author | wetmore |
Wed, 11 Apr 2012 17:12:35 -0700 | |
changeset 12428 | e9feb65d37fa |
parent 11521 | d7698e6c5f51 |
child 12874 | 14df9c7c18e1 |
permissions | -rw-r--r-- |
2 | 1 |
/* |
11521
d7698e6c5f51
7106773: 512 bits RSA key cannot work with SHA384 and SHA512
xuelei
parents:
9499
diff
changeset
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* Copyright (c) 1996, 2012, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. |
2 | 3 |
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER. |
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* |
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* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it |
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* under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as |
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* published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this |
2 | 8 |
* particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided |
5506 | 9 |
* by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code. |
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* |
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* This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT |
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* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or |
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* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License |
|
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* version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that |
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* accompanied this code). |
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* |
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version |
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* 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, |
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* Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. |
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* |
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5506 | 21 |
* Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA |
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* or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any |
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* questions. |
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2 | 24 |
*/ |
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package sun.security.ssl; |
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28 |
||
29 |
import java.io.*; |
|
30 |
import java.util.*; |
|
31 |
import java.security.*; |
|
32 |
import java.security.cert.*; |
|
33 |
import java.security.interfaces.*; |
|
34 |
import java.security.spec.ECParameterSpec; |
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35 |
||
36 |
import javax.crypto.SecretKey; |
|
37 |
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec; |
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38 |
||
39 |
import javax.net.ssl.*; |
|
40 |
||
41 |
import javax.security.auth.Subject; |
|
42 |
||
43 |
import sun.security.ssl.HandshakeMessage.*; |
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44 |
import sun.security.ssl.CipherSuite.*; |
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7043 | 45 |
import sun.security.ssl.SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.*; |
2 | 46 |
import static sun.security.ssl.CipherSuite.*; |
47 |
import static sun.security.ssl.CipherSuite.KeyExchange.*; |
|
48 |
||
49 |
/** |
|
50 |
* ServerHandshaker does the protocol handshaking from the point |
|
51 |
* of view of a server. It is driven asychronously by handshake messages |
|
52 |
* as delivered by the parent Handshaker class, and also uses |
|
53 |
* common functionality (e.g. key generation) that is provided there. |
|
54 |
* |
|
55 |
* @author David Brownell |
|
56 |
*/ |
|
57 |
final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker { |
|
58 |
||
59 |
// is the server going to require the client to authenticate? |
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60 |
private byte doClientAuth; |
|
61 |
||
62 |
// our authentication info |
|
63 |
private X509Certificate[] certs; |
|
64 |
private PrivateKey privateKey; |
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65 |
||
4236 | 66 |
private SecretKey[] kerberosKeys; |
2 | 67 |
|
68 |
// flag to check for clientCertificateVerify message |
|
69 |
private boolean needClientVerify = false; |
|
70 |
||
71 |
/* |
|
72 |
* For exportable ciphersuites using non-exportable key sizes, we use |
|
73 |
* ephemeral RSA keys. We could also do anonymous RSA in the same way |
|
74 |
* but there are no such ciphersuites currently defined. |
|
75 |
*/ |
|
76 |
private PrivateKey tempPrivateKey; |
|
77 |
private PublicKey tempPublicKey; |
|
78 |
||
79 |
/* |
|
80 |
* For anonymous and ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange, we use |
|
81 |
* ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys. |
|
82 |
*/ |
|
83 |
private DHCrypt dh; |
|
84 |
||
85 |
// Helper for ECDH based key exchanges |
|
86 |
private ECDHCrypt ecdh; |
|
87 |
||
88 |
// version request by the client in its ClientHello |
|
89 |
// we remember it for the RSA premaster secret version check |
|
90 |
private ProtocolVersion clientRequestedVersion; |
|
91 |
||
92 |
private SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension supportedCurves; |
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93 |
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7043 | 94 |
// the preferable signature algorithm used by ServerKeyExchange message |
95 |
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm preferableSignatureAlgorithm; |
|
96 |
||
2 | 97 |
/* |
98 |
* Constructor ... use the keys found in the auth context. |
|
99 |
*/ |
|
100 |
ServerHandshaker(SSLSocketImpl socket, SSLContextImpl context, |
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5182 | 101 |
ProtocolList enabledProtocols, byte clientAuth, |
6856 | 102 |
ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion, boolean isInitialHandshake, |
103 |
boolean secureRenegotiation, |
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104 |
byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) { |
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5182 | 105 |
|
2 | 106 |
super(socket, context, enabledProtocols, |
6856 | 107 |
(clientAuth != SSLEngineImpl.clauth_none), false, |
108 |
activeProtocolVersion, isInitialHandshake, secureRenegotiation, |
|
109 |
clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData); |
|
2 | 110 |
doClientAuth = clientAuth; |
111 |
} |
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112 |
||
113 |
/* |
|
114 |
* Constructor ... use the keys found in the auth context. |
|
115 |
*/ |
|
116 |
ServerHandshaker(SSLEngineImpl engine, SSLContextImpl context, |
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5182 | 117 |
ProtocolList enabledProtocols, byte clientAuth, |
6856 | 118 |
ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion, |
119 |
boolean isInitialHandshake, boolean secureRenegotiation, |
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120 |
byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) { |
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5182 | 121 |
|
2 | 122 |
super(engine, context, enabledProtocols, |
6856 | 123 |
(clientAuth != SSLEngineImpl.clauth_none), false, |
124 |
activeProtocolVersion, isInitialHandshake, secureRenegotiation, |
|
125 |
clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData); |
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2 | 126 |
doClientAuth = clientAuth; |
127 |
} |
|
128 |
||
129 |
/* |
|
130 |
* As long as handshaking has not started, we can change |
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131 |
* whether client authentication is required. Otherwise, |
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132 |
* we will need to wait for the next handshake. |
|
133 |
*/ |
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134 |
void setClientAuth(byte clientAuth) { |
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135 |
doClientAuth = clientAuth; |
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136 |
} |
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137 |
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138 |
/* |
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139 |
* This routine handles all the server side handshake messages, one at |
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140 |
* a time. Given the message type (and in some cases the pending cipher |
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141 |
* spec) it parses the type-specific message. Then it calls a function |
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142 |
* that handles that specific message. |
|
143 |
* |
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144 |
* It updates the state machine as each message is processed, and writes |
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145 |
* responses as needed using the connection in the constructor. |
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146 |
*/ |
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147 |
void processMessage(byte type, int message_len) |
|
148 |
throws IOException { |
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149 |
// |
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150 |
// In SSLv3 and TLS, messages follow strictly increasing |
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151 |
// numerical order _except_ for one annoying special case. |
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152 |
// |
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153 |
if ((state > type) |
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154 |
&& (state != HandshakeMessage.ht_client_key_exchange |
|
155 |
&& type != HandshakeMessage.ht_certificate_verify)) { |
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156 |
throw new SSLProtocolException( |
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157 |
"Handshake message sequence violation, state = " + state |
|
158 |
+ ", type = " + type); |
|
159 |
} |
|
160 |
||
161 |
switch (type) { |
|
162 |
case HandshakeMessage.ht_client_hello: |
|
163 |
ClientHello ch = new ClientHello(input, message_len); |
|
164 |
/* |
|
165 |
* send it off for processing. |
|
166 |
*/ |
|
167 |
this.clientHello(ch); |
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168 |
break; |
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169 |
||
170 |
case HandshakeMessage.ht_certificate: |
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171 |
if (doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_none) { |
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172 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_unexpected_message, |
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173 |
"client sent unsolicited cert chain"); |
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174 |
// NOTREACHED |
|
175 |
} |
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176 |
this.clientCertificate(new CertificateMsg(input)); |
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177 |
break; |
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178 |
||
179 |
case HandshakeMessage.ht_client_key_exchange: |
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180 |
SecretKey preMasterSecret; |
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181 |
switch (keyExchange) { |
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182 |
case K_RSA: |
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183 |
case K_RSA_EXPORT: |
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184 |
/* |
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185 |
* The client's pre-master secret is decrypted using |
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186 |
* either the server's normal private RSA key, or the |
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187 |
* temporary one used for non-export or signing-only |
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188 |
* certificates/keys. |
|
189 |
*/ |
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7039 | 190 |
RSAClientKeyExchange pms = new RSAClientKeyExchange( |
191 |
protocolVersion, clientRequestedVersion, |
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192 |
sslContext.getSecureRandom(), input, |
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193 |
message_len, privateKey); |
|
2 | 194 |
preMasterSecret = this.clientKeyExchange(pms); |
195 |
break; |
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196 |
case K_KRB5: |
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197 |
case K_KRB5_EXPORT: |
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preMasterSecret = this.clientKeyExchange( |
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199 |
new KerberosClientKeyExchange(protocolVersion, |
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200 |
clientRequestedVersion, |
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201 |
sslContext.getSecureRandom(), |
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202 |
input, |
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203 |
kerberosKeys)); |
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204 |
break; |
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205 |
case K_DHE_RSA: |
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206 |
case K_DHE_DSS: |
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207 |
case K_DH_ANON: |
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208 |
/* |
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209 |
* The pre-master secret is derived using the normal |
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210 |
* Diffie-Hellman calculation. Note that the main |
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211 |
* protocol difference in these five flavors is in how |
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212 |
* the ServerKeyExchange message was constructed! |
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213 |
*/ |
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214 |
preMasterSecret = this.clientKeyExchange( |
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215 |
new DHClientKeyExchange(input)); |
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216 |
break; |
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217 |
case K_ECDH_RSA: |
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218 |
case K_ECDH_ECDSA: |
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219 |
case K_ECDHE_RSA: |
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220 |
case K_ECDHE_ECDSA: |
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221 |
case K_ECDH_ANON: |
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222 |
preMasterSecret = this.clientKeyExchange |
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223 |
(new ECDHClientKeyExchange(input)); |
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224 |
break; |
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225 |
default: |
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226 |
throw new SSLProtocolException |
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227 |
("Unrecognized key exchange: " + keyExchange); |
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228 |
} |
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229 |
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230 |
// |
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231 |
// All keys are calculated from the premaster secret |
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232 |
// and the exchanged nonces in the same way. |
|
233 |
// |
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234 |
calculateKeys(preMasterSecret, clientRequestedVersion); |
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235 |
break; |
|
236 |
||
237 |
case HandshakeMessage.ht_certificate_verify: |
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7043 | 238 |
this.clientCertificateVerify(new CertificateVerify(input, |
239 |
localSupportedSignAlgs, protocolVersion)); |
|
2 | 240 |
break; |
241 |
||
242 |
case HandshakeMessage.ht_finished: |
|
7043 | 243 |
this.clientFinished( |
244 |
new Finished(protocolVersion, input, cipherSuite)); |
|
2 | 245 |
break; |
246 |
||
247 |
default: |
|
248 |
throw new SSLProtocolException( |
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249 |
"Illegal server handshake msg, " + type); |
|
250 |
} |
|
251 |
||
252 |
// |
|
253 |
// Move the state machine forward except for that annoying |
|
254 |
// special case. This means that clients could send extra |
|
255 |
// cert verify messages; not a problem so long as all of |
|
256 |
// them actually check out. |
|
257 |
// |
|
258 |
if (state < type && type != HandshakeMessage.ht_certificate_verify) { |
|
259 |
state = type; |
|
260 |
} |
|
261 |
} |
|
262 |
||
263 |
||
264 |
/* |
|
265 |
* ClientHello presents the server with a bunch of options, to which the |
|
266 |
* server replies with a ServerHello listing the ones which this session |
|
267 |
* will use. If needed, it also writes its Certificate plus in some cases |
|
268 |
* a ServerKeyExchange message. It may also write a CertificateRequest, |
|
269 |
* to elicit a client certificate. |
|
270 |
* |
|
271 |
* All these messages are terminated by a ServerHelloDone message. In |
|
272 |
* most cases, all this can be sent in a single Record. |
|
273 |
*/ |
|
274 |
private void clientHello(ClientHello mesg) throws IOException { |
|
275 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
276 |
mesg.print(System.out); |
|
277 |
} |
|
5182 | 278 |
|
6856 | 279 |
// Does the message include security renegotiation indication? |
280 |
boolean renegotiationIndicated = false; |
|
5182 | 281 |
|
6856 | 282 |
// check the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV |
283 |
CipherSuiteList cipherSuites = mesg.getCipherSuites(); |
|
284 |
if (cipherSuites.contains(CipherSuite.C_SCSV)) { |
|
285 |
renegotiationIndicated = true; |
|
286 |
if (isInitialHandshake) { |
|
287 |
secureRenegotiation = true; |
|
288 |
} else { |
|
289 |
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert |
|
290 |
if (secureRenegotiation) { |
|
291 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, |
|
292 |
"The SCSV is present in a secure renegotiation"); |
|
293 |
} else { |
|
294 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, |
|
295 |
"The SCSV is present in a insecure renegotiation"); |
|
296 |
} |
|
297 |
} |
|
298 |
} |
|
5182 | 299 |
|
6856 | 300 |
// check the "renegotiation_info" extension |
301 |
RenegotiationInfoExtension clientHelloRI = (RenegotiationInfoExtension) |
|
302 |
mesg.extensions.get(ExtensionType.EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO); |
|
303 |
if (clientHelloRI != null) { |
|
304 |
renegotiationIndicated = true; |
|
305 |
if (isInitialHandshake) { |
|
306 |
// verify the length of the "renegotiated_connection" field |
|
307 |
if (!clientHelloRI.isEmpty()) { |
|
308 |
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert |
|
309 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, |
|
310 |
"The renegotiation_info field is not empty"); |
|
311 |
} |
|
5182 | 312 |
|
6856 | 313 |
secureRenegotiation = true; |
314 |
} else { |
|
315 |
if (!secureRenegotiation) { |
|
316 |
// unexpected RI extension for insecure renegotiation, |
|
317 |
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert |
|
318 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, |
|
319 |
"The renegotiation_info is present in a insecure " + |
|
320 |
"renegotiation"); |
|
5182 | 321 |
} |
322 |
||
6856 | 323 |
// verify the client_verify_data value |
324 |
if (!Arrays.equals(clientVerifyData, |
|
325 |
clientHelloRI.getRenegotiatedConnection())) { |
|
326 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, |
|
327 |
"Incorrect verify data in ClientHello " + |
|
328 |
"renegotiation_info message"); |
|
329 |
} |
|
330 |
} |
|
331 |
} else if (!isInitialHandshake && secureRenegotiation) { |
|
332 |
// if the connection's "secure_renegotiation" flag is set to TRUE |
|
333 |
// and the "renegotiation_info" extension is not present, abort |
|
334 |
// the handshake. |
|
335 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, |
|
336 |
"Inconsistent secure renegotiation indication"); |
|
337 |
} |
|
338 |
||
339 |
// if there is no security renegotiation indication or the previous |
|
340 |
// handshake is insecure. |
|
341 |
if (!renegotiationIndicated || !secureRenegotiation) { |
|
342 |
if (isInitialHandshake) { |
|
343 |
if (!allowLegacyHelloMessages) { |
|
344 |
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert |
|
345 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, |
|
346 |
"Failed to negotiate the use of secure renegotiation"); |
|
347 |
} |
|
348 |
||
349 |
// continue with legacy ClientHello |
|
350 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
351 |
System.out.println("Warning: No renegotiation " + |
|
352 |
"indication in ClientHello, allow legacy ClientHello"); |
|
353 |
} |
|
354 |
} else if (!allowUnsafeRenegotiation) { |
|
355 |
// abort the handshake |
|
356 |
if (activeProtocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS10.v) { |
|
357 |
// response with a no_renegotiation warning, |
|
358 |
warningSE(Alerts.alert_no_renegotiation); |
|
359 |
||
360 |
// invalidate the handshake so that the caller can |
|
361 |
// dispose this object. |
|
362 |
invalidated = true; |
|
363 |
||
364 |
// If there is still unread block in the handshake |
|
365 |
// input stream, it would be truncated with the disposal |
|
366 |
// and the next handshake message will become incomplete. |
|
367 |
// |
|
368 |
// However, according to SSL/TLS specifications, no more |
|
369 |
// handshake message could immediately follow ClientHello |
|
370 |
// or HelloRequest. But in case of any improper messages, |
|
371 |
// we'd better check to ensure there is no remaining bytes |
|
372 |
// in the handshake input stream. |
|
373 |
if (input.available() > 0) { |
|
374 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_unexpected_message, |
|
375 |
"ClientHello followed by an unexpected " + |
|
376 |
"handshake message"); |
|
377 |
} |
|
378 |
||
379 |
return; |
|
380 |
} else { |
|
381 |
// For SSLv3, send the handshake_failure fatal error. |
|
382 |
// Note that SSLv3 does not define a no_renegotiation |
|
383 |
// alert like TLSv1. However we cannot ignore the message |
|
384 |
// simply, otherwise the other side was waiting for a |
|
385 |
// response that would never come. |
|
386 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, |
|
387 |
"Renegotiation is not allowed"); |
|
388 |
} |
|
389 |
} else { // !isInitialHandshake && allowUnsafeRenegotiation |
|
390 |
// continue with unsafe renegotiation. |
|
391 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
392 |
System.out.println( |
|
393 |
"Warning: continue with insecure renegotiation"); |
|
394 |
} |
|
5182 | 395 |
} |
396 |
} |
|
397 |
||
2 | 398 |
/* |
399 |
* Always make sure this entire record has been digested before we |
|
400 |
* start emitting output, to ensure correct digesting order. |
|
401 |
*/ |
|
402 |
input.digestNow(); |
|
403 |
||
404 |
/* |
|
405 |
* FIRST, construct the ServerHello using the options and priorities |
|
406 |
* from the ClientHello. Update the (pending) cipher spec as we do |
|
407 |
* so, and save the client's version to protect against rollback |
|
408 |
* attacks. |
|
409 |
* |
|
410 |
* There are a bunch of minor tasks here, and one major one: deciding |
|
411 |
* if the short or the full handshake sequence will be used. |
|
412 |
*/ |
|
413 |
ServerHello m1 = new ServerHello(); |
|
414 |
||
415 |
clientRequestedVersion = mesg.protocolVersion; |
|
416 |
||
7039 | 417 |
// select a proper protocol version. |
418 |
ProtocolVersion selectedVersion = |
|
419 |
selectProtocolVersion(clientRequestedVersion); |
|
420 |
if (selectedVersion == null || |
|
421 |
selectedVersion.v == ProtocolVersion.SSL20Hello.v) { |
|
2 | 422 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, |
423 |
"Client requested protocol " + clientRequestedVersion + |
|
7039 | 424 |
" not enabled or not supported"); |
2 | 425 |
} |
7043 | 426 |
|
7804 | 427 |
handshakeHash.protocolDetermined(selectedVersion); |
2 | 428 |
setVersion(selectedVersion); |
429 |
||
430 |
m1.protocolVersion = protocolVersion; |
|
431 |
||
432 |
// |
|
433 |
// random ... save client and server values for later use |
|
434 |
// in computing the master secret (from pre-master secret) |
|
435 |
// and thence the other crypto keys. |
|
436 |
// |
|
437 |
// NOTE: this use of three inputs to generating _each_ set |
|
438 |
// of ciphers slows things down, but it does increase the |
|
439 |
// security since each connection in the session can hold |
|
440 |
// its own authenticated (and strong) keys. One could make |
|
441 |
// creation of a session a rare thing... |
|
442 |
// |
|
443 |
clnt_random = mesg.clnt_random; |
|
444 |
svr_random = new RandomCookie(sslContext.getSecureRandom()); |
|
445 |
m1.svr_random = svr_random; |
|
446 |
||
447 |
session = null; // forget about the current session |
|
448 |
// |
|
449 |
// Here we go down either of two paths: (a) the fast one, where |
|
450 |
// the client's asked to rejoin an existing session, and the server |
|
451 |
// permits this; (b) the other one, where a new session is created. |
|
452 |
// |
|
453 |
if (mesg.sessionId.length() != 0) { |
|
454 |
// client is trying to resume a session, let's see... |
|
455 |
||
456 |
SSLSessionImpl previous = ((SSLSessionContextImpl)sslContext |
|
457 |
.engineGetServerSessionContext()) |
|
458 |
.get(mesg.sessionId.getId()); |
|
459 |
// |
|
460 |
// Check if we can use the fast path, resuming a session. We |
|
461 |
// can do so iff we have a valid record for that session, and |
|
462 |
// the cipher suite for that session was on the list which the |
|
463 |
// client requested, and if we're not forgetting any needed |
|
464 |
// authentication on the part of the client. |
|
465 |
// |
|
466 |
if (previous != null) { |
|
467 |
resumingSession = previous.isRejoinable(); |
|
468 |
||
469 |
if (resumingSession) { |
|
470 |
ProtocolVersion oldVersion = previous.getProtocolVersion(); |
|
471 |
// cannot resume session with different version |
|
472 |
if (oldVersion != protocolVersion) { |
|
473 |
resumingSession = false; |
|
474 |
} |
|
475 |
} |
|
476 |
||
477 |
if (resumingSession && |
|
478 |
(doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_required)) { |
|
479 |
try { |
|
480 |
previous.getPeerPrincipal(); |
|
481 |
} catch (SSLPeerUnverifiedException e) { |
|
482 |
resumingSession = false; |
|
483 |
} |
|
484 |
} |
|
485 |
||
486 |
// validate subject identity |
|
487 |
if (resumingSession) { |
|
488 |
CipherSuite suite = previous.getSuite(); |
|
489 |
if (suite.keyExchange == K_KRB5 || |
|
490 |
suite.keyExchange == K_KRB5_EXPORT) { |
|
491 |
Principal localPrincipal = previous.getLocalPrincipal(); |
|
492 |
||
493 |
Subject subject = null; |
|
494 |
try { |
|
495 |
subject = AccessController.doPrivileged( |
|
496 |
new PrivilegedExceptionAction<Subject>() { |
|
497 |
public Subject run() throws Exception { |
|
4236 | 498 |
return |
499 |
Krb5Helper.getServerSubject(getAccSE()); |
|
2 | 500 |
}}); |
501 |
} catch (PrivilegedActionException e) { |
|
502 |
subject = null; |
|
503 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) { |
|
504 |
System.out.println("Attempt to obtain" + |
|
505 |
" subject failed!"); |
|
506 |
} |
|
507 |
} |
|
508 |
||
509 |
if (subject != null) { |
|
4236 | 510 |
// Eliminate dependency on KerberosPrincipal |
511 |
Set<Principal> principals = |
|
512 |
subject.getPrincipals(Principal.class); |
|
2 | 513 |
if (!principals.contains(localPrincipal)) { |
514 |
resumingSession = false; |
|
515 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) { |
|
516 |
System.out.println("Subject identity" + |
|
517 |
" is not the same"); |
|
518 |
} |
|
519 |
} else { |
|
520 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) |
|
521 |
System.out.println("Subject identity" + |
|
522 |
" is same"); |
|
523 |
} |
|
524 |
} else { |
|
525 |
resumingSession = false; |
|
526 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) |
|
527 |
System.out.println("Kerberos credentials are" + |
|
528 |
" not present in the current Subject;" + |
|
529 |
" check if " + |
|
530 |
" javax.security.auth.useSubjectAsCreds" + |
|
531 |
" system property has been set to false"); |
|
532 |
} |
|
533 |
} |
|
534 |
} |
|
535 |
||
536 |
if (resumingSession) { |
|
537 |
CipherSuite suite = previous.getSuite(); |
|
538 |
// verify that the ciphersuite from the cached session |
|
539 |
// is in the list of client requested ciphersuites and |
|
540 |
// we have it enabled |
|
6856 | 541 |
if ((isNegotiable(suite) == false) || |
2 | 542 |
(mesg.getCipherSuites().contains(suite) == false)) { |
543 |
resumingSession = false; |
|
544 |
} else { |
|
545 |
// everything looks ok, set the ciphersuite |
|
546 |
// this should be done last when we are sure we |
|
547 |
// will resume |
|
548 |
setCipherSuite(suite); |
|
549 |
} |
|
550 |
} |
|
551 |
||
552 |
if (resumingSession) { |
|
553 |
session = previous; |
|
554 |
if (debug != null && |
|
555 |
(Debug.isOn("handshake") || Debug.isOn("session"))) { |
|
556 |
System.out.println("%% Resuming " + session); |
|
557 |
} |
|
558 |
} |
|
559 |
} |
|
560 |
} // else client did not try to resume |
|
561 |
||
562 |
// |
|
563 |
// If client hasn't specified a session we can resume, start a |
|
564 |
// new one and choose its cipher suite and compression options. |
|
565 |
// Unless new session creation is disabled for this connection! |
|
566 |
// |
|
567 |
if (session == null) { |
|
568 |
if (!enableNewSession) { |
|
569 |
throw new SSLException("Client did not resume a session"); |
|
570 |
} |
|
7043 | 571 |
|
6856 | 572 |
supportedCurves = (SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension) |
573 |
mesg.extensions.get(ExtensionType.EXT_ELLIPTIC_CURVES); |
|
7043 | 574 |
|
575 |
// We only need to handle the "signature_algorithm" extension |
|
576 |
// for full handshakes and TLS 1.2 or later. |
|
577 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
|
578 |
SignatureAlgorithmsExtension signAlgs = |
|
579 |
(SignatureAlgorithmsExtension)mesg.extensions.get( |
|
580 |
ExtensionType.EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS); |
|
581 |
if (signAlgs != null) { |
|
582 |
Collection<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm> peerSignAlgs = |
|
583 |
signAlgs.getSignAlgorithms(); |
|
584 |
if (peerSignAlgs == null || peerSignAlgs.isEmpty()) { |
|
585 |
throw new SSLHandshakeException( |
|
586 |
"No peer supported signature algorithms"); |
|
587 |
} |
|
588 |
||
589 |
Collection<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm> |
|
590 |
supportedPeerSignAlgs = |
|
591 |
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getSupportedAlgorithms( |
|
592 |
peerSignAlgs); |
|
593 |
if (supportedPeerSignAlgs.isEmpty()) { |
|
594 |
throw new SSLHandshakeException( |
|
595 |
"No supported signature and hash algorithm " + |
|
596 |
"in common"); |
|
597 |
} |
|
598 |
||
599 |
setPeerSupportedSignAlgs(supportedPeerSignAlgs); |
|
600 |
} // else, need to use peer implicit supported signature algs |
|
601 |
} |
|
602 |
||
603 |
session = new SSLSessionImpl(protocolVersion, CipherSuite.C_NULL, |
|
604 |
getLocalSupportedSignAlgs(), |
|
605 |
sslContext.getSecureRandom(), |
|
606 |
getHostAddressSE(), getPortSE()); |
|
607 |
||
608 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
|
609 |
if (peerSupportedSignAlgs != null) { |
|
610 |
session.setPeerSupportedSignatureAlgorithms( |
|
611 |
peerSupportedSignAlgs); |
|
612 |
} // else, we will set the implicit peer supported signature |
|
613 |
// algorithms in chooseCipherSuite() |
|
614 |
} |
|
615 |
||
616 |
// set the handshake session |
|
617 |
setHandshakeSessionSE(session); |
|
618 |
||
619 |
// choose cipher suite and corresponding private key |
|
2 | 620 |
chooseCipherSuite(mesg); |
7043 | 621 |
|
622 |
session.setSuite(cipherSuite); |
|
2 | 623 |
session.setLocalPrivateKey(privateKey); |
7043 | 624 |
|
2 | 625 |
// chooseCompression(mesg); |
7043 | 626 |
} else { |
627 |
// set the handshake session |
|
628 |
setHandshakeSessionSE(session); |
|
629 |
} |
|
630 |
||
631 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
|
632 |
if (resumingSession) { |
|
633 |
handshakeHash.setCertificateVerifyAlg(null); |
|
634 |
} |
|
635 |
handshakeHash.setFinishedAlg(cipherSuite.prfAlg.getPRFHashAlg()); |
|
2 | 636 |
} |
637 |
||
638 |
m1.cipherSuite = cipherSuite; |
|
639 |
m1.sessionId = session.getSessionId(); |
|
640 |
m1.compression_method = session.getCompression(); |
|
641 |
||
6856 | 642 |
if (secureRenegotiation) { |
643 |
// For ServerHellos that are initial handshakes, then the |
|
644 |
// "renegotiated_connection" field in "renegotiation_info" |
|
645 |
// extension is of zero length. |
|
646 |
// |
|
647 |
// For ServerHellos that are renegotiating, this field contains |
|
648 |
// the concatenation of client_verify_data and server_verify_data. |
|
649 |
// |
|
650 |
// Note that for initial handshakes, both the clientVerifyData |
|
651 |
// variable and serverVerifyData variable are of zero length. |
|
652 |
HelloExtension serverHelloRI = new RenegotiationInfoExtension( |
|
653 |
clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData); |
|
654 |
m1.extensions.add(serverHelloRI); |
|
655 |
} |
|
656 |
||
2 | 657 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
658 |
m1.print(System.out); |
|
659 |
System.out.println("Cipher suite: " + session.getSuite()); |
|
660 |
} |
|
661 |
m1.write(output); |
|
662 |
||
663 |
// |
|
664 |
// If we are resuming a session, we finish writing handshake |
|
665 |
// messages right now and then finish. |
|
666 |
// |
|
667 |
if (resumingSession) { |
|
668 |
calculateConnectionKeys(session.getMasterSecret()); |
|
669 |
sendChangeCipherAndFinish(false); |
|
670 |
return; |
|
671 |
} |
|
672 |
||
673 |
||
674 |
/* |
|
675 |
* SECOND, write the server Certificate(s) if we need to. |
|
676 |
* |
|
677 |
* NOTE: while an "anonymous RSA" mode is explicitly allowed by |
|
678 |
* the protocol, we can't support it since all of the SSL flavors |
|
679 |
* defined in the protocol spec are explicitly stated to require |
|
680 |
* using RSA certificates. |
|
681 |
*/ |
|
682 |
if (keyExchange == K_KRB5 || keyExchange == K_KRB5_EXPORT) { |
|
683 |
// Server certificates are omitted for Kerberos ciphers |
|
684 |
||
685 |
} else if ((keyExchange != K_DH_ANON) && (keyExchange != K_ECDH_ANON)) { |
|
686 |
if (certs == null) { |
|
687 |
throw new RuntimeException("no certificates"); |
|
688 |
} |
|
689 |
||
690 |
CertificateMsg m2 = new CertificateMsg(certs); |
|
691 |
||
692 |
/* |
|
693 |
* Set local certs in the SSLSession, output |
|
694 |
* debug info, and then actually write to the client. |
|
695 |
*/ |
|
696 |
session.setLocalCertificates(certs); |
|
697 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
698 |
m2.print(System.out); |
|
699 |
} |
|
700 |
m2.write(output); |
|
701 |
||
702 |
// XXX has some side effects with OS TCP buffering, |
|
703 |
// leave it out for now |
|
704 |
||
705 |
// let client verify chain in the meantime... |
|
706 |
// output.flush(); |
|
707 |
} else { |
|
708 |
if (certs != null) { |
|
709 |
throw new RuntimeException("anonymous keyexchange with certs"); |
|
710 |
} |
|
711 |
} |
|
712 |
||
713 |
/* |
|
714 |
* THIRD, the ServerKeyExchange message ... iff it's needed. |
|
715 |
* |
|
716 |
* It's usually needed unless there's an encryption-capable |
|
717 |
* RSA cert, or a D-H cert. The notable exception is that |
|
718 |
* exportable ciphers used with big RSA keys need to downgrade |
|
719 |
* to use short RSA keys, even when the key/cert encrypts OK. |
|
720 |
*/ |
|
721 |
||
722 |
ServerKeyExchange m3; |
|
723 |
switch (keyExchange) { |
|
724 |
case K_RSA: |
|
725 |
case K_KRB5: |
|
726 |
case K_KRB5_EXPORT: |
|
727 |
// no server key exchange for RSA or KRB5 ciphersuites |
|
728 |
m3 = null; |
|
729 |
break; |
|
730 |
case K_RSA_EXPORT: |
|
731 |
if (JsseJce.getRSAKeyLength(certs[0].getPublicKey()) > 512) { |
|
732 |
try { |
|
733 |
m3 = new RSA_ServerKeyExchange( |
|
734 |
tempPublicKey, privateKey, |
|
735 |
clnt_random, svr_random, |
|
736 |
sslContext.getSecureRandom()); |
|
737 |
privateKey = tempPrivateKey; |
|
738 |
} catch (GeneralSecurityException e) { |
|
739 |
throwSSLException |
|
740 |
("Error generating RSA server key exchange", e); |
|
741 |
m3 = null; // make compiler happy |
|
742 |
} |
|
743 |
} else { |
|
744 |
// RSA_EXPORT with short key, don't need ServerKeyExchange |
|
745 |
m3 = null; |
|
746 |
} |
|
747 |
break; |
|
748 |
case K_DHE_RSA: |
|
749 |
case K_DHE_DSS: |
|
750 |
try { |
|
751 |
m3 = new DH_ServerKeyExchange(dh, |
|
752 |
privateKey, |
|
753 |
clnt_random.random_bytes, |
|
754 |
svr_random.random_bytes, |
|
7043 | 755 |
sslContext.getSecureRandom(), |
756 |
preferableSignatureAlgorithm, |
|
757 |
protocolVersion); |
|
2 | 758 |
} catch (GeneralSecurityException e) { |
759 |
throwSSLException("Error generating DH server key exchange", e); |
|
760 |
m3 = null; // make compiler happy |
|
761 |
} |
|
762 |
break; |
|
763 |
case K_DH_ANON: |
|
7043 | 764 |
m3 = new DH_ServerKeyExchange(dh, protocolVersion); |
2 | 765 |
break; |
766 |
case K_ECDHE_RSA: |
|
767 |
case K_ECDHE_ECDSA: |
|
768 |
case K_ECDH_ANON: |
|
769 |
try { |
|
770 |
m3 = new ECDH_ServerKeyExchange(ecdh, |
|
771 |
privateKey, |
|
772 |
clnt_random.random_bytes, |
|
773 |
svr_random.random_bytes, |
|
7043 | 774 |
sslContext.getSecureRandom(), |
775 |
preferableSignatureAlgorithm, |
|
776 |
protocolVersion); |
|
2 | 777 |
} catch (GeneralSecurityException e) { |
7043 | 778 |
throwSSLException( |
779 |
"Error generating ECDH server key exchange", e); |
|
2 | 780 |
m3 = null; // make compiler happy |
781 |
} |
|
782 |
break; |
|
783 |
case K_ECDH_RSA: |
|
784 |
case K_ECDH_ECDSA: |
|
785 |
// ServerKeyExchange not used for fixed ECDH |
|
786 |
m3 = null; |
|
787 |
break; |
|
788 |
default: |
|
789 |
throw new RuntimeException("internal error: " + keyExchange); |
|
790 |
} |
|
791 |
if (m3 != null) { |
|
792 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
793 |
m3.print(System.out); |
|
794 |
} |
|
795 |
m3.write(output); |
|
796 |
} |
|
797 |
||
798 |
// |
|
799 |
// FOURTH, the CertificateRequest message. The details of |
|
800 |
// the message can be affected by the key exchange algorithm |
|
801 |
// in use. For example, certs with fixed Diffie-Hellman keys |
|
802 |
// are only useful with the DH_DSS and DH_RSA key exchange |
|
803 |
// algorithms. |
|
804 |
// |
|
805 |
// Needed only if server requires client to authenticate self. |
|
806 |
// Illegal for anonymous flavors, so we need to check that. |
|
807 |
// |
|
7043 | 808 |
// CertificateRequest is omitted for Kerberos ciphers |
809 |
if (doClientAuth != SSLEngineImpl.clauth_none && |
|
810 |
keyExchange != K_DH_ANON && keyExchange != K_ECDH_ANON && |
|
811 |
keyExchange != K_KRB5 && keyExchange != K_KRB5_EXPORT) { |
|
2 | 812 |
|
813 |
CertificateRequest m4; |
|
814 |
X509Certificate caCerts[]; |
|
815 |
||
7043 | 816 |
Collection<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm> localSignAlgs = null; |
817 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
|
818 |
// We currently use all local upported signature and hash |
|
819 |
// algorithms. However, to minimize the computation cost |
|
820 |
// of requested hash algorithms, we may use a restricted |
|
821 |
// set of signature algorithms in the future. |
|
822 |
localSignAlgs = getLocalSupportedSignAlgs(); |
|
823 |
if (localSignAlgs.isEmpty()) { |
|
824 |
throw new SSLHandshakeException( |
|
825 |
"No supported signature algorithm"); |
|
826 |
} |
|
827 |
||
828 |
Set<String> localHashAlgs = |
|
829 |
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getHashAlgorithmNames( |
|
830 |
localSignAlgs); |
|
831 |
if (localHashAlgs.isEmpty()) { |
|
832 |
throw new SSLHandshakeException( |
|
833 |
"No supported signature algorithm"); |
|
834 |
} |
|
835 |
handshakeHash.restrictCertificateVerifyAlgs(localHashAlgs); |
|
836 |
} |
|
837 |
||
2 | 838 |
caCerts = sslContext.getX509TrustManager().getAcceptedIssuers(); |
7043 | 839 |
m4 = new CertificateRequest(caCerts, keyExchange, |
840 |
localSignAlgs, protocolVersion); |
|
2 | 841 |
|
842 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
843 |
m4.print(System.out); |
|
844 |
} |
|
845 |
m4.write(output); |
|
7043 | 846 |
} else { |
847 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
|
848 |
handshakeHash.setCertificateVerifyAlg(null); |
|
849 |
} |
|
2 | 850 |
} |
851 |
||
852 |
/* |
|
853 |
* FIFTH, say ServerHelloDone. |
|
854 |
*/ |
|
855 |
ServerHelloDone m5 = new ServerHelloDone(); |
|
856 |
||
857 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
858 |
m5.print(System.out); |
|
859 |
} |
|
860 |
m5.write(output); |
|
861 |
||
862 |
/* |
|
863 |
* Flush any buffered messages so the client will see them. |
|
864 |
* Ideally, all the messages above go in a single network level |
|
865 |
* message to the client. Without big Certificate chains, it's |
|
866 |
* going to be the common case. |
|
867 |
*/ |
|
868 |
output.flush(); |
|
869 |
} |
|
870 |
||
871 |
/* |
|
872 |
* Choose cipher suite from among those supported by client. Sets |
|
873 |
* the cipherSuite and keyExchange variables. |
|
874 |
*/ |
|
875 |
private void chooseCipherSuite(ClientHello mesg) throws IOException { |
|
876 |
for (CipherSuite suite : mesg.getCipherSuites().collection()) { |
|
6856 | 877 |
if (isNegotiable(suite) == false) { |
2 | 878 |
continue; |
879 |
} |
|
6856 | 880 |
|
2 | 881 |
if (doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_required) { |
6856 | 882 |
if ((suite.keyExchange == K_DH_ANON) || |
883 |
(suite.keyExchange == K_ECDH_ANON)) { |
|
2 | 884 |
continue; |
885 |
} |
|
886 |
} |
|
887 |
if (trySetCipherSuite(suite) == false) { |
|
888 |
continue; |
|
889 |
} |
|
890 |
return; |
|
891 |
} |
|
892 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, |
|
893 |
"no cipher suites in common"); |
|
894 |
} |
|
895 |
||
896 |
/** |
|
897 |
* Set the given CipherSuite, if possible. Return the result. |
|
898 |
* The call succeeds if the CipherSuite is available and we have |
|
899 |
* the necessary certificates to complete the handshake. We don't |
|
900 |
* check if the CipherSuite is actually enabled. |
|
901 |
* |
|
902 |
* If successful, this method also generates ephemeral keys if |
|
903 |
* required for this ciphersuite. This may take some time, so this |
|
904 |
* method should only be called if you really want to use the |
|
905 |
* CipherSuite. |
|
906 |
* |
|
7039 | 907 |
* This method is called from chooseCipherSuite() in this class. |
2 | 908 |
*/ |
909 |
boolean trySetCipherSuite(CipherSuite suite) { |
|
910 |
/* |
|
911 |
* If we're resuming a session we know we can |
|
912 |
* support this key exchange algorithm and in fact |
|
913 |
* have already cached the result of it in |
|
914 |
* the session state. |
|
915 |
*/ |
|
916 |
if (resumingSession) { |
|
917 |
return true; |
|
918 |
} |
|
919 |
||
6856 | 920 |
if (suite.isNegotiable() == false) { |
2 | 921 |
return false; |
922 |
} |
|
923 |
||
7043 | 924 |
// must not negotiate the obsoleted weak cipher suites. |
7039 | 925 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= suite.obsoleted) { |
926 |
return false; |
|
927 |
} |
|
928 |
||
7043 | 929 |
// must not negotiate unsupported cipher suites. |
930 |
if (protocolVersion.v < suite.supported) { |
|
931 |
return false; |
|
932 |
} |
|
933 |
||
2 | 934 |
KeyExchange keyExchange = suite.keyExchange; |
935 |
||
936 |
// null out any existing references |
|
937 |
privateKey = null; |
|
938 |
certs = null; |
|
939 |
dh = null; |
|
940 |
tempPrivateKey = null; |
|
941 |
tempPublicKey = null; |
|
942 |
||
7043 | 943 |
Collection<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm> supportedSignAlgs = null; |
944 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
|
945 |
if (peerSupportedSignAlgs != null) { |
|
946 |
supportedSignAlgs = peerSupportedSignAlgs; |
|
947 |
} else { |
|
948 |
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm = null; |
|
949 |
||
950 |
// we may optimize the performance |
|
951 |
switch (keyExchange) { |
|
952 |
// If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of |
|
953 |
// (RSA, DHE_RSA, DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), |
|
954 |
// behave as if client had sent the value {sha1,rsa}. |
|
955 |
case K_RSA: |
|
956 |
case K_DHE_RSA: |
|
957 |
case K_DH_RSA: |
|
958 |
// case K_RSA_PSK: |
|
959 |
case K_ECDH_RSA: |
|
960 |
case K_ECDHE_RSA: |
|
961 |
algorithm = SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.valueOf( |
|
962 |
HashAlgorithm.SHA1.value, |
|
963 |
SignatureAlgorithm.RSA.value, 0); |
|
964 |
break; |
|
965 |
// If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of |
|
966 |
// (DHE_DSS, DH_DSS), behave as if the client had |
|
967 |
// sent the value {sha1,dsa}. |
|
968 |
case K_DHE_DSS: |
|
969 |
case K_DH_DSS: |
|
970 |
algorithm = SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.valueOf( |
|
971 |
HashAlgorithm.SHA1.value, |
|
972 |
SignatureAlgorithm.DSA.value, 0); |
|
973 |
break; |
|
974 |
// If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of |
|
975 |
// (ECDH_ECDSA, ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client |
|
976 |
// had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}. |
|
977 |
case K_ECDH_ECDSA: |
|
978 |
case K_ECDHE_ECDSA: |
|
979 |
algorithm = SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.valueOf( |
|
980 |
HashAlgorithm.SHA1.value, |
|
981 |
SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA.value, 0); |
|
982 |
break; |
|
983 |
default: |
|
984 |
// no peer supported signature algorithms |
|
985 |
} |
|
986 |
||
987 |
if (algorithm == null) { |
|
988 |
supportedSignAlgs = |
|
989 |
Collections.<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm>emptySet(); |
|
990 |
} else { |
|
991 |
supportedSignAlgs = |
|
992 |
new ArrayList<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm>(1); |
|
993 |
supportedSignAlgs.add(algorithm); |
|
994 |
} |
|
995 |
||
996 |
// Sets the peer supported signature algorithm to use in KM |
|
997 |
// temporarily. |
|
998 |
session.setPeerSupportedSignatureAlgorithms(supportedSignAlgs); |
|
999 |
} |
|
1000 |
} |
|
1001 |
||
2 | 1002 |
switch (keyExchange) { |
1003 |
case K_RSA: |
|
7043 | 1004 |
// need RSA certs for authentication |
1005 |
if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("RSA") == false) { |
|
1006 |
return false; |
|
1007 |
} |
|
1008 |
break; |
|
2 | 1009 |
case K_RSA_EXPORT: |
1010 |
// need RSA certs for authentication |
|
1011 |
if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("RSA") == false) { |
|
1012 |
return false; |
|
1013 |
} |
|
1014 |
||
7043 | 1015 |
try { |
1016 |
if (JsseJce.getRSAKeyLength(certs[0].getPublicKey()) > 512) { |
|
1017 |
if (!setupEphemeralRSAKeys(suite.exportable)) { |
|
1018 |
return false; |
|
1019 |
} |
|
1020 |
} |
|
1021 |
} catch (RuntimeException e) { |
|
1022 |
// could not determine keylength, ignore key |
|
1023 |
return false; |
|
1024 |
} |
|
1025 |
break; |
|
1026 |
case K_DHE_RSA: |
|
11521
d7698e6c5f51
7106773: 512 bits RSA key cannot work with SHA384 and SHA512
xuelei
parents:
9499
diff
changeset
|
1027 |
// need RSA certs for authentication |
d7698e6c5f51
7106773: 512 bits RSA key cannot work with SHA384 and SHA512
xuelei
parents:
9499
diff
changeset
|
1028 |
if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("RSA") == false) { |
d7698e6c5f51
7106773: 512 bits RSA key cannot work with SHA384 and SHA512
xuelei
parents:
9499
diff
changeset
|
1029 |
return false; |
d7698e6c5f51
7106773: 512 bits RSA key cannot work with SHA384 and SHA512
xuelei
parents:
9499
diff
changeset
|
1030 |
} |
d7698e6c5f51
7106773: 512 bits RSA key cannot work with SHA384 and SHA512
xuelei
parents:
9499
diff
changeset
|
1031 |
|
7043 | 1032 |
// get preferable peer signature algorithm for server key exchange |
1033 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
|
1034 |
preferableSignatureAlgorithm = |
|
1035 |
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getPreferableAlgorithm( |
|
11521
d7698e6c5f51
7106773: 512 bits RSA key cannot work with SHA384 and SHA512
xuelei
parents:
9499
diff
changeset
|
1036 |
supportedSignAlgs, "RSA", privateKey); |
7043 | 1037 |
if (preferableSignatureAlgorithm == null) { |
2 | 1038 |
return false; |
1039 |
} |
|
7043 | 1040 |
} |
1041 |
||
11521
d7698e6c5f51
7106773: 512 bits RSA key cannot work with SHA384 and SHA512
xuelei
parents:
9499
diff
changeset
|
1042 |
setupEphemeralDHKeys(suite.exportable); |
d7698e6c5f51
7106773: 512 bits RSA key cannot work with SHA384 and SHA512
xuelei
parents:
9499
diff
changeset
|
1043 |
break; |
d7698e6c5f51
7106773: 512 bits RSA key cannot work with SHA384 and SHA512
xuelei
parents:
9499
diff
changeset
|
1044 |
case K_ECDHE_RSA: |
7043 | 1045 |
// need RSA certs for authentication |
1046 |
if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("RSA") == false) { |
|
1047 |
return false; |
|
1048 |
} |
|
11521
d7698e6c5f51
7106773: 512 bits RSA key cannot work with SHA384 and SHA512
xuelei
parents:
9499
diff
changeset
|
1049 |
|
7043 | 1050 |
// get preferable peer signature algorithm for server key exchange |
1051 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
|
1052 |
preferableSignatureAlgorithm = |
|
1053 |
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getPreferableAlgorithm( |
|
11521
d7698e6c5f51
7106773: 512 bits RSA key cannot work with SHA384 and SHA512
xuelei
parents:
9499
diff
changeset
|
1054 |
supportedSignAlgs, "RSA", privateKey); |
7043 | 1055 |
if (preferableSignatureAlgorithm == null) { |
2 | 1056 |
return false; |
1057 |
} |
|
7043 | 1058 |
} |
1059 |
||
1060 |
if (setupEphemeralECDHKeys() == false) { |
|
1061 |
return false; |
|
1062 |
} |
|
2 | 1063 |
break; |
1064 |
case K_DHE_DSS: |
|
7043 | 1065 |
// get preferable peer signature algorithm for server key exchange |
1066 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
|
1067 |
preferableSignatureAlgorithm = |
|
1068 |
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getPreferableAlgorithm( |
|
1069 |
supportedSignAlgs, "DSA"); |
|
1070 |
if (preferableSignatureAlgorithm == null) { |
|
1071 |
return false; |
|
1072 |
} |
|
1073 |
} |
|
1074 |
||
2 | 1075 |
// need DSS certs for authentication |
1076 |
if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("DSA") == false) { |
|
1077 |
return false; |
|
1078 |
} |
|
1079 |
setupEphemeralDHKeys(suite.exportable); |
|
1080 |
break; |
|
1081 |
case K_ECDHE_ECDSA: |
|
7043 | 1082 |
// get preferable peer signature algorithm for server key exchange |
1083 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
|
1084 |
preferableSignatureAlgorithm = |
|
1085 |
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getPreferableAlgorithm( |
|
1086 |
supportedSignAlgs, "ECDSA"); |
|
1087 |
if (preferableSignatureAlgorithm == null) { |
|
1088 |
return false; |
|
1089 |
} |
|
1090 |
} |
|
1091 |
||
2 | 1092 |
// need EC cert signed using EC |
1093 |
if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("EC_EC") == false) { |
|
1094 |
return false; |
|
1095 |
} |
|
1096 |
if (setupEphemeralECDHKeys() == false) { |
|
1097 |
return false; |
|
1098 |
} |
|
1099 |
break; |
|
1100 |
case K_ECDH_RSA: |
|
1101 |
// need EC cert signed using RSA |
|
1102 |
if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("EC_RSA") == false) { |
|
1103 |
return false; |
|
1104 |
} |
|
1105 |
setupStaticECDHKeys(); |
|
1106 |
break; |
|
1107 |
case K_ECDH_ECDSA: |
|
1108 |
// need EC cert signed using EC |
|
1109 |
if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("EC_EC") == false) { |
|
1110 |
return false; |
|
1111 |
} |
|
1112 |
setupStaticECDHKeys(); |
|
1113 |
break; |
|
1114 |
case K_KRB5: |
|
1115 |
case K_KRB5_EXPORT: |
|
1116 |
// need Kerberos Key |
|
1117 |
if (!setupKerberosKeys()) { |
|
1118 |
return false; |
|
1119 |
} |
|
1120 |
break; |
|
1121 |
case K_DH_ANON: |
|
1122 |
// no certs needed for anonymous |
|
1123 |
setupEphemeralDHKeys(suite.exportable); |
|
1124 |
break; |
|
1125 |
case K_ECDH_ANON: |
|
1126 |
// no certs needed for anonymous |
|
1127 |
if (setupEphemeralECDHKeys() == false) { |
|
1128 |
return false; |
|
1129 |
} |
|
1130 |
break; |
|
1131 |
default: |
|
1132 |
// internal error, unknown key exchange |
|
1133 |
throw new RuntimeException("Unrecognized cipherSuite: " + suite); |
|
1134 |
} |
|
1135 |
setCipherSuite(suite); |
|
7043 | 1136 |
|
1137 |
// set the peer implicit supported signature algorithms |
|
1138 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
|
1139 |
if (peerSupportedSignAlgs == null) { |
|
1140 |
setPeerSupportedSignAlgs(supportedSignAlgs); |
|
1141 |
// we had alreay update the session |
|
1142 |
} |
|
1143 |
} |
|
2 | 1144 |
return true; |
1145 |
} |
|
1146 |
||
1147 |
/* |
|
1148 |
* Get some "ephemeral" RSA keys for this context. This means |
|
1149 |
* generating them if it's not already been done. |
|
1150 |
* |
|
1151 |
* Note that we currently do not implement any ciphersuites that use |
|
1152 |
* strong ephemeral RSA. (We do not support the EXPORT1024 ciphersuites |
|
1153 |
* and standard RSA ciphersuites prohibit ephemeral mode for some reason) |
|
1154 |
* This means that export is always true and 512 bit keys are generated. |
|
1155 |
*/ |
|
1156 |
private boolean setupEphemeralRSAKeys(boolean export) { |
|
1157 |
KeyPair kp = sslContext.getEphemeralKeyManager(). |
|
1158 |
getRSAKeyPair(export, sslContext.getSecureRandom()); |
|
1159 |
if (kp == null) { |
|
1160 |
return false; |
|
1161 |
} else { |
|
1162 |
tempPublicKey = kp.getPublic(); |
|
1163 |
tempPrivateKey = kp.getPrivate(); |
|
1164 |
return true; |
|
1165 |
} |
|
1166 |
} |
|
1167 |
||
1168 |
/* |
|
1169 |
* Acquire some "ephemeral" Diffie-Hellman keys for this handshake. |
|
1170 |
* We don't reuse these, for improved forward secrecy. |
|
1171 |
*/ |
|
1172 |
private void setupEphemeralDHKeys(boolean export) { |
|
1173 |
/* |
|
1174 |
* Diffie-Hellman keys ... we use 768 bit private keys due |
|
1175 |
* to the "use twice as many key bits as bits you want secret" |
|
1176 |
* rule of thumb, assuming we want the same size premaster |
|
1177 |
* secret with Diffie-Hellman and RSA key exchanges. Except |
|
1178 |
* that exportable ciphers max out at 512 bits modulus values. |
|
1179 |
*/ |
|
1180 |
dh = new DHCrypt((export ? 512 : 768), sslContext.getSecureRandom()); |
|
1181 |
} |
|
1182 |
||
1183 |
// Setup the ephemeral ECDH parameters. |
|
1184 |
// If we cannot continue because we do not support any of the curves that |
|
1185 |
// the client requested, return false. Otherwise (all is well), return true. |
|
1186 |
private boolean setupEphemeralECDHKeys() { |
|
1187 |
int index = -1; |
|
1188 |
if (supportedCurves != null) { |
|
1189 |
// if the client sent the supported curves extension, pick the |
|
1190 |
// first one that we support; |
|
1191 |
for (int curveId : supportedCurves.curveIds()) { |
|
1192 |
if (SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.isSupported(curveId)) { |
|
1193 |
index = curveId; |
|
1194 |
break; |
|
1195 |
} |
|
1196 |
} |
|
1197 |
if (index < 0) { |
|
1198 |
// no match found, cannot use this ciphersuite |
|
1199 |
return false; |
|
1200 |
} |
|
1201 |
} else { |
|
1202 |
// pick our preference |
|
1203 |
index = SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.DEFAULT.curveIds()[0]; |
|
1204 |
} |
|
1205 |
String oid = SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.getCurveOid(index); |
|
1206 |
ecdh = new ECDHCrypt(oid, sslContext.getSecureRandom()); |
|
1207 |
return true; |
|
1208 |
} |
|
1209 |
||
1210 |
private void setupStaticECDHKeys() { |
|
1211 |
// don't need to check whether the curve is supported, already done |
|
1212 |
// in setupPrivateKeyAndChain(). |
|
1213 |
ecdh = new ECDHCrypt(privateKey, certs[0].getPublicKey()); |
|
1214 |
} |
|
1215 |
||
1216 |
/** |
|
1217 |
* Retrieve the server key and certificate for the specified algorithm |
|
1218 |
* from the KeyManager and set the instance variables. |
|
1219 |
* |
|
1220 |
* @return true if successful, false if not available or invalid |
|
1221 |
*/ |
|
1222 |
private boolean setupPrivateKeyAndChain(String algorithm) { |
|
1223 |
X509ExtendedKeyManager km = sslContext.getX509KeyManager(); |
|
1224 |
String alias; |
|
1225 |
if (conn != null) { |
|
1226 |
alias = km.chooseServerAlias(algorithm, null, conn); |
|
1227 |
} else { |
|
1228 |
alias = km.chooseEngineServerAlias(algorithm, null, engine); |
|
1229 |
} |
|
1230 |
if (alias == null) { |
|
1231 |
return false; |
|
1232 |
} |
|
1233 |
PrivateKey tempPrivateKey = km.getPrivateKey(alias); |
|
1234 |
if (tempPrivateKey == null) { |
|
1235 |
return false; |
|
1236 |
} |
|
1237 |
X509Certificate[] tempCerts = km.getCertificateChain(alias); |
|
1238 |
if ((tempCerts == null) || (tempCerts.length == 0)) { |
|
1239 |
return false; |
|
1240 |
} |
|
1241 |
String keyAlgorithm = algorithm.split("_")[0]; |
|
1242 |
PublicKey publicKey = tempCerts[0].getPublicKey(); |
|
1243 |
if ((tempPrivateKey.getAlgorithm().equals(keyAlgorithm) == false) |
|
1244 |
|| (publicKey.getAlgorithm().equals(keyAlgorithm) == false)) { |
|
1245 |
return false; |
|
1246 |
} |
|
1247 |
// For ECC certs, check whether we support the EC domain parameters. |
|
1248 |
// If the client sent a SupportedEllipticCurves ClientHello extension, |
|
1249 |
// check against that too. |
|
1250 |
if (keyAlgorithm.equals("EC")) { |
|
1251 |
if (publicKey instanceof ECPublicKey == false) { |
|
1252 |
return false; |
|
1253 |
} |
|
1254 |
ECParameterSpec params = ((ECPublicKey)publicKey).getParams(); |
|
1255 |
int index = SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.getCurveIndex(params); |
|
1256 |
if (SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.isSupported(index) == false) { |
|
1257 |
return false; |
|
1258 |
} |
|
1259 |
if ((supportedCurves != null) && !supportedCurves.contains(index)) { |
|
1260 |
return false; |
|
1261 |
} |
|
1262 |
} |
|
1263 |
this.privateKey = tempPrivateKey; |
|
1264 |
this.certs = tempCerts; |
|
1265 |
return true; |
|
1266 |
} |
|
1267 |
||
1268 |
/** |
|
1269 |
* Retrieve the Kerberos key for the specified server principal |
|
1270 |
* from the JAAS configuration file. |
|
1271 |
* |
|
1272 |
* @return true if successful, false if not available or invalid |
|
1273 |
*/ |
|
1274 |
private boolean setupKerberosKeys() { |
|
1275 |
if (kerberosKeys != null) { |
|
1276 |
return true; |
|
1277 |
} |
|
1278 |
try { |
|
1279 |
final AccessControlContext acc = getAccSE(); |
|
1280 |
kerberosKeys = AccessController.doPrivileged( |
|
4236 | 1281 |
// Eliminate dependency on KerberosKey |
1282 |
new PrivilegedExceptionAction<SecretKey[]>() { |
|
1283 |
public SecretKey[] run() throws Exception { |
|
2 | 1284 |
// get kerberos key for the default principal |
4236 | 1285 |
return Krb5Helper.getServerKeys(acc); |
2 | 1286 |
}}); |
1287 |
||
1288 |
// check permission to access and use the secret key of the |
|
1289 |
// Kerberized "host" service |
|
9499 | 1290 |
if (kerberosKeys != null && kerberosKeys.length > 0) { |
2 | 1291 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
9499 | 1292 |
for (SecretKey k: kerberosKeys) { |
1293 |
System.out.println("Using Kerberos key: " + |
|
1294 |
k); |
|
1295 |
} |
|
2 | 1296 |
} |
1297 |
||
1298 |
String serverPrincipal = |
|
4236 | 1299 |
Krb5Helper.getServerPrincipalName(kerberosKeys[0]); |
2 | 1300 |
SecurityManager sm = System.getSecurityManager(); |
1301 |
try { |
|
1302 |
if (sm != null) { |
|
4236 | 1303 |
// Eliminate dependency on ServicePermission |
1304 |
sm.checkPermission(Krb5Helper.getServicePermission( |
|
1305 |
serverPrincipal, "accept"), acc); |
|
2 | 1306 |
} |
1307 |
} catch (SecurityException se) { |
|
1308 |
kerberosKeys = null; |
|
1309 |
// %%% destroy keys? or will that affect Subject? |
|
1310 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) |
|
1311 |
System.out.println("Permission to access Kerberos" |
|
1312 |
+ " secret key denied"); |
|
1313 |
return false; |
|
1314 |
} |
|
1315 |
} |
|
1316 |
return (kerberosKeys != null); |
|
1317 |
} catch (PrivilegedActionException e) { |
|
1318 |
// Likely exception here is LoginExceptin |
|
1319 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
1320 |
System.out.println("Attempt to obtain Kerberos key failed: " |
|
1321 |
+ e.toString()); |
|
1322 |
} |
|
1323 |
return false; |
|
1324 |
} |
|
1325 |
} |
|
1326 |
||
1327 |
/* |
|
1328 |
* For Kerberos ciphers, the premaster secret is encrypted using |
|
1329 |
* the session key. See RFC 2712. |
|
1330 |
*/ |
|
1331 |
private SecretKey clientKeyExchange(KerberosClientKeyExchange mesg) |
|
1332 |
throws IOException { |
|
1333 |
||
1334 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
1335 |
mesg.print(System.out); |
|
1336 |
} |
|
1337 |
||
1338 |
// Record the principals involved in exchange |
|
1339 |
session.setPeerPrincipal(mesg.getPeerPrincipal()); |
|
1340 |
session.setLocalPrincipal(mesg.getLocalPrincipal()); |
|
1341 |
||
4236 | 1342 |
byte[] b = mesg.getUnencryptedPreMasterSecret(); |
2 | 1343 |
return new SecretKeySpec(b, "TlsPremasterSecret"); |
1344 |
} |
|
1345 |
||
1346 |
/* |
|
1347 |
* Diffie Hellman key exchange is used when the server presented |
|
1348 |
* D-H parameters in its certificate (signed using RSA or DSS/DSA), |
|
1349 |
* or else the server presented no certificate but sent D-H params |
|
1350 |
* in a ServerKeyExchange message. Use of D-H is specified by the |
|
1351 |
* cipher suite chosen. |
|
1352 |
* |
|
1353 |
* The message optionally contains the client's D-H public key (if |
|
1354 |
* it wasn't not sent in a client certificate). As always with D-H, |
|
1355 |
* if a client and a server have each other's D-H public keys and |
|
1356 |
* they use common algorithm parameters, they have a shared key |
|
1357 |
* that's derived via the D-H calculation. That key becomes the |
|
1358 |
* pre-master secret. |
|
1359 |
*/ |
|
1360 |
private SecretKey clientKeyExchange(DHClientKeyExchange mesg) |
|
1361 |
throws IOException { |
|
1362 |
||
1363 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
1364 |
mesg.print(System.out); |
|
1365 |
} |
|
1366 |
return dh.getAgreedSecret(mesg.getClientPublicKey()); |
|
1367 |
} |
|
1368 |
||
1369 |
private SecretKey clientKeyExchange(ECDHClientKeyExchange mesg) |
|
1370 |
throws IOException { |
|
1371 |
||
1372 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
1373 |
mesg.print(System.out); |
|
1374 |
} |
|
1375 |
return ecdh.getAgreedSecret(mesg.getEncodedPoint()); |
|
1376 |
} |
|
1377 |
||
1378 |
/* |
|
1379 |
* Client wrote a message to verify the certificate it sent earlier. |
|
1380 |
* |
|
1381 |
* Note that this certificate isn't involved in key exchange. Client |
|
1382 |
* authentication messages are included in the checksums used to |
|
1383 |
* validate the handshake (e.g. Finished messages). Other than that, |
|
1384 |
* the _exact_ identity of the client is less fundamental to protocol |
|
1385 |
* security than its role in selecting keys via the pre-master secret. |
|
1386 |
*/ |
|
1387 |
private void clientCertificateVerify(CertificateVerify mesg) |
|
1388 |
throws IOException { |
|
1389 |
||
1390 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
1391 |
mesg.print(System.out); |
|
1392 |
} |
|
1393 |
||
7043 | 1394 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
1395 |
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm signAlg = |
|
1396 |
mesg.getPreferableSignatureAlgorithm(); |
|
1397 |
if (signAlg == null) { |
|
1398 |
throw new SSLHandshakeException( |
|
1399 |
"Illegal CertificateVerify message"); |
|
1400 |
} |
|
1401 |
||
1402 |
String hashAlg = |
|
1403 |
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getHashAlgorithmName(signAlg); |
|
1404 |
if (hashAlg == null || hashAlg.length() == 0) { |
|
1405 |
throw new SSLHandshakeException( |
|
1406 |
"No supported hash algorithm"); |
|
1407 |
} |
|
1408 |
||
1409 |
handshakeHash.setCertificateVerifyAlg(hashAlg); |
|
1410 |
} |
|
1411 |
||
2 | 1412 |
try { |
1413 |
PublicKey publicKey = |
|
1414 |
session.getPeerCertificates()[0].getPublicKey(); |
|
1415 |
||
1416 |
boolean valid = mesg.verify(protocolVersion, handshakeHash, |
|
1417 |
publicKey, session.getMasterSecret()); |
|
1418 |
if (valid == false) { |
|
1419 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_bad_certificate, |
|
1420 |
"certificate verify message signature error"); |
|
1421 |
} |
|
1422 |
} catch (GeneralSecurityException e) { |
|
1423 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_bad_certificate, |
|
1424 |
"certificate verify format error", e); |
|
1425 |
} |
|
1426 |
||
1427 |
// reset the flag for clientCertificateVerify message |
|
1428 |
needClientVerify = false; |
|
1429 |
} |
|
1430 |
||
1431 |
||
1432 |
/* |
|
1433 |
* Client writes "finished" at the end of its handshake, after cipher |
|
1434 |
* spec is changed. We verify it and then send ours. |
|
1435 |
* |
|
1436 |
* When we're resuming a session, we'll have already sent our own |
|
1437 |
* Finished message so just the verification is needed. |
|
1438 |
*/ |
|
1439 |
private void clientFinished(Finished mesg) throws IOException { |
|
1440 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
1441 |
mesg.print(System.out); |
|
1442 |
} |
|
1443 |
||
1444 |
/* |
|
1445 |
* Verify if client did send the certificate when client |
|
1446 |
* authentication was required, otherwise server should not proceed |
|
1447 |
*/ |
|
1448 |
if (doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_required) { |
|
1449 |
// get X500Principal of the end-entity certificate for X509-based |
|
1450 |
// ciphersuites, or Kerberos principal for Kerberos ciphersuites |
|
1451 |
session.getPeerPrincipal(); |
|
1452 |
} |
|
1453 |
||
1454 |
/* |
|
1455 |
* Verify if client did send clientCertificateVerify message following |
|
1456 |
* the client Certificate, otherwise server should not proceed |
|
1457 |
*/ |
|
1458 |
if (needClientVerify) { |
|
1459 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, |
|
1460 |
"client did not send certificate verify message"); |
|
1461 |
} |
|
1462 |
||
1463 |
/* |
|
1464 |
* Verify the client's message with the "before" digest of messages, |
|
1465 |
* and forget about continuing to use that digest. |
|
1466 |
*/ |
|
7043 | 1467 |
boolean verified = mesg.verify(handshakeHash, Finished.CLIENT, |
1468 |
session.getMasterSecret()); |
|
2 | 1469 |
|
1470 |
if (!verified) { |
|
1471 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, |
|
1472 |
"client 'finished' message doesn't verify"); |
|
1473 |
// NOTREACHED |
|
1474 |
} |
|
1475 |
||
1476 |
/* |
|
6856 | 1477 |
* save client verify data for secure renegotiation |
1478 |
*/ |
|
1479 |
if (secureRenegotiation) { |
|
1480 |
clientVerifyData = mesg.getVerifyData(); |
|
1481 |
} |
|
1482 |
||
1483 |
/* |
|
2 | 1484 |
* OK, it verified. If we're doing the full handshake, add that |
1485 |
* "Finished" message to the hash of handshake messages, then send |
|
1486 |
* the change_cipher_spec and Finished message. |
|
1487 |
*/ |
|
1488 |
if (!resumingSession) { |
|
1489 |
input.digestNow(); |
|
1490 |
sendChangeCipherAndFinish(true); |
|
1491 |
} |
|
1492 |
||
1493 |
/* |
|
1494 |
* Update the session cache only after the handshake completed, else |
|
1495 |
* we're open to an attack against a partially completed handshake. |
|
1496 |
*/ |
|
1497 |
session.setLastAccessedTime(System.currentTimeMillis()); |
|
1498 |
if (!resumingSession && session.isRejoinable()) { |
|
1499 |
((SSLSessionContextImpl)sslContext.engineGetServerSessionContext()) |
|
1500 |
.put(session); |
|
1501 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) { |
|
1502 |
System.out.println( |
|
1503 |
"%% Cached server session: " + session); |
|
1504 |
} |
|
1505 |
} else if (!resumingSession && |
|
1506 |
debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) { |
|
1507 |
System.out.println( |
|
1508 |
"%% Didn't cache non-resumable server session: " |
|
1509 |
+ session); |
|
1510 |
} |
|
1511 |
} |
|
1512 |
||
1513 |
/* |
|
1514 |
* Compute finished message with the "server" digest (and then forget |
|
1515 |
* about that digest, it can't be used again). |
|
1516 |
*/ |
|
1517 |
private void sendChangeCipherAndFinish(boolean finishedTag) |
|
1518 |
throws IOException { |
|
1519 |
||
1520 |
output.flush(); |
|
1521 |
||
1522 |
Finished mesg = new Finished(protocolVersion, handshakeHash, |
|
7043 | 1523 |
Finished.SERVER, session.getMasterSecret(), cipherSuite); |
2 | 1524 |
|
1525 |
/* |
|
1526 |
* Send the change_cipher_spec record; then our Finished handshake |
|
1527 |
* message will be the last handshake message. Flush, and now we |
|
1528 |
* are ready for application data!! |
|
1529 |
*/ |
|
1530 |
sendChangeCipherSpec(mesg, finishedTag); |
|
1531 |
||
1532 |
/* |
|
6856 | 1533 |
* save server verify data for secure renegotiation |
1534 |
*/ |
|
1535 |
if (secureRenegotiation) { |
|
1536 |
serverVerifyData = mesg.getVerifyData(); |
|
1537 |
} |
|
1538 |
||
1539 |
/* |
|
2 | 1540 |
* Update state machine so client MUST send 'finished' next |
1541 |
* The update should only take place if it is not in the fast |
|
1542 |
* handshake mode since the server has to wait for a finished |
|
1543 |
* message from the client. |
|
1544 |
*/ |
|
1545 |
if (finishedTag) { |
|
1546 |
state = HandshakeMessage.ht_finished; |
|
1547 |
} |
|
1548 |
} |
|
1549 |
||
1550 |
||
1551 |
/* |
|
1552 |
* Returns a HelloRequest message to kickstart renegotiations |
|
1553 |
*/ |
|
1554 |
HandshakeMessage getKickstartMessage() { |
|
1555 |
return new HelloRequest(); |
|
1556 |
} |
|
1557 |
||
1558 |
||
1559 |
/* |
|
1560 |
* Fault detected during handshake. |
|
1561 |
*/ |
|
1562 |
void handshakeAlert(byte description) throws SSLProtocolException { |
|
1563 |
||
1564 |
String message = Alerts.alertDescription(description); |
|
1565 |
||
1566 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
1567 |
System.out.println("SSL -- handshake alert: " |
|
1568 |
+ message); |
|
1569 |
} |
|
1570 |
||
1571 |
/* |
|
1572 |
* It's ok to get a no_certificate alert from a client of which |
|
1573 |
* we *requested* authentication information. |
|
1574 |
* However, if we *required* it, then this is not acceptable. |
|
1575 |
* |
|
1576 |
* Anyone calling getPeerCertificates() on the |
|
1577 |
* session will get an SSLPeerUnverifiedException. |
|
1578 |
*/ |
|
1579 |
if ((description == Alerts.alert_no_certificate) && |
|
1580 |
(doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_requested)) { |
|
1581 |
return; |
|
1582 |
} |
|
1583 |
||
1584 |
throw new SSLProtocolException("handshake alert: " + message); |
|
1585 |
} |
|
1586 |
||
1587 |
/* |
|
1588 |
* RSA key exchange is normally used. The client encrypts a "pre-master |
|
1589 |
* secret" with the server's public key, from the Certificate (or else |
|
1590 |
* ServerKeyExchange) message that was sent to it by the server. That's |
|
1591 |
* decrypted using the private key before we get here. |
|
1592 |
*/ |
|
7043 | 1593 |
private SecretKey clientKeyExchange(RSAClientKeyExchange mesg) |
1594 |
throws IOException { |
|
2 | 1595 |
|
1596 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
1597 |
mesg.print(System.out); |
|
1598 |
} |
|
1599 |
return mesg.preMaster; |
|
1600 |
} |
|
1601 |
||
1602 |
/* |
|
1603 |
* Verify the certificate sent by the client. We'll only get one if we |
|
1604 |
* sent a CertificateRequest to request client authentication. If we |
|
1605 |
* are in TLS mode, the client may send a message with no certificates |
|
1606 |
* to indicate it does not have an appropriate chain. (In SSLv3 mode, |
|
1607 |
* it would send a no certificate alert). |
|
1608 |
*/ |
|
1609 |
private void clientCertificate(CertificateMsg mesg) throws IOException { |
|
1610 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { |
|
1611 |
mesg.print(System.out); |
|
1612 |
} |
|
1613 |
||
1614 |
X509Certificate[] peerCerts = mesg.getCertificateChain(); |
|
1615 |
||
1616 |
if (peerCerts.length == 0) { |
|
1617 |
/* |
|
1618 |
* If the client authentication is only *REQUESTED* (e.g. |
|
1619 |
* not *REQUIRED*, this is an acceptable condition.) |
|
1620 |
*/ |
|
1621 |
if (doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_requested) { |
|
7043 | 1622 |
// Smart (aka stupid) to forecast that no CertificateVerify |
1623 |
// message will be received. |
|
1624 |
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { |
|
1625 |
handshakeHash.setCertificateVerifyAlg(null); |
|
1626 |
} |
|
2 | 1627 |
return; |
1628 |
} else { |
|
1629 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_bad_certificate, |
|
1630 |
"null cert chain"); |
|
1631 |
} |
|
1632 |
} |
|
1633 |
||
1634 |
// ask the trust manager to verify the chain |
|
1635 |
X509TrustManager tm = sslContext.getX509TrustManager(); |
|
1636 |
||
1637 |
try { |
|
1638 |
// find out the types of client authentication used |
|
1639 |
PublicKey key = peerCerts[0].getPublicKey(); |
|
1640 |
String keyAlgorithm = key.getAlgorithm(); |
|
1641 |
String authType; |
|
1642 |
if (keyAlgorithm.equals("RSA")) { |
|
1643 |
authType = "RSA"; |
|
1644 |
} else if (keyAlgorithm.equals("DSA")) { |
|
1645 |
authType = "DSA"; |
|
1646 |
} else if (keyAlgorithm.equals("EC")) { |
|
1647 |
authType = "EC"; |
|
1648 |
} else { |
|
1649 |
// unknown public key type |
|
1650 |
authType = "UNKNOWN"; |
|
1651 |
} |
|
1652 |
||
1653 |
if (tm instanceof X509ExtendedTrustManager) { |
|
7043 | 1654 |
if (conn != null) { |
1655 |
((X509ExtendedTrustManager)tm).checkClientTrusted( |
|
1656 |
peerCerts.clone(), |
|
2 | 1657 |
authType, |
7043 | 1658 |
conn); |
1659 |
} else { |
|
1660 |
((X509ExtendedTrustManager)tm).checkClientTrusted( |
|
1661 |
peerCerts.clone(), |
|
1662 |
authType, |
|
1663 |
engine); |
|
1664 |
} |
|
2 | 1665 |
} else { |
7043 | 1666 |
// Unlikely to happen, because we have wrapped the old |
1667 |
// X509TrustManager with the new X509ExtendedTrustManager. |
|
1668 |
throw new CertificateException( |
|
1669 |
"Improper X509TrustManager implementation"); |
|
2 | 1670 |
} |
1671 |
} catch (CertificateException e) { |
|
1672 |
// This will throw an exception, so include the original error. |
|
1673 |
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_certificate_unknown, e); |
|
1674 |
} |
|
1675 |
// set the flag for clientCertificateVerify message |
|
1676 |
needClientVerify = true; |
|
1677 |
||
1678 |
session.setPeerCertificates(peerCerts); |
|
1679 |
} |
|
1680 |
} |