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 * particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided

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 * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License

 * version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that

 * accompanied this code).

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package java.awt;

import java.security.BasicPermission;

/**

 * This class is for AWT permissions.

 * An <code>AWTPermission</code> contains a target name but

 * no actions list; you either have the named permission

 * or you don't.

 *

 * <P>

 * The target name is the name of the AWT permission (see below). The naming

 * convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention.

 * Also, an asterisk could be used to represent all AWT permissions.

 *

 * <P>

 * The following table lists all the possible <code>AWTPermission</code>

 * target names, and for each provides a description of what the

 * permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code

 * the permission.

 *

 * <table border=1 cellpadding=5 summary="AWTPermission target names, descriptions, and associated risks.">

 * <tr>

 * <th>Permission Target Name</th>

 * <th>What the Permission Allows</th>

 * <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>accessClipboard</td>

 *   <td>Posting and retrieval of information to and from the AWT clipboard</td>

 *   <td>This would allow malfeasant code to share

 * potentially sensitive or confidential information.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>accessEventQueue</td>

 *   <td>Access to the AWT event queue</td>

 *   <td>After retrieving the AWT event queue,

 * malicious code may peek at and even remove existing events

 * from its event queue, as well as post bogus events which may purposefully

 * cause the application or applet to misbehave in an insecure manner.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>accessSystemTray</td>

 *   <td>Access to the AWT SystemTray instance</td>

 *   <td>This would allow malicious code to add tray icons to the system tray.

 * First, such an icon may look like the icon of some known application

 * (such as a firewall or anti-virus) and order a user to do something unsafe

 * (with help of balloon messages). Second, the system tray may be glutted with

 * tray icons so that no one could add a tray icon anymore.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>createRobot</td>

 *   <td>Create java.awt.Robot objects</td>

 *   <td>The java.awt.Robot object allows code to generate native-level

 * mouse and keyboard events as well as read the screen. It could allow

 * malicious code to control the system, run other programs, read the

 * display, and deny mouse and keyboard access to the user.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>fullScreenExclusive</td>

 *   <td>Enter full-screen exclusive mode</td>

 *   <td>Entering full-screen exclusive mode allows direct access to

 * low-level graphics card memory.  This could be used to spoof the

 * system, since the program is in direct control of rendering. Depending on

 * the implementation, the security warning may not be shown for the windows

 * used to enter the full-screen exclusive mode (assuming that the {@code

 * fullScreenExclusive} permission has been granted to this application). Note

 * that this behavior does not mean that the {@code

 * showWindowWithoutWarningBanner} permission will be automatically granted to

 * the application which has the {@code fullScreenExclusive} permission:

 * non-full-screen windows will continue to be shown with the security

 * warning.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>listenToAllAWTEvents</td>

 *   <td>Listen to all AWT events, system-wide</td>

 *   <td>After adding an AWT event listener,

 * malicious code may scan all AWT events dispatched in the system,

 * allowing it to read all user input (such as passwords).  Each

 * AWT event listener is called from within the context of that

 * event queue's EventDispatchThread, so if the accessEventQueue

 * permission is also enabled, malicious code could modify the

 * contents of AWT event queues system-wide, causing the application

 * or applet to misbehave in an insecure manner.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>readDisplayPixels</td>

 *   <td>Readback of pixels from the display screen</td>

 *   <td>Interfaces such as the java.awt.Composite interface or the

 * java.awt.Robot class allow arbitrary code to examine pixels on the

 * display enable malicious code to snoop on the activities of the user.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>replaceKeyboardFocusManager</td>

 *   <td>Sets the <code>KeyboardFocusManager</code> for

 *       a particular thread.

 *   <td>When <code>SecurityManager</code> is installed, the invoking

 *       thread must be granted this permission in order to replace

 *       the current <code>KeyboardFocusManager</code>.  If permission

 *       is not granted, a <code>SecurityException</code> will be thrown.

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>setAppletStub</td>

 *   <td>Setting the stub which implements Applet container services</td>

 *   <td>Malicious code could set an applet's stub and result in unexpected

 * behavior or denial of service to an applet.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>setWindowAlwaysOnTop</td>

 *   <td>Setting always-on-top property of the window: {@link Window#setAlwaysOnTop}</td>

 *   <td>The malicious window might make itself look and behave like a real full desktop, so that

 * information entered by the unsuspecting user is captured and subsequently misused </td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>showWindowWithoutWarningBanner</td>

 *   <td>Display of a window without also displaying a banner warning

 * that the window was created by an applet</td>

 *   <td>Without this warning,

 * an applet may pop up windows without the user knowing that they

 * belong to an applet.  Since users may make security-sensitive

 * decisions based on whether or not the window belongs to an applet

 * (entering a username and password into a dialog box, for example),

 * disabling this warning banner may allow applets to trick the user

 * into entering such information.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>toolkitModality</td>

 *   <td>Creating {@link Dialog.ModalityType#TOOLKIT_MODAL TOOLKIT_MODAL} dialogs

 *       and setting the {@link Dialog.ModalExclusionType#TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE

 *       TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE} window property.</td>

 *   <td>When a toolkit-modal dialog is shown from an applet, it blocks all other

 * applets in the browser. When launching applications from Java Web Start,

 * its windows (such as the security dialog) may also be blocked by toolkit-modal

 * dialogs, shown from these applications.</td>

 * </tr>

 *

 * <tr>

 *   <td>watchMousePointer</td>

 *   <td>Getting the information about the mouse pointer position at any

 * time</td>

 *   <td>Constantly watching the mouse pointer,

 * an applet can make guesses about what the user is doing, i.e. moving

 * the mouse to the lower left corner of the screen most likely means that

 * the user is about to launch an application. If a virtual keypad is used

 * so that keyboard is emulated using the mouse, an applet may guess what

 * is being typed.</td>

 * </tr>

 * </table>

 *

 * @see java.security.BasicPermission

 * @see java.security.Permission

 * @see java.security.Permissions

 * @see java.security.PermissionCollection

 * @see java.lang.SecurityManager

 *

 *

 * @author Marianne Mueller

 * @author Roland Schemers

 */

public final class AWTPermission extends BasicPermission {

    /** use serialVersionUID from the Java 2 platform for interoperability */

    private static final long serialVersionUID = 8890392402588814465L;

    /**

     * Creates a new <code>AWTPermission</code> with the specified name.

     * The name is the symbolic name of the <code>AWTPermission</code>,

     * such as "topLevelWindow", "systemClipboard", etc. An asterisk

     * may be used to indicate all AWT permissions.

     *

     * @param name the name of the AWTPermission

     *

     * @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>.

     * @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty.

     */

    public AWTPermission(String name)

    {

        super(name);

    }

    /**

     * Creates a new <code>AWTPermission</code> object with the specified name.

     * The name is the symbolic name of the <code>AWTPermission</code>, and the

     * actions string is currently unused and should be <code>null</code>.

     *

     * @param name the name of the <code>AWTPermission</code>

     * @param actions should be <code>null</code>

     *

     * @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>.

     * @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty.

     */

    public AWTPermission(String name, String actions)

    {

        super(name, actions);

    }

}