/ |
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public static int getByteLength(BigInteger b) { |
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int n = b.bitLength(); |
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return (n + 7) >> 3; |
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} |
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/** |
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* Return the number of bytes required to store the modulus of this |
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* RSA key. |
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*/ |
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public static int getByteLength(RSAKey key) { |
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return getByteLength(key.getModulus()); |
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} |
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// temporary, used by RSACipher and RSAPadding. Move this somewhere else |
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public static byte[] convert(byte[] b, int ofs, int len) { |
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if ((ofs == 0) && (len == b.length)) { |
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return b; |
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} else { |
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byte[] t = new byte[len]; |
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System.arraycopy(b, ofs, t, 0, len); |
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return t; |
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} |
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} |
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/** |
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* Perform an RSA public key operation. |
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*/ |
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public static byte[] rsa(byte[] msg, RSAPublicKey key) |
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throws BadPaddingException { |
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return crypt(msg, key.getModulus(), key.getPublicExponent()); |
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} |
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/** |
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* Perform an RSA private key operation. Uses CRT if the key is a |
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* CRT key. |
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*/ |
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public static byte[] rsa(byte[] msg, RSAPrivateKey key) |
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throws BadPaddingException { |
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if (key instanceof RSAPrivateCrtKey) { |
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return crtCrypt(msg, (RSAPrivateCrtKey)key); |
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} else { |
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return crypt(msg, key.getModulus(), key.getPrivateExponent()); |
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} |
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} |
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/** |
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* RSA public key ops and non-CRT private key ops. Simple modPow(). |
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*/ |
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private static byte[] crypt(byte[] msg, BigInteger n, BigInteger exp) |
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throws BadPaddingException { |
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BigInteger m = parseMsg(msg, n); |
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BigInteger c = m.modPow(exp, n); |
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return toByteArray(c, getByteLength(n)); |
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} |
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/** |
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* RSA private key operations with CRT. Algorithm and variable naming |
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* are taken from PKCS#1 v2.1, section 5.1.2. |
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* |
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* The only difference is the addition of blinding to twart timing attacks. |
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* This is described in the RSA Bulletin#2 (Jan 96) among other places. |
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* This means instead of implementing RSA as |
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* m = c ^ d mod n (or RSA in CRT variant) |
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* we do |
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* r = random(0, n-1) |
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* c' = c * r^e mod n |
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* m' = c' ^ d mod n (or RSA in CRT variant) |
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* m = m' * r^-1 mod n (where r^-1 is the modular inverse of r mod n) |
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* This works because r^(e*d) * r^-1 = r * r^-1 = 1 (all mod n) |
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* |
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* We do not generate new blinding parameters for each operation but reuse |
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* them BLINDING_MAX_REUSE times (see definition below). |
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*/ |
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private static byte[] crtCrypt(byte[] msg, RSAPrivateCrtKey key) |
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throws BadPaddingException { |
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BigInteger n = key.getModulus(); |
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BigInteger c = parseMsg(msg, n); |
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BigInteger p = key.getPrimeP(); |
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BigInteger q = key.getPrimeQ(); |
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BigInteger dP = key.getPrimeExponentP(); |
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BigInteger dQ = key.getPrimeExponentQ(); |
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BigInteger qInv = key.getCrtCoefficient(); |
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BlindingParameters params; |
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if (ENABLE_BLINDING) { |
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params = getBlindingParameters(key); |
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c = c.multiply(params.re).mod(n); |
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} else { |
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params = null; |
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} |
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// m1 = c ^ dP mod p |
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BigInteger m1 = c.modPow(dP, p); |
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// m2 = c ^ dQ mod q |
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BigInteger m2 = c.modPow(dQ, q); |
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// h = (m1 - m2) * qInv mod p |
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BigInteger mtmp = m1.subtract(m2); |
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if (mtmp.signum() < 0) { |
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mtmp = mtmp.add(p); |
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} |
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BigInteger h = mtmp.multiply(qInv).mod(p); |
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// m = m2 + q * h |
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BigInteger m = h.multiply(q).add(m2); |
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if (params != null) { |
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m = m.multiply(params.rInv).mod(n); |
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} |
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return toByteArray(m, getByteLength(n)); |
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} |
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/** |
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* Parse the msg into a BigInteger and check against the modulus n. |
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*/ |
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private static BigInteger parseMsg(byte[] msg, BigInteger n) |
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throws BadPaddingException { |
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BigInteger m = new BigInteger(1, msg); |
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if (m.compareTo(n) >= 0) { |
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throw new BadPaddingException("Message is larger than modulus"); |
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} |
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return m; |
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} |
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/** |
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* Return the encoding of this BigInteger that is exactly len bytes long. |
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* Prefix/strip off leading 0x00 bytes if necessary. |
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* Precondition: bi must fit into len bytes |
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*/ |
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private static byte[] toByteArray(BigInteger bi, int len) { |
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byte[] b = bi.toByteArray(); |
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int n = b.length; |
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if (n == len) { |
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return b; |
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} |
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// BigInteger prefixed a 0x00 byte for 2's complement form, remove it |
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if ((n == len + 1) && (b[0] == 0)) { |
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byte[] t = new byte[len]; |
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System.arraycopy(b, 1, t, 0, len); |
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return t; |
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} |
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// must be smaller |
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assert (n < len); |
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byte[] t = new byte[len]; |
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System.arraycopy(b, 0, t, (len - n), n); |
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return t; |
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} |
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// globally enable/disable use of blinding |
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private final static boolean ENABLE_BLINDING = true; |
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// maximum number of times that we will use a set of blinding parameters |
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// value suggested by Paul Kocher (quoted by NSS) |
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private final static int BLINDING_MAX_REUSE = 50; |
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// cache for blinding parameters. Map<BigInteger, BlindingParameters> |
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// use a weak hashmap so that cached values are automatically cleared |
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// when the modulus is GC'ed |
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private final static Map<BigInteger, BlindingParameters> blindingCache = |
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new WeakHashMap<>(); |
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/** |
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* Set of blinding parameters for a given RSA key. |
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* |
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* The RSA modulus is usually unique, so we index by modulus in |
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* blindingCache. However, to protect against the unlikely case of two |
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* keys sharing the same modulus, we also store the public exponent. |
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* This means we cannot cache blinding parameters for multiple keys that |
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* share the same modulus, but since sharing moduli is fundamentally broken |
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* an insecure, this does not matter. |
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*/ |
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private static final class BlindingParameters { |
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// e (RSA public exponent) |
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final BigInteger e; |
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// r ^ e mod n |
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final BigInteger re; |
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// inverse of r mod n |
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final BigInteger rInv; |
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// how many more times this parameter object can be used |
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private volatile int remainingUses; |
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BlindingParameters(BigInteger e, BigInteger re, BigInteger rInv) { |
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this.e = e; |
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this.re = re; |
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this.rInv = rInv; |
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// initialize remaining uses, subtract current use now |
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remainingUses = BLINDING_MAX_REUSE - 1; |
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} |
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boolean valid(BigInteger e) { |
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int k = remainingUses--; |
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return (k > 0) && this.e.equals(e); |
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} |
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} |
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/** |
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* Return valid RSA blinding parameters for the given private key. |
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* Use cached parameters if available. If not, generate new parameters |
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* and cache. |
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*/ |
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private static BlindingParameters getBlindingParameters |
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(RSAPrivateCrtKey key) { |
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BigInteger modulus = key.getModulus(); |
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BigInteger e = key.getPublicExponent(); |
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BlindingParameters params; |
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// we release the lock between get() and put() |
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// that means threads might concurrently generate new blinding |
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// parameters for the same modulus. this is only a slight waste |
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// of cycles and seems preferable in terms of scalability |
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// to locking out all threads while generating new parameters |
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synchronized (blindingCache) { |
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params = blindingCache.get(modulus); |
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} |
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if ((params != null) && params.valid(e)) { |
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return params; |
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} |
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int len = modulus.bitLength(); |
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SecureRandom random = JCAUtil.getSecureRandom(); |
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BigInteger r = new BigInteger(len, random).mod(modulus); |
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BigInteger re = r.modPow(e, modulus); |
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BigInteger rInv = r.modInverse(modulus); |
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params = new BlindingParameters(e, re, rInv); |
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synchronized (blindingCache) { |
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blindingCache.put(modulus, params); |
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} |
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return params; |
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} |
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} |