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/*
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* Copyright (c) 1996, 2008, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
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*
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* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
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* under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this
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* particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided
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* by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code.
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*
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* This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
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* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
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* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
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* version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that
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* accompanied this code).
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version
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* 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
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* Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
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*
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* Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA
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* or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any
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* questions.
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*/
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package sun.security.ssl;
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import java.io.*;
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import java.nio.*;
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import java.net.SocketException;
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import java.net.SocketTimeoutException;
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import javax.crypto.BadPaddingException;
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import javax.net.ssl.*;
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import sun.misc.HexDumpEncoder;
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/**
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* SSL 3.0 records, as pulled off a TCP stream. Input records are
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* basically buffers tied to a particular input stream ... a layer
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* above this must map these records into the model of a continuous
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* stream of data.
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*
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* Since this returns SSL 3.0 records, it's the layer that needs to
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* map SSL 2.0 style handshake records into SSL 3.0 ones for those
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* "old" clients that interop with both V2 and V3 servers. Not as
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* pretty as might be desired.
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*
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* NOTE: During handshaking, each message must be hashed to support
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* verification that the handshake process wasn't compromised.
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*
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* @author David Brownell
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*/
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class InputRecord extends ByteArrayInputStream implements Record {
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private HandshakeHash handshakeHash;
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private int lastHashed;
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boolean formatVerified = true; // SSLv2 ruled out?
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private boolean isClosed;
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private boolean appDataValid;
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// The ClientHello version to accept. If set to ProtocolVersion.SSL20Hello
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// and the first message we read is a ClientHello in V2 format, we convert
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// it to V3. Otherwise we throw an exception when encountering a V2 hello.
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private ProtocolVersion helloVersion;
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/* Class and subclass dynamic debugging support */
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static final Debug debug = Debug.getInstance("ssl");
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/* The existing record length */
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private int exlen;
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/* V2 handshake message */
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private byte v2Buf[];
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/*
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* Construct the record to hold the maximum sized input record.
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* Data will be filled in separately.
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*/
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InputRecord() {
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super(new byte[maxRecordSize]);
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setHelloVersion(ProtocolVersion.DEFAULT_HELLO);
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pos = headerSize;
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count = headerSize;
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lastHashed = count;
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exlen = 0;
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v2Buf = null;
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}
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void setHelloVersion(ProtocolVersion helloVersion) {
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this.helloVersion = helloVersion;
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}
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ProtocolVersion getHelloVersion() {
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return helloVersion;
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}
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/*
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* Enable format checks if initial handshaking hasn't completed
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*/
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void enableFormatChecks() {
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formatVerified = false;
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}
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// return whether the data in this record is valid, decrypted data
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boolean isAppDataValid() {
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return appDataValid;
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}
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void setAppDataValid(boolean value) {
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appDataValid = value;
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}
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/*
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* Return the content type of the record.
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*/
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byte contentType() {
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return buf[0];
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}
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/*
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* For handshaking, we need to be able to hash every byte above the
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* record marking layer. This is where we're guaranteed to see those
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* bytes, so this is where we can hash them ... especially in the
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* case of hashing the initial V2 message!
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*/
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void setHandshakeHash(HandshakeHash handshakeHash) {
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this.handshakeHash = handshakeHash;
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}
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HandshakeHash getHandshakeHash() {
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return handshakeHash;
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}
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/*
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* Verify and remove the MAC ... used for all records.
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*/
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boolean checkMAC(MAC signer) {
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int len = signer.MAClen();
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if (len == 0) { // no mac
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return true;
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}
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int offset = count - len;
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if (offset < headerSize) {
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// data length would be negative, something is wrong
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return false;
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}
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byte[] mac = signer.compute(contentType(), buf,
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headerSize, offset - headerSize);
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if (len != mac.length) {
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throw new RuntimeException("Internal MAC error");
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}
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for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
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if (buf[offset + i] != mac[i]) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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count -= len;
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return true;
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}
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void decrypt(CipherBox box) throws BadPaddingException {
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int len = count - headerSize;
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count = headerSize + box.decrypt(buf, headerSize, len);
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}
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/*
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* Well ... hello_request messages are _never_ hashed since we can't
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* know when they'd appear in the sequence.
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*/
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void ignore(int bytes) {
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if (bytes > 0) {
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pos += bytes;
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lastHashed = pos;
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}
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}
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/*
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* We hash the (plaintext) we've processed, but only on demand.
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*
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* There is one place where we want to access the hash in the middle
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* of a record: client cert message gets hashed, and part of the
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* same record is the client cert verify message which uses that hash.
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* So we track how much we've read and hashed.
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*/
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void doHashes() {
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int len = pos - lastHashed;
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if (len > 0) {
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hashInternal(buf, lastHashed, len);
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lastHashed = pos;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Need a helper function so we can hash the V2 hello correctly
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*/
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private void hashInternal(byte databuf [], int offset, int len) {
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if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("data")) {
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try {
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HexDumpEncoder hd = new HexDumpEncoder();
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System.out.println("[read] MD5 and SHA1 hashes: len = "
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+ len);
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hd.encodeBuffer(new ByteArrayInputStream(databuf, offset, len),
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System.out);
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} catch (IOException e) { }
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}
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handshakeHash.update(databuf, offset, len);
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}
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/*
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* Handshake messages may cross record boundaries. We "queue"
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* these in big buffers if we need to cope with this problem.
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* This is not anticipated to be a common case; if this turns
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* out to be wrong, this can readily be sped up.
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*/
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void queueHandshake(InputRecord r) throws IOException {
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int len;
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/*
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* Hash any data that's read but unhashed.
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*/
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doHashes();
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/*
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* Move any unread data to the front of the buffer,
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* flagging it all as unhashed.
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*/
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if (pos > headerSize) {
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len = count - pos;
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if (len != 0) {
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System.arraycopy(buf, pos, buf, headerSize, len);
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}
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pos = headerSize;
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lastHashed = pos;
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count = headerSize + len;
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}
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/*
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* Grow "buf" if needed
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*/
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len = r.available() + count;
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if (buf.length < len) {
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byte newbuf [];
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newbuf = new byte [len];
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System.arraycopy(buf, 0, newbuf, 0, count);
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buf = newbuf;
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}
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/*
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* Append the new buffer to this one.
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*/
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System.arraycopy(r.buf, r.pos, buf, count, len - count);
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count = len;
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/*
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* Adjust lastHashed; important for now with clients which
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* send SSL V2 client hellos. This will go away eventually,
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* by buffer code cleanup.
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*/
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len = r.lastHashed - r.pos;
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if (pos == headerSize) {
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lastHashed += len;
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} else {
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throw new SSLProtocolException("?? confused buffer hashing ??");
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}
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// we've read the record, advance the pointers
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r.pos = r.count;
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}
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/**
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* Prevent any more data from being read into this record,
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* and flag the record as holding no data.
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*/
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public void close() {
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appDataValid = false;
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isClosed = true;
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mark = 0;
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pos = 0;
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count = 0;
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}
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/*
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* We may need to send this SSL v2 "No Cipher" message back, if we
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* are faced with an SSLv2 "hello" that's not saying "I talk v3".
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* It's the only one documented in the V2 spec as a fatal error.
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*/
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private static final byte[] v2NoCipher = {
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(byte)0x80, (byte)0x03, // unpadded 3 byte record
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(byte)0x00, // ... error message
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(byte)0x00, (byte)0x01 // ... NO_CIPHER error
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};
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private int readFully(InputStream s, byte b[], int off, int len)
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throws IOException {
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int n = 0;
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while (n < len) {
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int readLen = s.read(b, off + n, len - n);
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if (readLen < 0) {
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return readLen;
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}
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if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("packet")) {
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try {
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HexDumpEncoder hd = new HexDumpEncoder();
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ByteBuffer bb = ByteBuffer.wrap(b, off + n, readLen);
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System.out.println("[Raw read]: length = " +
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bb.remaining());
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hd.encodeBuffer(bb, System.out);
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} catch (IOException e) { }
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}
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n += readLen;
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exlen += readLen;
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}
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return n;
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}
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/*
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* Read the SSL V3 record ... first time around, check to see if it
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* really IS a V3 record. Handle SSL V2 clients which can talk V3.0,
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* as well as real V3 record format; otherwise report an error.
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*/
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void read(InputStream s, OutputStream o) throws IOException {
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if (isClosed) {
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return;
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}
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/*
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* For SSL it really _is_ an error if the other end went away
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* so ungracefully as to not shut down cleanly.
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*/
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if(exlen < headerSize) {
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int really = readFully(s, buf, exlen, headerSize - exlen);
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if (really < 0) {
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throw new EOFException("SSL peer shut down incorrectly");
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}
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pos = headerSize;
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count = headerSize;
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lastHashed = pos;
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}
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/*
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* The first record might use some other record marking convention,
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* typically SSL v2 header. (PCT could also be detected here.)
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* This case is currently common -- Navigator 3.0 usually works
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* this way, as do IE 3.0 and other products.
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*/
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if (!formatVerified) {
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formatVerified = true;
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/*
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369 |
* The first record must either be a handshake record or an
|
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* alert message. If it's not, it is either invalid or an
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* SSLv2 message.
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*/
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if (buf[0] != ct_handshake && buf[0] != ct_alert) {
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handleUnknownRecord(s, o);
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375 |
} else {
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376 |
readV3Record(s, o);
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377 |
}
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378 |
} else { // formatVerified == true
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readV3Record(s, o);
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380 |
}
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381 |
}
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382 |
|
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383 |
/**
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* Read a SSL/TLS record. Throw an IOException if the format is invalid.
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385 |
*/
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386 |
private void readV3Record(InputStream s, OutputStream o)
|
|
387 |
throws IOException {
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|
388 |
ProtocolVersion recordVersion = ProtocolVersion.valueOf(buf[1], buf[2]);
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|
389 |
// Check if too old (currently not possible)
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390 |
// or if the major version does not match.
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391 |
// The actual version negotiation is in the handshaker classes
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392 |
if ((recordVersion.v < ProtocolVersion.MIN.v)
|
|
393 |
|| (recordVersion.major > ProtocolVersion.MAX.major)) {
|
|
394 |
throw new SSLException(
|
|
395 |
"Unsupported record version " + recordVersion);
|
|
396 |
}
|
|
397 |
|
|
398 |
/*
|
|
399 |
* Get and check length, then the data.
|
|
400 |
*/
|
|
401 |
int contentLen = ((buf[3] & 0x0ff) << 8) + (buf[4] & 0xff);
|
|
402 |
|
|
403 |
/*
|
|
404 |
* Check for upper bound.
|
|
405 |
*/
|
|
406 |
if (contentLen < 0 || contentLen > maxLargeRecordSize - headerSize) {
|
|
407 |
throw new SSLProtocolException("Bad InputRecord size"
|
|
408 |
+ ", count = " + contentLen
|
|
409 |
+ ", buf.length = " + buf.length);
|
|
410 |
}
|
|
411 |
|
|
412 |
/*
|
|
413 |
* Grow "buf" if needed. Since buf is maxRecordSize by default,
|
|
414 |
* this only occurs when we receive records which violate the
|
|
415 |
* SSL specification. This is a workaround for a Microsoft SSL bug.
|
|
416 |
*/
|
|
417 |
if (contentLen > buf.length - headerSize) {
|
|
418 |
byte[] newbuf = new byte[contentLen + headerSize];
|
|
419 |
System.arraycopy(buf, 0, newbuf, 0, headerSize);
|
|
420 |
buf = newbuf;
|
|
421 |
}
|
|
422 |
|
|
423 |
if (exlen < contentLen + headerSize) {
|
|
424 |
int really = readFully(
|
|
425 |
s, buf, exlen, contentLen + headerSize - exlen);
|
|
426 |
if (really < 0) {
|
|
427 |
throw new SSLException("SSL peer shut down incorrectly");
|
|
428 |
}
|
99
|
429 |
}
|
2
|
430 |
|
99
|
431 |
// now we've got a complete record.
|
|
432 |
count = contentLen + headerSize;
|
|
433 |
exlen = 0;
|
2
|
434 |
|
|
435 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("record")) {
|
|
436 |
if (count < 0 || count > (maxRecordSize - headerSize)) {
|
|
437 |
System.out.println(Thread.currentThread().getName()
|
|
438 |
+ ", Bad InputRecord size" + ", count = " + count);
|
|
439 |
}
|
|
440 |
System.out.println(Thread.currentThread().getName()
|
|
441 |
+ ", READ: " + recordVersion + " "
|
|
442 |
+ contentName(contentType()) + ", length = " + available());
|
|
443 |
}
|
|
444 |
/*
|
|
445 |
* then caller decrypts, verifies, and uncompresses
|
|
446 |
*/
|
|
447 |
}
|
|
448 |
|
|
449 |
/**
|
|
450 |
* Deal with unknown records. Called if the first data we read on this
|
|
451 |
* connection does not look like an SSL/TLS record. It could a SSLv2
|
|
452 |
* message, or just garbage.
|
|
453 |
*/
|
|
454 |
private void handleUnknownRecord(InputStream s, OutputStream o)
|
|
455 |
throws IOException {
|
|
456 |
/*
|
|
457 |
* No? Oh well; does it look like a V2 "ClientHello"?
|
|
458 |
* That'd be an unpadded handshake message; we don't
|
|
459 |
* bother checking length just now.
|
|
460 |
*/
|
|
461 |
if (((buf[0] & 0x080) != 0) && buf[2] == 1) {
|
|
462 |
/*
|
|
463 |
* if the user has disabled SSLv2Hello (using
|
|
464 |
* setEnabledProtocol) then throw an
|
|
465 |
* exception
|
|
466 |
*/
|
|
467 |
if (helloVersion != ProtocolVersion.SSL20Hello) {
|
|
468 |
throw new SSLHandshakeException("SSLv2Hello is disabled");
|
|
469 |
}
|
|
470 |
|
|
471 |
ProtocolVersion recordVersion =
|
|
472 |
ProtocolVersion.valueOf(buf[3], buf[4]);
|
|
473 |
|
|
474 |
if (recordVersion == ProtocolVersion.SSL20Hello) {
|
|
475 |
/*
|
|
476 |
* Looks like a V2 client hello, but not one saying
|
|
477 |
* "let's talk SSLv3". So we send an SSLv2 error
|
|
478 |
* message, one that's treated as fatal by clients.
|
|
479 |
* (Otherwise we'll hang.)
|
|
480 |
*/
|
|
481 |
try {
|
|
482 |
writeBuffer(o, v2NoCipher, 0, v2NoCipher.length);
|
|
483 |
} catch (Exception e) {
|
|
484 |
/* NOTHING */
|
|
485 |
}
|
|
486 |
throw new SSLException("Unsupported SSL v2.0 ClientHello");
|
|
487 |
}
|
|
488 |
|
|
489 |
/*
|
|
490 |
* If we can map this into a V3 ClientHello, read and
|
|
491 |
* hash the rest of the V2 handshake, turn it into a
|
|
492 |
* V3 ClientHello message, and pass it up.
|
|
493 |
*/
|
|
494 |
int len = ((buf[0] & 0x7f) << 8) +
|
|
495 |
(buf[1] & 0xff) - 3;
|
|
496 |
if (v2Buf == null) {
|
|
497 |
v2Buf = new byte[len];
|
|
498 |
}
|
|
499 |
if (exlen < len + headerSize) {
|
|
500 |
int really = readFully(
|
|
501 |
s, v2Buf, exlen - headerSize, len + headerSize - exlen);
|
|
502 |
if (really < 0) {
|
|
503 |
throw new EOFException("SSL peer shut down incorrectly");
|
|
504 |
}
|
99
|
505 |
}
|
2
|
506 |
|
99
|
507 |
// now we've got a complete record.
|
|
508 |
exlen = 0;
|
|
509 |
|
2
|
510 |
hashInternal(buf, 2, 3);
|
|
511 |
hashInternal(v2Buf, 0, len);
|
|
512 |
V2toV3ClientHello(v2Buf);
|
|
513 |
v2Buf = null;
|
|
514 |
lastHashed = count;
|
|
515 |
|
|
516 |
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("record")) {
|
|
517 |
System.out.println(
|
|
518 |
Thread.currentThread().getName()
|
|
519 |
+ ", READ: SSL v2, contentType = "
|
|
520 |
+ contentName(contentType())
|
|
521 |
+ ", translated length = " + available());
|
|
522 |
}
|
|
523 |
return;
|
|
524 |
|
|
525 |
} else {
|
|
526 |
/*
|
|
527 |
* Does it look like a V2 "ServerHello"?
|
|
528 |
*/
|
|
529 |
if (((buf [0] & 0x080) != 0) && buf [2] == 4) {
|
|
530 |
throw new SSLException(
|
|
531 |
"SSL V2.0 servers are not supported.");
|
|
532 |
}
|
|
533 |
|
|
534 |
/*
|
|
535 |
* If this is a V2 NoCipher message then this means
|
|
536 |
* the other server doesn't support V3. Otherwise, we just
|
|
537 |
* don't understand what it's saying.
|
|
538 |
*/
|
|
539 |
for (int i = 0; i < v2NoCipher.length; i++) {
|
|
540 |
if (buf[i] != v2NoCipher[i]) {
|
|
541 |
throw new SSLException(
|
|
542 |
"Unrecognized SSL message, plaintext connection?");
|
|
543 |
}
|
|
544 |
}
|
|
545 |
|
|
546 |
throw new SSLException("SSL V2.0 servers are not supported.");
|
|
547 |
}
|
|
548 |
}
|
|
549 |
|
|
550 |
/*
|
|
551 |
* Actually do the write here. For SSLEngine's HS data,
|
|
552 |
* we'll override this method and let it take the appropriate
|
|
553 |
* action.
|
|
554 |
*/
|
|
555 |
void writeBuffer(OutputStream s, byte [] buf, int off, int len)
|
|
556 |
throws IOException {
|
|
557 |
s.write(buf, 0, len);
|
|
558 |
s.flush();
|
|
559 |
}
|
|
560 |
|
|
561 |
/*
|
|
562 |
* Support "old" clients which are capable of SSL V3.0 protocol ... for
|
|
563 |
* example, Navigator 3.0 clients. The V2 message is in the header and
|
|
564 |
* the bytes passed as parameter. This routine translates the V2 message
|
|
565 |
* into an equivalent V3 one.
|
|
566 |
*/
|
|
567 |
private void V2toV3ClientHello(byte v2Msg []) throws SSLException
|
|
568 |
{
|
|
569 |
int i;
|
|
570 |
|
|
571 |
/*
|
|
572 |
* Build the first part of the V3 record header from the V2 one
|
|
573 |
* that's now buffered up. (Lengths are fixed up later).
|
|
574 |
*/
|
|
575 |
buf [0] = ct_handshake;
|
|
576 |
buf [1] = buf [3]; // V3.x
|
|
577 |
buf[2] = buf[4];
|
|
578 |
// header [3..4] for handshake message length
|
|
579 |
// count = 5;
|
|
580 |
|
|
581 |
/*
|
|
582 |
* Store the generic V3 handshake header: 4 bytes
|
|
583 |
*/
|
|
584 |
buf [5] = 1; // HandshakeMessage.ht_client_hello
|
|
585 |
// buf [6..8] for length of ClientHello (int24)
|
|
586 |
// count += 4;
|
|
587 |
|
|
588 |
/*
|
|
589 |
* ClientHello header starts with SSL version
|
|
590 |
*/
|
|
591 |
buf [9] = buf [1];
|
|
592 |
buf [10] = buf [2];
|
|
593 |
// count += 2;
|
|
594 |
count = 11;
|
|
595 |
|
|
596 |
/*
|
|
597 |
* Start parsing the V2 message ...
|
|
598 |
*/
|
|
599 |
int cipherSpecLen, sessionIdLen, nonceLen;
|
|
600 |
|
|
601 |
cipherSpecLen = ((v2Msg [0] & 0xff) << 8) + (v2Msg [1] & 0xff);
|
|
602 |
sessionIdLen = ((v2Msg [2] & 0xff) << 8) + (v2Msg [3] & 0xff);
|
|
603 |
nonceLen = ((v2Msg [4] & 0xff) << 8) + (v2Msg [5] & 0xff);
|
|
604 |
|
|
605 |
/*
|
|
606 |
* Copy Random value/nonce ... if less than the 32 bytes of
|
|
607 |
* a V3 "Random", right justify and zero pad to the left. Else
|
|
608 |
* just take the last 32 bytes.
|
|
609 |
*/
|
|
610 |
int offset = 6 + cipherSpecLen + sessionIdLen;
|
|
611 |
|
|
612 |
if (nonceLen < 32) {
|
|
613 |
for (i = 0; i < (32 - nonceLen); i++)
|
|
614 |
buf [count++] = 0;
|
|
615 |
System.arraycopy(v2Msg, offset, buf, count, nonceLen);
|
|
616 |
count += nonceLen;
|
|
617 |
} else {
|
|
618 |
System.arraycopy(v2Msg, offset + (nonceLen - 32),
|
|
619 |
buf, count, 32);
|
|
620 |
count += 32;
|
|
621 |
}
|
|
622 |
|
|
623 |
/*
|
|
624 |
* Copy Session ID (only one byte length!)
|
|
625 |
*/
|
|
626 |
offset -= sessionIdLen;
|
|
627 |
buf [count++] = (byte) sessionIdLen;
|
|
628 |
|
|
629 |
System.arraycopy(v2Msg, offset, buf, count, sessionIdLen);
|
|
630 |
count += sessionIdLen;
|
|
631 |
|
|
632 |
/*
|
|
633 |
* Copy and translate cipher suites ... V2 specs with first byte zero
|
|
634 |
* are really V3 specs (in the last 2 bytes), just copy those and drop
|
|
635 |
* the other ones. Preference order remains unchanged.
|
|
636 |
*
|
|
637 |
* Example: Netscape Navigator 3.0 (exportable) says:
|
|
638 |
*
|
|
639 |
* 0/3, SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
|
|
640 |
* 0/6, SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5
|
|
641 |
*
|
|
642 |
* Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0 (exportable) supports only
|
|
643 |
*
|
|
644 |
* 0/3, SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
|
|
645 |
*/
|
|
646 |
int j;
|
|
647 |
|
|
648 |
offset -= cipherSpecLen;
|
|
649 |
j = count + 2;
|
|
650 |
|
|
651 |
for (i = 0; i < cipherSpecLen; i += 3) {
|
|
652 |
if (v2Msg [offset + i] != 0)
|
|
653 |
continue;
|
|
654 |
buf [j++] = v2Msg [offset + i + 1];
|
|
655 |
buf [j++] = v2Msg [offset + i + 2];
|
|
656 |
}
|
|
657 |
|
|
658 |
j -= count + 2;
|
|
659 |
buf [count++] = (byte) (j >>> 8);
|
|
660 |
buf [count++] = (byte) j;
|
|
661 |
count += j;
|
|
662 |
|
|
663 |
/*
|
|
664 |
* Append compression methods (default/null only)
|
|
665 |
*/
|
|
666 |
buf [count++] = 1;
|
|
667 |
buf [count++] = 0; // Session.compression_null
|
|
668 |
|
|
669 |
/*
|
|
670 |
* Fill in lengths of the messages we synthesized (nested:
|
|
671 |
* V3 handshake message within V3 record) and then return
|
|
672 |
*/
|
|
673 |
buf [3] = (byte) (count - headerSize);
|
|
674 |
buf [4] = (byte) ((count - headerSize) >>> 8);
|
|
675 |
|
|
676 |
buf [headerSize + 1] = 0;
|
|
677 |
buf [headerSize + 2] = (byte) (((count - headerSize) - 4) >>> 8);
|
|
678 |
buf [headerSize + 3] = (byte) ((count - headerSize) - 4);
|
|
679 |
|
|
680 |
pos = headerSize;
|
|
681 |
}
|
|
682 |
|
|
683 |
/**
|
|
684 |
* Return a description for the given content type. This method should be
|
|
685 |
* in Record, but since that is an interface this is not possible.
|
|
686 |
* Called from InputRecord and OutputRecord.
|
|
687 |
*/
|
|
688 |
static String contentName(int contentType) {
|
|
689 |
switch (contentType) {
|
|
690 |
case ct_change_cipher_spec:
|
|
691 |
return "Change Cipher Spec";
|
|
692 |
case ct_alert:
|
|
693 |
return "Alert";
|
|
694 |
case ct_handshake:
|
|
695 |
return "Handshake";
|
|
696 |
case ct_application_data:
|
|
697 |
return "Application Data";
|
|
698 |
default:
|
|
699 |
return "contentType = " + contentType;
|
|
700 |
}
|
|
701 |
}
|
|
702 |
|
|
703 |
}
|