jdk/src/java.base/share/classes/sun/security/ssl/EngineInputRecord.java
changeset 33958 8d838be4f4ec
parent 33957 39113ae98993
parent 31008 5b500c93ce48
child 33959 36f534ca18c0
--- a/jdk/src/java.base/share/classes/sun/security/ssl/EngineInputRecord.java	Fri Jun 12 08:31:01 2015 +0200
+++ /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,427 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- * DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
- *
- * This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation.  Oracle designates this
- * particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided
- * by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code.
- *
- * This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
- * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
- * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
- * version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that
- * accompanied this code).
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version
- * 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
- * Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
- *
- * Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA
- * or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any
- * questions.
- */
-
-
-package sun.security.ssl;
-
-import java.io.*;
-import java.nio.*;
-import javax.net.ssl.*;
-import javax.crypto.BadPaddingException;
-import sun.misc.HexDumpEncoder;
-
-
-/**
- * Wrapper class around InputRecord.
- *
- * Application data is kept external to the InputRecord,
- * but handshake data (alert/change_cipher_spec/handshake) will
- * be kept internally in the ByteArrayInputStream.
- *
- * @author Brad Wetmore
- */
-final class EngineInputRecord extends InputRecord {
-
-    private SSLEngineImpl engine;
-
-    /*
-     * A dummy ByteBuffer we'll pass back even when the data
-     * is stored internally.  It'll never actually be used.
-     */
-    static private ByteBuffer tmpBB = ByteBuffer.allocate(0);
-
-    /*
-     * Flag to tell whether the last read/parsed data resides
-     * internal in the ByteArrayInputStream, or in the external
-     * buffers.
-     */
-    private boolean internalData;
-
-    EngineInputRecord(SSLEngineImpl engine) {
-        super();
-        this.engine = engine;
-    }
-
-    @Override
-    byte contentType() {
-        if (internalData) {
-            return super.contentType();
-        } else {
-            return ct_application_data;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Check if there is enough inbound data in the ByteBuffer
-     * to make a inbound packet.  Look for both SSLv2 and SSLv3.
-     *
-     * @return -1 if there are not enough bytes to tell (small header),
-     */
-    int bytesInCompletePacket(ByteBuffer buf) throws SSLException {
-
-        /*
-         * SSLv2 length field is in bytes 0/1
-         * SSLv3/TLS length field is in bytes 3/4
-         */
-        if (buf.remaining() < 5) {
-            return -1;
-        }
-
-        int pos = buf.position();
-        byte byteZero = buf.get(pos);
-
-        int len = 0;
-
-        /*
-         * If we have already verified previous packets, we can
-         * ignore the verifications steps, and jump right to the
-         * determination.  Otherwise, try one last hueristic to
-         * see if it's SSL/TLS.
-         */
-        if (formatVerified ||
-                (byteZero == ct_handshake) ||
-                (byteZero == ct_alert)) {
-            /*
-             * Last sanity check that it's not a wild record
-             */
-            ProtocolVersion recordVersion =
-                ProtocolVersion.valueOf(buf.get(pos + 1), buf.get(pos + 2));
-
-            // check the record version
-            checkRecordVersion(recordVersion, false);
-
-            /*
-             * Reasonably sure this is a V3, disable further checks.
-             * We can't do the same in the v2 check below, because
-             * read still needs to parse/handle the v2 clientHello.
-             */
-            formatVerified = true;
-
-            /*
-             * One of the SSLv3/TLS message types.
-             */
-            len = ((buf.get(pos + 3) & 0xff) << 8) +
-                (buf.get(pos + 4) & 0xff) + headerSize;
-
-        } else {
-            /*
-             * Must be SSLv2 or something unknown.
-             * Check if it's short (2 bytes) or
-             * long (3) header.
-             *
-             * Internals can warn about unsupported SSLv2
-             */
-            boolean isShort = ((byteZero & 0x80) != 0);
-
-            if (isShort &&
-                    ((buf.get(pos + 2) == 1) || buf.get(pos + 2) == 4)) {
-
-                ProtocolVersion recordVersion =
-                    ProtocolVersion.valueOf(buf.get(pos + 3), buf.get(pos + 4));
-
-                // check the record version
-                checkRecordVersion(recordVersion, true);
-
-                /*
-                 * Client or Server Hello
-                 */
-                int mask = (isShort ? 0x7f : 0x3f);
-                len = ((byteZero & mask) << 8) + (buf.get(pos + 1) & 0xff) +
-                    (isShort ? 2 : 3);
-
-            } else {
-                // Gobblygook!
-                throw new SSLException(
-                    "Unrecognized SSL message, plaintext connection?");
-            }
-        }
-
-        return len;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Pass the data down if it's internally cached, otherwise
-     * do it here.
-     *
-     * If internal data, data is decrypted internally.
-     *
-     * If external data(app), return a new ByteBuffer with data to
-     * process.
-     */
-    ByteBuffer decrypt(Authenticator authenticator,
-            CipherBox box, ByteBuffer bb) throws BadPaddingException {
-
-        if (internalData) {
-            decrypt(authenticator, box);   // MAC is checked during decryption
-            return tmpBB;
-        }
-
-        BadPaddingException reservedBPE = null;
-        int tagLen =
-            (authenticator instanceof MAC) ? ((MAC)authenticator).MAClen() : 0;
-        int cipheredLength = bb.remaining();
-
-        if (!box.isNullCipher()) {
-            try {
-                // apply explicit nonce for AEAD/CBC cipher suites if needed
-                int nonceSize =
-                    box.applyExplicitNonce(authenticator, contentType(), bb);
-
-                // decrypt the content
-                if (box.isAEADMode()) {
-                    // DON'T encrypt the nonce_explicit for AEAD mode
-                    bb.position(bb.position() + nonceSize);
-                }   // The explicit IV for CBC mode can be decrypted.
-
-                // Note that the CipherBox.decrypt() does not change
-                // the capacity of the buffer.
-                box.decrypt(bb, tagLen);
-                bb.position(nonceSize); // We don't actually remove the nonce.
-            } catch (BadPaddingException bpe) {
-                // RFC 2246 states that decryption_failed should be used
-                // for this purpose. However, that allows certain attacks,
-                // so we just send bad record MAC. We also need to make
-                // sure to always check the MAC to avoid a timing attack
-                // for the same issue. See paper by Vaudenay et al and the
-                // update in RFC 4346/5246.
-                //
-                // Failover to message authentication code checking.
-                reservedBPE = bpe;
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Requires message authentication code for null, stream and block
-        // cipher suites.
-        if ((authenticator instanceof MAC) && (tagLen != 0)) {
-            MAC signer = (MAC)authenticator;
-            int macOffset = bb.limit() - tagLen;
-
-            // Note that although it is not necessary, we run the same MAC
-            // computation and comparison on the payload for both stream
-            // cipher and CBC block cipher.
-            if (bb.remaining() < tagLen) {
-                // negative data length, something is wrong
-                if (reservedBPE == null) {
-                    reservedBPE = new BadPaddingException("bad record");
-                }
-
-                // set offset of the dummy MAC
-                macOffset = cipheredLength - tagLen;
-                bb.limit(cipheredLength);
-            }
-
-            // Run MAC computation and comparison on the payload.
-            if (checkMacTags(contentType(), bb, signer, false)) {
-                if (reservedBPE == null) {
-                    reservedBPE = new BadPaddingException("bad record MAC");
-                }
-            }
-
-            // Run MAC computation and comparison on the remainder.
-            //
-            // It is only necessary for CBC block cipher.  It is used to get a
-            // constant time of MAC computation and comparison on each record.
-            if (box.isCBCMode()) {
-                int remainingLen = calculateRemainingLen(
-                                        signer, cipheredLength, macOffset);
-
-                // NOTE: here we use the InputRecord.buf because I did not find
-                // an effective way to work on ByteBuffer when its capacity is
-                // less than remainingLen.
-
-                // NOTE: remainingLen may be bigger (less than 1 block of the
-                // hash algorithm of the MAC) than the cipheredLength. However,
-                // We won't need to worry about it because we always use a
-                // maximum buffer for every record.  We need a change here if
-                // we use small buffer size in the future.
-                if (remainingLen > buf.length) {
-                    // unlikely to happen, just a placehold
-                    throw new RuntimeException(
-                        "Internal buffer capacity error");
-                }
-
-                // Won't need to worry about the result on the remainder. And
-                // then we won't need to worry about what's actual data to
-                // check MAC tag on.  We start the check from the header of the
-                // buffer so that we don't need to construct a new byte buffer.
-                checkMacTags(contentType(), buf, 0, remainingLen, signer, true);
-            }
-
-            bb.limit(macOffset);
-        }
-
-        // Is it a failover?
-        if (reservedBPE != null) {
-            throw reservedBPE;
-        }
-
-        return bb.slice();
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Run MAC computation and comparison
-     *
-     * Please DON'T change the content of the ByteBuffer parameter!
-     */
-    private static boolean checkMacTags(byte contentType, ByteBuffer bb,
-            MAC signer, boolean isSimulated) {
-
-        int position = bb.position();
-        int tagLen = signer.MAClen();
-        int lim = bb.limit();
-        int macData = lim - tagLen;
-
-        bb.limit(macData);
-        byte[] hash = signer.compute(contentType, bb, isSimulated);
-        if (hash == null || tagLen != hash.length) {
-            // Something is wrong with MAC implementation.
-            throw new RuntimeException("Internal MAC error");
-        }
-
-        bb.position(macData);
-        bb.limit(lim);
-        try {
-            int[] results = compareMacTags(bb, hash);
-            return (results[0] != 0);
-        } finally {
-            // reset to the data
-            bb.position(position);
-            bb.limit(macData);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * A constant-time comparison of the MAC tags.
-     *
-     * Please DON'T change the content of the ByteBuffer parameter!
-     */
-    private static int[] compareMacTags(ByteBuffer bb, byte[] tag) {
-
-        // An array of hits is used to prevent Hotspot optimization for
-        // the purpose of a constant-time check.
-        int[] results = {0, 0};     // {missed #, matched #}
-
-        // The caller ensures there are enough bytes available in the buffer.
-        // So we won't need to check the remaining of the buffer.
-        for (int i = 0; i < tag.length; i++) {
-            if (bb.get() != tag[i]) {
-                results[0]++;       // mismatched bytes
-            } else {
-                results[1]++;       // matched bytes
-            }
-        }
-
-        return results;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Override the actual write below.  We do things this way to be
-     * consistent with InputRecord.  InputRecord may try to write out
-     * data to the peer, and *then* throw an Exception.  This forces
-     * data to be generated/output before the exception is ever
-     * generated.
-     */
-    @Override
-    void writeBuffer(OutputStream s, byte [] buf, int off, int len)
-            throws IOException {
-        /*
-         * Copy data out of buffer, it's ready to go.
-         */
-        ByteBuffer netBB = ByteBuffer.allocate(len).put(buf, 0, len).flip();
-        engine.writer.putOutboundDataSync(netBB);
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Delineate or read a complete packet from src.
-     *
-     * If internal data (hs, alert, ccs), the data is read and
-     * stored internally.
-     *
-     * If external data (app), return a new ByteBuffer which points
-     * to the data to process.
-     */
-    ByteBuffer read(ByteBuffer srcBB) throws IOException {
-        /*
-         * Could have a src == null/dst == null check here,
-         * but that was already checked by SSLEngine.unwrap before
-         * ever attempting to read.
-         */
-
-        /*
-         * If we have anything besides application data,
-         * or if we haven't even done the initial v2 verification,
-         * we send this down to be processed by the underlying
-         * internal cache.
-         */
-        if (!formatVerified ||
-                (srcBB.get(srcBB.position()) != ct_application_data)) {
-            internalData = true;
-            read(new ByteBufferInputStream(srcBB), (OutputStream) null);
-            return tmpBB;
-        }
-
-        internalData = false;
-
-        int srcPos = srcBB.position();
-        int srcLim = srcBB.limit();
-
-        ProtocolVersion recordVersion = ProtocolVersion.valueOf(
-                srcBB.get(srcPos + 1), srcBB.get(srcPos + 2));
-
-        // check the record version
-        checkRecordVersion(recordVersion, false);
-
-        /*
-         * It's really application data.  How much to consume?
-         * Jump over the header.
-         */
-        int len = bytesInCompletePacket(srcBB);
-        assert(len > 0);
-
-        if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("packet")) {
-            try {
-                HexDumpEncoder hd = new HexDumpEncoder();
-                ByteBuffer bb = srcBB.duplicate();  // Use copy of BB
-                bb.limit(srcPos + len);
-
-                System.out.println("[Raw read (bb)]: length = " + len);
-                hd.encodeBuffer(bb, System.out);
-            } catch (IOException e) { }
-        }
-
-        // Demarcate past header to end of packet.
-        srcBB.position(srcPos + headerSize);
-        srcBB.limit(srcPos + len);
-
-        // Protect remainder of buffer, create slice to actually
-        // operate on.
-        ByteBuffer bb = srcBB.slice();
-
-        srcBB.position(srcBB.limit());
-        srcBB.limit(srcLim);
-
-        return bb;
-    }
-}